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Abstract	
	
I	argue	for	two	main	links	between	a	meaningful	life	and	an	integrated	one.	First,	if	
we	give	meaningfulness	its	proper	role	in	our	conceptions	of	happiness	and	morality,	
we	will	be	likely	to	be	less	pulled	in	different	directions	and	so	likely	to	be	more	
integrated.	Second,	if	we	are	integrated,	our	lives	will	be	more	meaningful.	
	
My	conclusions	largely	hinge	on	my	definition	of	a	meaningful	life	as	one	that	is	
effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	
for.	As	such,	a	meaningful	life	has	subjective	and	objective	aspects.	I	explain	that	
reflection	plays	a	central	role	in	this	conception	of	meaningfulness,	not	least	because	
it	is	often	the	spur	to	seeking	meaning	in	the	first	place.	I	defend	my	conception	of	
meaningfulness	against	other	alternatives.	
	
I	then	argue	that	reflective	beings	have	no	reason	to	pursue	a	happy	life	unless	their	
conception	of	happiness	embraces	meaningfulness	and	that	they	have	no	reason	to	
pursue	an	ethical	life	if	that	alienates	them	from	their	raison	d’etre.	This	leads	to	the	
first	of	my	main	conclusions:	that	if	meaningfulness	takes	its	proper	place	in	our	
conceptions	of	happiness	and	morality,	we	will	be	likely	to	be	less	pulled	in	different	
directions	and	so	likely	to	be	more	integrated.		
	
I	next	look	at	the	issue	from	the	other	direction:	to	what	extent	an	integrated	life	
contributes	to	a	meaningful	one.	I	examine	three	ways	a	life	can	be	integrated:	
integrating	one’s	agency,	integrating	oneself	and	integrating	with	one’s	world.	In	
each	case,	I	argue	that	integration	enables	us	to	understand	better	why	the	things	
we	care	for	matter	and	to	engage	more	effectively	in	promoting	their	wellbeing.	As	
such,	integration	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	
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1	
Introduction	
	
In	this	thesis,	I	argue	for	two	main	links	between	a	meaningful	life	and	an	integrated	
one.	First,	if	we	give	meaningfulness	its	proper	role	in	our	conceptions	of	happiness	
and	morality,	we	will	be	likely	to	be	less	pulled	in	different	directions	and	so	likely	to	
be	more	integrated.	Second,	if	we	are	integrated,	our	lives	will	be	more	meaningful.	
	
A	meaningful	life,	for	me,	is	one	that	is	effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	
which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	As	such,	a	meaningful	life	has	
subjective	aspects	–	in	that	we	care	for	things	and	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	do	
so.	It	also	has	objective	aspects	-	in	that	there	must	be	actually	be	reasons	for	the	
things	we	care	for	and	we	must	be	able	to	engage	effectively	with	them.	
	
Integration,	for	me,	is	creating	a	dynamic	harmony	of	diverse	elements	rather	than	
forcing	uniformity.	I	look	at	three	main	ways	that	a	person’s	life	can	be	brought	
together:	integration	of	agency,	integration	with	oneself	and	integration	with	one’s	
world.	I	argue	that	these	three	types	of	integration,	which	are	themselves	
connected,	contribute	to	leading	a	meaningful	life	because	they	enable	a	person	to	
see	why	she	cares	for	what	she	does	and	to	engage	effectively	in	what	she	cares	for.	
They	also	enhance	her	ability	to	feel	deeply	for	things.	
	
I	accept	that	my	definition	of	meaningfulness	is	by	no	means	the	only	one	that	could	
be	given	–	and	that	my	thesis	that	a	meaningful	life	is,	in	important	ways,	integrated	
largely	hinges	on	this	definition.	However,	I	seek	to	defend	my	particular	conception	
of	meaningfulness	not	merely	as	a	plausible	clarification	of	the	concept	but	also	as	a	
desirable	way	of	living.	My	main	basis	for	this	claim	is	an	argument	that	the	pursuit	
of	meaning	is	one	of	the	fundamental	sources	of	reasons	for	action.	Insofar	as	one	is	
a	reflective	being	exercising	one’s	capacity	to	reflect,	I	therefore	contend	one	should	
seek	a	meaningful	life.	
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Although	I	don’t	just	analyse	the	concept	of	meaningfulness,	I	do	engage	in	
conceptual	analysis.	In	particular,	I	aim	to	show	that	some	of	the	connections	I	draw	
between	meaningful	and	integrated	lives	are	conceptual,	rather	than	empirical	
generalisations.	These	conceptual	conceptions	are	often	in	the	form	of	what	
Wittgensteinians	call	“defeasible”	criteria.	The	prominent	Wittgensteinian,	Peter	
Hacker,	defines	criterion	as	follows:	“Unlike	inductive	evidence,	criterial	support	is	
determined	by	convention	and	is	partly	constitutive	of	the	meaning	of	the	
expression	for	whose	application	it	is	a	criterion.	Unlike	entailment,	criterial	support	
is	characteristically	defeasible.”	1	I	will	often	make	arguments	to	the	effect	that	two	
things	normally	or	typically	go	together,	but	that	this	normality	is	a	conceptual	
rather	than	an	empirical	link.	
	
Plan	of	thesis	
	
In	the	rest	of	this	chapter,	I	flesh	out	my	conception	of	meaningfulness.	I	explain:	my	
assumption	that	values	are	at	least	minimally	objective;	the	centrality	of	reflection;	
the	role	of	autonomy;	why	caring	is	important;	and	why	effective	engagement	
matters.	I	then	explain	in	more	detail	how	I	am	using	the	word	integration.	Finally,	I	
give	two	examples	of	people	who	have,	in	my	view,	led	paradigmatically	meaningful	
lives:	Socrates	and	Mohandas	Gandhi.		
	
The	rest	of	the	thesis	is	in	two	main	parts.	The	first,	covering	Chapters	2,	3	and	4,	
defends	the	conception	of	meaningfulness	I	have	chosen	and	spells	out	its	
connection	with	other	related	concepts.	In	Chapter	2,	I	defend	the	central	role	that	
reflection	plays	in	my	conception	of	a	meaningful	life.	I	argue	that	our	reflective	
nature	can	both	can	lead	us	to	worry	that	life	is	meaningless	and	prompt	us	to	seek	
meaning	in	our	lives.	In	Chapter	3,	I	consider	alternatives	to	my	contention	that	
meaningful	lives	add	up	both	subjectively	and	objectively.	I	question	the	coherence	
of	various	nihilistic,	theistic	and	voluntaristic	approaches.	In	Chapter	4,	I	argue	that	
we	have	no	reason	to	seek	a	happy	life	unless	our	conception	of	happiness	embraces	
																																																						
1	In	Honderich.	
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meaningfulness;	that	we	have	no	reason	to	pursue	an	ethical	life	if	that	alienates	us	
from	our	raison	d’etre;	and	that	it	is	legitimate	and	important	in	seeking	a	
meaningful	life	to	take	care	of	ourselves.	Looking	at	life	in	these	ways	will	lead	to	a	
less	fragmented	life.	This	is	the	first	way	in	which	I	argue	that	a	meaningful	life	is	
integrated.	It	is	part	of	the	answer	to	my	thesis	question:	to	what	extent	is	a	
meaningful	life	and	integrated	one?		
	
The	second	part	of	the	thesis,	Chapters	5,	6	and	7,	looks	at	the	question	from	the	
opposite	direction,	exploring	how	an	integrated	life	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	
Chapter	5	examines	the	integration	of	agency,	by	which	I	mean	the	alignment	of	
what	one	cares	for	with	one’s	principles,	values,	specific	judgments	and	actions.	
Chapter	6	looks	at	integration	of	oneself,	by	which	I	mean	mainly	the	alignment	of	
emotions,	memories,	purposes,	projects	and	plans.	Chapter	7	discusses	integration	
with	one’s	world,	by	which	I	mean	caring	for,	understanding	and	being	supported	by	
things	outside	oneself.	I	argue	that	integration	enhances	a	person’s	ability	to	makes	
sense	of	the	things	she	cares	for	and	engage	effectively	with	them	–	and,	as	such,	
contributes	to	the	meaningfulness	of	her	life.		
	
In	the	concluding	chapter,	Chapter	8,	I	show	how	the	different	types	of	integration	
reinforce	one	another.	The	integration	of	agency	and	integration	of	oneself	are	two	
aspects	of	the	integration	of	a	person;	and	the	integration	of	a	person	and	the	
integration	with	her	world	go	hand	in	hand,	as	we	are	creatures	that	cannot	be	
divorced	from	our	environment.	Somebody	who	is	integrated	in	this	way,	I	argue,	
will	have	a	meaningful	life.	
	
Meaning	of	meaningfulness	
	
It	is	important	to	distinguish	between	three	types	of	meaning:	semantic	meaning,	
existential	meaning	and	cosmic	meaning.	Semantic	meaning	concerns	the	meaning	
of	language.	Existential	meaning,	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	concerns	the	meaning	of	a	
life.	Cosmic	meaning	concerns	the	meaning	of	the	universe.	Although	these	are	
separate	concepts,	there	are	some	connections	between	them.	As	I	argue	in	the	next	
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chapter,	reflecting	on	our	smallness	in	the	context	of	the	vast	expanse	of	space	and	
time	can	be	a	fruitful	impetus	for	thinking	about	how	to	find	and	create	meaning	in	
our	lives.	Meanwhile,	although	a	meaningful	sentence	and	a	meaningful	life	aren’t	
the	same,	semantic	and	existential	meaning	share	concepts	such	as	intelligibility,	
interpretation	and	coherence.	Both	sentences	and	lives	can	be	intelligible,	
interpreted	and	coherent.		
	
My	definition	of	a	meaningful	life	is	one	effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	
which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	I	have	arrived	at	this	definition	
through	an	Aristotelian	endoxic	method:	considering	some	of	the	features	
meaningful	lives	are	commonly	thought	to	involve,	and	then	refining	them.	Aristotle	
explained	this	method	as	follows:	“We	must…	set	out	people’s	perceptions	and,	after	
first	discussing	the	problems,	go	on	to	prove,	if	possible,	the	truth	of	all	the	
reputable	opinions	about	these	phenomena	or,	failing	this,	of	the	greatest	number	
and	the	most	authoritative.”2		I	end	up	with	a	definition	which	isn’t	exactly	like	those	
used	by	others	but	which	still	bears	a	resemblance	to	common	usage	and	which	
helps	explain	why	wise	people	throughout	the	ages	have	often	thought	it	is	
important	for	humans	to	lead	meaningful	lives.	
	
My	definition	is	somewhat	similar	to	Aristotle’s	own	definition	of	a	good	life	
(εὐδαιμονία):	“The	human	good	turns	out	to	be	activity	of	soul	in	conformity	with	
virtue.”3	What’s	more,	in	the	passage	preceding	this,	he	talks	about	the	human’s	way	
of	life	as	being	“activity	of	soul	in	accordance	with	reason”.4	Of	course,	Aristotle	is	
defining	a	good	life	rather	than	a	meaningful	one.	But,	as	I	explain	in	Chapter	4,	if	we	
accept	that	an	important	element	of	a	good	life	for	a	reflective	being	is	that	it	should	
be	meaningful,	there	may	not	be	such	a	big	difference	between	the	two.	
	
Meanwhile,	Susan	Wolf	outlines	the	following	conception	of	meaningfulness:	“What	
is	valuable	is	that	one’s	life	be	actively	(and	lovingly)	engaged	in	projects	that	give	
																																																						
2	Aristotle	p134.	
3	Aristotle	p225.	
4	Aristotle	p225.	
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rise	to	[the]	feeling	[of	being	fulfilled],	when	the	projects	in	question	can	be	seen	to	
have	a	certain	kind	of	objective	worth.”	5		This	definition	is	also	similar	to	the	one	I	
am	using.	Wolf	further	argues	that	“meaning	arises	when	subjective	attraction	meets	
objective	attractiveness.”6	This,	too,	is	similar	to	my	contention	that	a	meaningful	life	
has	both	subjective	and	objective	aspects.	For	me,	the	subjective	aspects	are:	caring	
for	things,	and	being	able	to	see	we	have	reasons	to	do	so.	The	objective	aspects:	are	
there	actually	being	reasons	for	what	we	care	for,	and	being	able	to	engage	
effectively	with	them.		
	
Assumption	of	minimal	objectivity	
	
Both	Wolf’s	and	my	account	of	meaningfulness	assume	there	is	at	least	some	
minimal	objectivity	to	what	we	care	for.	In	Chapter	4,	I	explore	the	sources	of	
normativity.	But,	for	now,	I	just	wish	to	remark	that	we	can’t	have	good	reasons	to	
care	for	absolutely	anything.	Somebody	may	be	a	passionate	neo-Nazi	or	jihadist,	
but	that	won’t	mean	she	has	a	good	reason	to	drive	into	crowds	of	peaceful	people	
killing	them.	There	are	various	ways	of	considering	what	might	be	acceptable	
reasons,	but	I	think	the	most	promising	may	be	to	say	that	a	purely	private	reason	is	
not	a	genuine	one.	By	purely	private,	I	mean	a	reason	that	could	never	be	justified	in	
public,	not	one	that	just	happens	not	to	have	been	aired	in	public.	Kantians	such	as	
Christine	Korsgaard	take	a	similar	approach.7	
	
This	raises	the	further	question	of	what	determines	whether	a	public	reason	is	a	
good	one.	Mere	agreement	by	other	people	can’t	be	the	answer,	because	that	
would	leave	the	validity	of	reasons	to	the	whims	of	society.	Perhaps	we	need	a	wise	
person,	who	according	to	Aristotle	can	“deliberate	well…	about	what	sorts	of	things	
conduce	to	the	good	life”8,	to	advise	us.	Or	maybe	we	need	an	unbiased	process,	
such	as	John	Rawls’	community,	which	can	make	impartial	decisions	because	the	
																																																						
5	Wolf,	2010,	p27	.	
6	Wolf,	2010,	p9.	
7	Korsgaard,	1996,	pp136-145.	
8	Aristotle	p120.	
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agents	are	operating	behind	a	“veil	of	ignorance”	about	their	personal	
characteristics.9	Alternatively,	we	could	have	an	account	that	ultimately	grounds	
reasons	in	certain	features	of	human	nature	such	as	our	reflectiveness	and	
sociability.	In	this	thesis,	I	will	not	attempt	to	set	out,	let	alone	defend,	any	particular	
approach	to	value	objectivity.	I	just	note	that	my	argument	assumes	that	values	are	
objective	on	at	least	a	minimal	level.	
	
Centrality	of	reflection	
	
My	definition	of	meaningfulness	is	not	uncontentious.	There	are	rival	conceptions,	
which	suggest	either	that	what	the	subject	thinks	about	her	life	is	irrelevant	or	that	
objective	considerations	are	irrelevant.	I	consider	these	in	Chapter	3.	But	there	are	
differences	of	emphasis	even	among	those	who	think	a	meaningful	life	has	both	
subjective	and	objective	aspects.	I	particular,	I	stress	reflection	more	than	Wolf	does.	
Her	definition	merely	insists	that	the	projects	we	are	engaged	in	“can	be	seen”	as	
objectively	valuable	whereas	I	say	“we	can	see”	the	reasons	for	caring	for	them.	That	
said,	although	reflection	isn’t	centre-stage	in	her	account,	she	does	at	times	
acknowledge	its	importance.	For	example,	she	writes:	“‘fulfillment’	seems	to	me	to	
include	a	cognitive	component	that	requires	seeing	the	source	or	object	of	
fulfillment	as	being,	in	some	independent	way,	good	or	worthwhile.”10	
	
Reflection	plays	a	central	role	in	my	account	of	meaningfulness	for	two	reasons.	
First,	as	I	argue	in	the	next	chapter,	reflection	is	the	impetus	that	drives	some	people	
to	seek	meaning	in	their	lives.	Second,	for	somebody’s	life	to	make	sense	to	her,	she	
needs	to	find	it	intelligible	why	she	cares	for	what	she	does.	This	requires	reflection.	
Also,	without	thinking,	she	won’t	be	able	to	interpret	her	life	to	herself.	She	needs	to	
be	aware	of	what	she’s	doing	and	the	significance	of	what	she	is	doing.	In	other	
words,	concepts	such	as	sense,	intelligibility,	interpretation	and	significance	would	
have	no	place	in	a	meaningful	life	unless	that	life	was	also	a	reflective	one.	While	it	
may	be	possible	to	think	of	meaningfulness	without	these	concepts,	doing	so	would	
																																																						
9	Rawls	pp118-123.	
10	Wolf,	2010,	p24.	
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involve	severing	any	link	between	semantic	meaning	(where	sense,	intelligibility,	
interpretation	and	significance	play	an	essential	role)	and	existential	meaning.		
	
Some	philosophers	argue	that	it	is	mistaken	to	look	for	any	connection	between	
these	two	types	of	meaning.	For	example,	Antti	Kauppinen	says:	“Clearly,	life	doesn’t	
have	a	meaning	like	words	or	signs	do.	It	does	not	signify	anything,	and	it	would	be	
misleading	to	look	for	meaning	of	life	in	this	direction.”11	However,	others	such	as	
John	Cottingham,	agree	with	me.	He	writes:	“For	something	to	be	meaningful	to	an	
agent,	that	agent	must	interpret	it	or	construe	it	in	a	certain	way.”	12		
	
One	consequence	of	arguing	that	a	meaningful	life	has	to	involve	reflection	is	that	
creatures,	which	are	incapable	of	reflecting	about	their	lives,	cannot	have	
meaningful	ones.	Nor,	for	that	matter,	would	their	lives	be	meaningless.	The	concept	
just	doesn’t	apply	to	their	lives.	So	a	baby	doesn’t	have	a	meaningful	life,	though	she	
may	grow	into	having	one.	Nor	does	a	dog	or	a	monkey.	A	normal	adult	human,	by	
contrast,	can	have	a	life	that	is	more	or	less	meaningful	–	and	more	or	less	
meaningless.		
	
Role	of	autonomy	
	
Meaningful	lives	don’t	just	involve	reflection	–	or	thinking	for	oneself.	They	also	
involve	autonomy	–	or	deciding	and	choosing	for	oneself.	The	two	go	hand-in-hand.	
Somebody	who	cannot	or	will	not	reflect	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	decide	for	herself	
–	and	thereby	act	for	herself.	On	the	other	hand,	somebody	who	thinks	for	herself	
but	then	allows	somebody	else	to	decide	for	her	what	to	do	is	not	leading	a	
meaningful	life.	She	is	adopting	a	slave	mentality.		
	
Many	philosophers	accept	the	importance	of	autonomy	for	a	meaningful	life.	
Cottingham,	for	example,	argues	that	a	meaningful	life	“implies	an	agent’s	
																																																						
11	Kauppinen	pp352-353.	
12	Cottingham	p22.		
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involvement	in	projects	that	reflect	his	or	her	free	and	autonomous	choices.”13	Julian	
Baggini	writes:	“The	ability	to	choose	one’s	own	purposes	is	part	of	what	
distinguishes	what	Jean-Paul	Sartre	calls	a	conscious	‘being-for-itself’	from	an	
unconscious	‘being-in-itself.’”14		
	
It	might,	though,	be	argued	that	my	account	of	meaningfulness	fetishizes	autonomy.	
Why	couldn’t	somebody	have	a	perfectly	meaningful	life	by	joining	a	sect,	like	the	
Scientologists,	where	she	is	not	supposed	to	question	what	she	is	doing?	Couldn’t	
people	actually	have	a	more	meaningful	life	by	deferring	to	authority	rather	than	
trying	to	decide	how	to	live	for	themselves?	Isn’t	it	precisely	because	there	has	been	
such	a	decline	in	deference	since	the	Enlightenment	–	of	intellectuals	to	dogma,	
working	classes	to	the	aristocracy,	women	to	men,	young	to	the	old,	and	everybody	
to	God	–	that	the	West	is	now	witnessing	what	the	existential	psychotherapist	Irvin	
Yalom	describes	as	a	“malady	of	meaninglessness”?15	
	
My	answer	to	these	questions	is	that,	although	the	decline	of	deference	has	in	
practice	spawned	a	malady	of	meaninglessness,	it	doesn’t	have	to.	Autonomy,	as	I	
argue	in	Chapter	4,	doesn’t	have	to	lead	to	an	“anything	goes”	mentality.	The	
problem	we	face	at	this	moment	in	history	is,	therefore,	not	that	we	have	swept	
away	ignorance,	bigotry	and	oppression;	but	rather	that	we	have	not	adequately	
replaced	our	old	cultural	practices	with	new	meaningful	ones.		
	
That	said,	I	accept	that	people	can	have	lives	that	are	meaningful	up	to	a	point	if	
there	are	constraints	on	their	autonomy.	The	devout	believer	in	Scientology	can	
engage	in	meaningful	projects	and	have	meaningful	relationships.	But,	if	at	some	
point,	reflection	about	what	to	do	and	what	they	care	about	has	to	stop,	at	that	
point	their	ability	to	make	sense	of	their	lives	also	has	to	stop.	If	we	ask	them	“why	
do	you	do	that?”	and	they	reply	“that’s	what	Ron	Hubbard	says”,	the	intelligibility	of	
their	lives	has	reached	a	limit.	Meanwhile,	if	they	say	something	like	“I	don’t	
																																																						
13	Cottingham	p25.	
14	Baggini	p13.	
15	Yalom	p447.	
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question	the	rules	because	I	am	not	good	at	rule-making”,	we	could	sympathise	with	
the	answer	but	still	believe	that	their	lives	would	be	even	more	meaningful	if	they	
had	the	capacity	to	decide	for	themselves.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	most	
meaningful	life	has	to	involve	rejecting	our	culture.	If	we	consciously	buy	into	
traditions,	we	are	still	acting	autonomously.		
	
What	about	the	objection	that	I	too	am	guilty	of	belonging	to	a	sect,	the	“liberal”	
sect	that	values	autonomy?	Isn’t	this	just	as	parochial	a	position	as	that	of	the	
Scientologist?	Aren’t	I	just	as	much	brainwashed	by	my	culture	as	she	is?	My	answer	
is	that	my	approach	values	openness	–	in	particular,	reflecting	on	why	I	care	for	what	
I	do	care	for.	Often,	no	doubt,	I	will	in	practice	fail	to	be	sufficiently	open	to	
alternative	ways	of	creating	meaning	in	life,	but	this	is	not	a	structural	fault	in	my	
conception	of	meaningfulness.	Say	I	was	critical	of	polyamorous	marriages	without	
giving	much	thought	to	them.	That	could	well	be	parochial.	But	somebody	following	
my	conception	of	meaningfulness	should	be	open	to	reflecting	on	the	merits	of	such	
relationships	and	might,	then,	change	her	mind.	The	person	who	deals	with	
difference	by	reflecting	on	it	rather	than	dogmatically	insisting	on	her	point	of	view	
is	the	opposite	of	parochial.	
	
Importance	of	caring	
	
I	have	several	times	referred	to	the	importance	in	a	meaningful	life	of	caring	for	
things.	There	are	lots	of	things	we	can	care	about	that	contribute	to	a	meaningful	
life:	objects,	institutions,	causes,	nature,	animals	and,	above	all,	other	people	and	
ourselves.	In	talking	about	caring,	it	is	perhaps	most	natural	to	think	about	emotions.	
When	we	care	about	something,	we	have	positive	feelings	towards	it	and	negative	
feelings	towards	anything	that	might	damage	its	wellbeing.	Both	Harry	Frankfurt	and	
Wolf	emphasise	the	emotional	side	of	caring	and	the	essential	role	that	plays	in	
meaningful	lives,	arguing	that	when	you	act	because	you	care	about	something,	you	
are	acting	out	of	“reasons	of	love”.16	Wolf	adds	the	important	insight	that	loving	
																																																						
16	Frankfurt,	2004,	and	Wolf	2010,	p4.	
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something	also	gives	us	“reasons	to	live”17.	This	is	why	caring	is	so	important	for	
having	a	meaningful	life.	
	
In	my	mind,	though,	caring	is	not	just	a	feeling.	It	also	involves	thought	and	action.	
Reflection	enters	the	picture	in	two	ways:	we	think	about	what	is	good	for	the	thing	
we	care	about;	and	we	think	that	this	thing	is	important	for	us.	As	Frankfurt	puts	it:	
“Caring	about	something	makes	that	thing	important	to	the	person	who	cares	about	
it”.18	What’s	more,	in	caring,	you	are	prepared	to	act	to	advance	the	wellbeing	of	
what	you	care	about.	Caring	in	all	these	ways	is	constitutive	of	a	meaningful	life.	For	
example,	you	love	your	daughter,	you	realises	she’s	really	important	to	you,	you	
consider	what	is	good	for	her	and	you	are	prepared	to	make	sacrifices	on	her	behalf.	
You	both	have	reasons	to	engage	effectively	on	her	behalf	and	you	have	a	reason	to	
live.	
	
Why	effective	engagement	matters	
	
This	then	brings	me	to	the	third	aspect	of	my	definition	of	meaningfulness	–	
“effective	engagement”	in	things	one	cares	for.	There	are	two	parts	to	this:	
engagement	and	effectiveness.	If	one	is	merely	a	passive	observer,	one	is	not	
engaged	in	the	things	one	cares	for.	One	is	then	not	really	caring	for	them.	If	one	is	
engaged	but	totally	ineffective,	one	won’t	be	caring	for	them	either.	A	meaningful	
life,	therefore,	normally	has	to	have	some	chance	of	beneficial	impact.	Wolf	takes	a	
similar	line	saying	that	to	combat	the	feeling	that	life	is	meaningless	one	must	be	
“somewhat	successfully…	engaged	in	projects	of	independent	worth”19.		
	
One	doesn’t	strictly	speaking	need	to	succeed.	It	can	be	meaningful	to	strive	for	a	
noble	cause	against	the	odds,	even	if	one	ultimately	fails.	When	the	prize	is	big	
enough,	it	can	be	worth	putting	effort	into	attaining	it	even	if	the	chances	of	success	
are	slim.	One	can	imagine	abnormal	cases	where	the	most	meaningful	thing	is	to	
																																																						
17	Wolf,	2015,	191.	
18	Frankfurt,	1998b,	p92.	
19	Wolf,	2010,	p28.	
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fight	heroically	and	even	die	in	a	hopeless	struggle	because	one	really	doesn’t	have	
any	other	options	to	do	anything	more	valuable.	But,	in	most	normal	situations,	if	
there	was	zero	chance	of	success	and	there	was	no	consolation	prize	to	be	had	from	
fighting	valiantly	but	failing,	the	struggle	would	be	meaningless.	It	would	be	better	to	
devote	one’s	energies	to	something	else.		
	
Success	will	partly	be	down	to	how	effectively	one	deploys	one’s	talents	and	
energies.	This	is	why	it	is	important	if	one	is	seeking	a	meaningful	life	to	develop	
one’s	powers	and	marshal	them	effectively.	If	one	buries	one’s	talents	in	the	ground	
as	in	the	Biblical	parable20,	one	will	not	be	effectively	engaged	in	life.	Even	if	what	
one	wants	ends	up	happening,	by	luck,	this	will	not	be	the	result	of	one’s	own	
agency	and	will	not,	therefore,	contribute	to	a	meaningful	life.	The	connection	
between	a	meaningful	life	and	deploying	one’s	talents	is	therefore	not	an	empirical	
generalisation.	One	of	the	criteria	for	leading	a	meaningful	life,	albeit	one	defeasible	
by	bad	luck,	is	to	use	one’s	powers	effectively.	
	
Integration	as	dynamic	harmony	
	
Integration,	as	I	use	the	term,	is	creating	a	dynamic	harmony	of	diverse	elements.	I	
will	examine	integration	of	agency,	integration	of	oneself	and	integration	with	one’s	
world	in	future	chapters	–	and	argue	that	such	dynamic	harmony	contributes	to	
making	sense	of	the	things	one	cares	about	and	being	able	to	engage	effectively	with	
them.	In	this	way,	integration	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.		
	
This	clearly	is	not	the	only	way	of	understanding	the	concept.	Integration	can	mean	
fusion	that	leads	to	uniformity,	rigidity	and	stasis.	But	an	integrated	society	doesn’t	
have	to	be	like	the	one	Mao	Zedong	tried	to	impose	on	China,	where	everybody	was	
supposed	to	wear	the	same	clothes.	When	somebody	loves	another,	it	doesn’t	have	
to	involve	a	smooshing	together,	where	one	or	other	or	both	lose	their	identities.	
	
																																																						
20	The	Bible,	The	Gospel	according	to	Matthew,	Chapter	25,	verses	14-30.	
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The	word	harmony	derives	from	the	Ancient	Greek	verb	ἁρμόζω,	which	means	to	fit	
together	or	join.	Two	musical	notes	don’t	need	to	be	the	same	to	be	in	harmony.	In	
fact,	if	the	two	are	the	same,	although	you	won’t	have	a	clash,	you	won’t	have	
harmony	either.	You’ll	have	a	monotone.	Or	consider	the	Chinese	notion	of	yin	and	
yang.	They	are	considered	complementary	not	opposing	forces,	which	create	a	
dynamic	system	where	the	whole	is	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts.	The	pictorial	
representation	of	yin-yang	has	teardrop	shapes,	with	the	black	and	white	colours	
reversed,	that	fit	together	in	a	circle. Or	take	a	dovetail	joint	in	carpentry.	One	plank	
has	“tails”,	the	other	“pins”.	They	fit	together	to	form	a	strong	bond.	If	both	planks	
had	uniform	right-angled	teeth,	they	would	pull	apart	easily.	If	they	both	had	plane	
edges,	they	wouldn’t	hold	together	at	all. The	union	of	a	couple	doesn’t	imply	
uniformity	either.	It	involves	creativity	and	interplay.	You	can	dance	by	yourself.	But	
there’s	normally	more	joy	dancing	with	another.	There’s	tension	that	comes	from	
being	unsure	how	the	other	will	move.	She	may	inspire	you	to	move	in	ways	you	
hadn’t	imagined.	Of	course,	you	can	be	a	creative	solo	dancer	too	–	but	even	that	
involves	the	interplay	of	different	parts	of	yourself. 
	
The	harmony	I	have	outlined	typically	involves	reflection.	We	think	about	how	we	
relate	to	ourselves	and	to	others	in	order	to	integrate.	It	is	also	dynamic	because	we	
don’t	reach	a	final	end	point,	except	in	death	or	perhaps	dementia.	Any	equilibrium	
is	a	temporary	one.	In	response	to	changes	in	our	environment	or	within	ourselves,	
we	need	to	reflect	again	on	how	to	reach	a	new	harmony.	In	other	words,	
integration	is	a	process.	And	for	this	to	result	in	a	meaningful	life,	the	process	should	
be	guided	by	truthful	inquiry	and	openness.	If	the	inquiry	–	whether	reflecting	on	
one’s	own	or	in	dialogue	with	others	-	isn’t	truthful,	one’s	life	will	be	based	on	
dishonesty.	Although	one	may	dupe	oneself	that	one	has	reasons	to	care	for	the	
things	one	does,	one	won’t	really	have	reasons	to	do	so.	
	
Openness	means	revealing	oneself	to	others,	as	well	as	oneself,	and	being	open	to	
learning	from	them.	It	means	being	able	to	see	something	from	the	other’s	
perspective	–	and	then	integrating	what	is	good	from	her	perspective	with	one’s	
own.	That,	in	turn,	means	being	prepared	to	change	rather	than	being	frozen	in	
	 18	
one’s	ways.	Cottingham	makes	a	similar	point:	“A	truly	meaningful	life	as	a	human	
being	can	be	achieved	only	by	ones	whose	pattern	of	living	is	in	a	certain	sense	open	
rather	than	closed;	that	is,	whose	fundamental	dispositions	are	structured	in	such	a	
way	as	not	to	foreclose	the	possibility	of	genuine	emotional	interaction	and	genuine	
critical	dialogue	with	their	fellows.”	21		
	
One	objection	to	this	argument	could	be	that	it	is	unrealistic	or	unhealthy	to	expect	
people	to	open	up	fully,	either	to	others	or	to	themselves.	People	sensibly	put	up	
barriers	to	others	because	they	are	afraid	of	getting	hurt.	They	shut	off	parts	of	
themselves,	after	traumas,	as	well	as	less	wounding	experiences.	Many	people	also	
live	double	lives.	Consider	a	gay	person	in	some	countries.	If	he	is	open	about	his	
sexuality,	he	will	be	persecuted.	But	such	compartmentalisation	is	a	second-best	
option,	not	the	ideal.	It	would	be	better	if	the	country	didn’t	persecute	gays	in	the	
first	place.	People	are	forced	to	defend	themselves	from	others	–	and	indeed	from	
themselves	–	because	they	lack	trust.	If	one	was	not	at	risk	of	being	persecuted	by	
others	(or	by	oneself),	it	would	be	better	to	open	up	and	integrate.	Trauma	victims	
are	healthier	if	they	can	gradually	come	to	terms	with	what	they	suffered	rather	
than	live	in	denial.	Most	gay	people	find	it	is	a	huge	relief	if	they	can	come	out	rather	
than	live	in	the	closet.	As	I	argue	in	Chapter	7,	we	have	more	meaningful	
relationships	with	lovers	if	we	let	them	into	our	inner	world	–	while	at	the	same	time	
recognising	that	we	are	autonomous	and	need	our	private	zones.	I	will	also	argue	in	
Chapter	5	that	radical	fragmentation	militates	against	a	person’s	ability	to	engage	
effectively	in	what	she	cares	about.	
	
Gradations	of	meaning	
	
Human	lives	are	rarely	fully	meaningful	or	totally	meaningless.	Rather,	they	lie	
somewhere	in	between.	They	are	somewhat	meaningful,	very	meaningful,	largely	
meaningless	and	so	forth.	This	gradation	goes	too	for	the	main	ingredients	of	
meaningfulness.	People	can	reflect	more	or	less	deeply	on	what	they	care	for,	they	
																																																						
21	Cottingham	p29.	
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can	be	more	or	less	autonomous	in	their	choices,	they	can	care	for	things	
passionately	or	not	so	passionately,	and	they	can	be	more	or	less	effectively	engaged	
with	these	things.	Similarly,	lives	can	be	more	or	less	integrated.	A	person’s	actions,	
principles,	specific	judgments	and	what	she	cares	for	can	match	one	another,	more	
or	less.	She	can	be	more	or	less	in	touch	with	her	emotions	and	her	past,	and	more	
or	less	connected	with	the	world	around	her.	
	
It	is	also	possible	for	somebody’s	life	to	be	more	meaningful	in	one	dimension	(say,	
felling	passionately	for	things)	than	in	another	(say,	actually	advancing	the	well-being	
of	what	she	cares	for).	Similarly,	her	life	can	be	more	integrated	in	one	dimension	
(say,	aligning	her	principles	and	her	actions)	than	in	another	(say,	being	in	touch	with	
her	emotions).	It	may	also	be	the	case	that	in	a	world	where	people	have	limited	
time	and	other	resources,	there	are	trade-offs	between	different	dimensions	of	
meaningfulness	and	integration.	For	example,	time	spent	on	examining	one’s	life	
may	detract	from	one’s	ability	to	spend	time	fighting	for	those	one	loves;	or	money	
spent	improving	one’s	intellect	(say,	on	a	philosophy	course)	could	instead	be	spent	
sorting	out	one’s	emotional	life	(say,	by	seeing	a	shrink).	On	the	other	hand,	we	
shouldn’t	assume	there	will	always	be	trade-offs.	Progress	in	one	dimension	of	
meaningfulness	(say,	understanding	why	one	cares	for	something)	may	enhance	
progress	in	another	dimension	(say,	one’s	ability	to	improve	its	wellbeing).	
	
Socrates	and	Gandhi	
	
Throughout	this	thesis,	I	will	refer	to	Socrates	and	Gandhi	as	examples	of	people	
who	led	meaningful	lives.	I	do	not	mean	they	were	perfect,	or	that	one	can’t	have	a	
meaningful	life	unless	one	is	a	Socrates	or	Gandhi.	Rather,	I	take	it	that,	their	lives	
were	especially	meaningful.	In	particular,	they	were	engaged	in	things	they	had	
reason	to	care	about,	they	reflected	deeply	on	life	and	they	had	a	high	impact	with	
their	actions.	What’s	more,	their	agency	was	integrated	in	that	their	actions	and	
principles	were	aligned.	
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Socrates	cared	for	several	things	he	had	good	reason	to	value:	wisdom,	living	a	
virtuous	life	and	examining	life.	His	dictum	–	“the	unexamined	life	is	not	worth	
living”-	could	even	be	rephrased	as	“the	unexamined	life	is	not	meaningful”.	
Socrates	was	famous	for	his	moral	fibre.	Deep	soul-searching	was	presumably	one	
reason	he	developed	such	a	strong	set	of	principles.	What’s	more,	he	didn’t	just	
espouse	principles.	He	lived	by	them.	He	even	died	by	them	–	choosing	to	ask	for	a	
pension	after	he	was	found	guilty	instead	of	suggesting	a	lesser	punishment	than	the	
death	penalty	proposed	by	his	accusers,	and	drinking	the	hemlock	rather	than	
running	away	ignobly	into	exile.	This	showed	that	he	really	valued	his	principles;	he	
didn’t	just	pay	them	lip	service.	If	he	had	fled,	as	his	friends	urged,	that	would	have	
undermined	the	meaning	of	his	life.22	Socrates	also	had	a	huge	impact	on	the	world	
–	partly	because	of	his	teachings,	partly	because	of	his	method	of	inquiry	and	partly	
because	of	the	example	he	set.	Not	only	did	Socrates	have	an	influence	on	his	
immediate	circle	including	Plato	and,	via	him,	Aristotle.	He	has	been	an	inspiration	to	
Western	philosophers,	and	many	people	who	aren’t	philosophers,	for	two	and	a	half	
thousand	years.	
	
There	are	some	similarities	in	Gandhi’s	life.	He	too	had	good	reasons	to	care	for	the	
things	he	devoted	his	life	to:	nonviolent	struggle	and	Indian	independence.	One	of	
his	key	principles	was	Satyagraha,	normally	translated	as	“nonviolent	struggle”	but	
whose	etymological	meaning	is	“truth	force”	–	which	I	interpret	as	meaning	that	if	
you	are	honest	to	yourself,	truthful	to	others	and	realistic	about	the	political	
situation,	you	can	make	the	world	more	just	without	destroying	a	lot	of	things	in	the	
process.	Gandhi,	too,	was	known	for	his	moral	fibre.	As	he	developed	his	philosophy,	
Gandhi	tried	to	be	honest	with	himself	about	his	feelings	and	motivations	–	setting	
out	some	of	his	thoughts	in	his	revealing	and	aptly	titled	autobiography	“The	Story	of	
my	experiments	with	truth.”23	His	integrity	was	a	function	of	his	soul-searching.	
What’s	more,	he	had	the	courage	of	his	convictions.	Nonviolent	struggle	didn’t	mean	
shirking	from	confrontation	–	either	with	his	supporters	or	the	British	occupiers.	
																																																						
22	See	Plato’s	Apology	for	Socrates’	trial	and	Plato’s	Crito	for	his	explanation	of	why	
Socrates	would	not	flee	into	exile.	
23	Gandhi,	An	Autobiography	–	or	The	Story	of	my	experiments	with	truth.	
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Witness	his	multiple	hunger	strikes.	Again	and	again,	he	put	himself	in	danger	for	his	
beliefs.	He	was	eventually	assassinated.	Finally,	Gandhi	had	high	impact.	Not	only	did	
he	actually	help	achieve	Indian	independence,	he	has	been	an	inspiration	to	political	
activists	elsewhere	including	Martin	Luther	King,	Nelson	Mandela	and	Aung	San	Suu	
Kyi.	
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2	
Reflectiveness	and	the	pursuit	of	meaning	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	I	defined	meaningfulness	as	being	effectively	engaged	in	things	
we	care	for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	I	further	argued	that	the	
insistence	on	being	able	to	see	the	reasons	we	have	for	caring	for	things	meant	that	
meaningful	lives	have	to	be	intelligible	to	the	people	living	them,	and	that	this	means	
we	have	to	be	able	to	reflect	on	our	lives	and	what	we	care	for.		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	look	at	how	reflectiveness	provides	the	impetus	to	pursue	a	
meaningful	life	in	the	first	place.	I	start	by	arguing	that	our	reflective	capacity	is	a	
distinctive	and	important	feature	of	our	humanity.	I	then	explain	how	reflection	can	
lead	to	the	conclusion	that	life	is	unavoidably	meaningless.	This	typically	stems	from	
taking	a	“cosmic”	perspective	on	life’s	meaning.	After	dismissing	this	perspective	as	
incoherent,	I	look	at	its	polar	opposite	–	what	I	call	the	“egoism	of	the	moment”	or	
the	view	that	life	can	be	meaningful	if	we	care	only	about	ourselves	in	the	here	and	
now.	I	dismiss	this	too	as	incoherent	and	advocate	a	middle	position,	which	involves	
connecting	over	space	and	time.	I	end	by	considering	some	objections	to	the	view	
that	we	should	reflect	at	all.	While	I	accept	that	we	shouldn’t	fetishize	reflection,	I	
defend	the	view	that	it	plays	an	important	role	in	a	meaningful	life.	I	also	suggest	
that	we	should	seek	to	lead	such	lives	–	an	argument	I	develop	more	fully	in	Chapter	
4.	
	
Reflection	is	a	distinctive	and	important	feature	of	human	nature	
	
Humans	are	not	just	determined	by	instinct.	We	have	big	brains,	which	allow	us	to	
figure	out	what	to	do.	As	generations	of	humans	have	figured	out	what	seems	to	
work	well,	this	has	been	codified	in	culture.	Our	intellect	can	be	used	not	just	to	
determine	suitable	means	to	an	end,	but	also	to	question	the	ends	that	our	instincts	
and	our	culture	provide	for	us.	This	ability	to	step	back	and	think	about	things	is	
what	I	mean	by	reflection.	It	is	closely	linked	to	self-consciousness,	our	awareness	of	
ourselves.	It	is	also	closely	linked	to	rationality:	often,	when	we	reflect,	we	are	
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looking	for	reasons	to	believe	this	or	do	that,	although	we	can	sometimes	just	let	our	
minds	wander,	something	which	is	normally	not	considered	part	of	rationality.	
	
Philosophers	who	otherwise	have	somewhat	different	perspectives	agree	that	this	
capacity	to	step	back	and	take	a	view	on	whether	we	buy	into	our	desires	and	
instincts	is	important.	Frankfurt	calls	it	our	ability	to	form	“second-order	desires”24.	
Charles	Taylor	terms	this	our	ability	to	be	a	“strong	evaluator”,	classifying	desires	
into	categories	such	as	virtuous	or	vicious	rather	than	merely	deciding	how	best	to	
satisfy	them.25	It’s	also	what	makes	us	like	John	McDowell’s	“rational	wolf”,	which	is	
wondering	whether	to	follow	his	nature	and	pull	his	weight	by	hunting	with	the	pack	
or	whether	to	“idle	through	the	hunt	but	still	grab	his	share	of	the	prey”.26	We	have	
the	capacity	to	question	what	we	should	care	for	and	what	we	should	do	-	and	even	
whether	we	should	care	for	or	do	anything	at	all.		
	
We	reflect	about	a	lot	of	things.	For	example,	we	can	consider	what	we	should	eat	
for	dinner,	whether	we	would	prefer	to	go	for	a	swim	or	do	yoga,	whether	we	should	
get	married	and	even	whether	we	should	commit	suicide.	There	is	a	spectrum	of	
reflection	–	from	the	more	practical	to	the	more	existential.	But	there’s	no	hard	and	
fast	line	between	the	practical	and	existential.	Even	reflection	about	seemingly	small	
practical	matters,	such	as	what	to	eat,	involves	deciding	what	we	care	about.	
However,	as	I	argue	in	Chapter	4,	on	similar	lines	to	Korsgaard27,	it	is	our	ability	to	
reflect	on	existential	questions,	which	is	the	ultimate	source	of	normativity	–	and	
this	is	one	of	the	reasons	it	is	a	particular	important	feature	of	human	nature.		
	
Cosmic	perspective	on	meaningful	lives	is	incoherent	
	
When	we	don’t	just	take	a	bit	of	distance	from	ourselves	but	go	the	whole	hog	and	
take	a	cosmic	perspective	on	life,	this	can	cause	giddiness.	We	seem	so	small	
																																																						
24	Frankfurt,	1998a,	p12.	
25	Charles	Taylor,	1982,	p112.	
26	McDowell	p171.	
27	Korsgaard,	1996.	
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compared	to	the	vast	expanse	of	space;	and	our	life	seems	so	short	compared	to	the	
vast	expanse	of	eternity.	Taking	this	perspective	can	lead	us	to	think	life	is	
meaningless	–	or,	as	some	philosophers	say,	“absurd”.		
	
Leo	Tolstoy,	in	his	autobiography,	provides	a	good	description	of	how	this	can	
happen:	“My	question,	the	one	that	brought	me	to	the	point	of	suicide	when	I	was	
fifty	years	old,	was	a	most	simple	one	that	lies	in	the	soul	of	every	person,	from	a	
silly	child	to	a	wise	old	man.	It	is	the	question	without	which	life	is	impossible,	as	I	
had	learnt	from	experience.	It	is	this:	what	will	come	of	what	I	do	today	or	
tomorrow?	What	will	come	of	my	entire	life?	Expressed	another	way	the	question	
can	be	put	like	this:	why	do	I	live?	Why	do	I	wish	for	anything,	or	do	anything?	Or	
expressed	another	way:	is	there	any	meaning	in	my	life	that	will	not	be	annihilated	
by	the	inevitability	of	death	which	awaits	me?”28		
	
Existentialist	philosophers	were	much	exercised	by	the	problem	of	life’s	meaning.	A	
classic	text,	Albert	Camus’	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	opens	with	the	sentence:	“There	is	
but	one	truly	serious	philosophical	problem	and	that	is	suicide.”29	Among	
contemporary	philosophers,	Thomas	Nagel	has	explored	the	problem	extensively	–	
both	in	a	series	of	essays	collected	in	the	volume	Mortal	Questions30	and	in	a	later	
book,	The	View	from	Nowhere31.	He	writes:	“In	seeing	ourselves	from	outside	we	
find	it	difficult	to	take	our	lives	seriously.	This	loss	of	conviction,	and	the	attempt	to	
regain	it,	is	the	problem	of	the	meaning	of	life.”32	
	
Camus	and	Nagel	have	a	similar	diagnosis	of	the	source	of	the	problem:	reason,	
according	to	the	French	existentialist,	and	self-consciousness,	according	to	the	
American.	Camus	writes:	“If	I	were	a	tree	among	trees,	a	cat	among	animals,	this	life	
would	have	a	meaning	or	rather	this	problem	would	not	arise,	for	I	should	belong	to	
																																																						
28	Tolstoy	pp34-35.	
29	Camus	p11.	
30	Nagel,	Mortal	Questions.		
31	Nagel,The	View	from	Nowhere.	
32	Nagel,	1986,	p214.		
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this	world.”33	Nagel	says	that	“humans	have	the	special	capacity	to	step	back	and	
survey	themselves,	and	the	lives	to	which	they	are	committed,	with	that	detached	
amazement	which	comes	from	watching	an	ant	struggle	up	a	heap	of	sand.”34	He	
contrasts	this	human	capacity	with	that	of	other	creatures.	“Why	is	the	life	of	a	
mouse	not	absurd?...	Because	he	lacks	the	capacities	for	self-consciousness	and	self-
transcendence	that	would	enable	him	to	see	that	he	is	only	a	mouse.”35		
	
Although	Camus	and	Nagel	have	similar	diagnoses,	they	have	different	solutions	to	
meaninglessness,	with	the	French	philosopher	advocating	scorn36	and	the	American	
suggesting	irony.	In	what	follows,	I	will	focus	on	Nagel’s	arguments.	His	diagnosis	of	
the	source	of	the	problem,	in	self-consciousness,	is	correct.	But	his	conclusion	that	
“there	is	no	escape	from	alienation	or	conflict	of	one	kind	or	another”37	is	based	on	
the	error	of	assuming	that	the	cosmic	perspective	on	a	meaningful	life	is	a	coherent	
one.	This	involves	ripping	words	like	“meaning”	and	“importance”	out	of	the	context	
where	they	have	semantic	meaning.	
	
Nagel’s	use	of	the	wonderful	phrase	“the	view	from	nowhere”	hints	that	the	cosmic	
perspective	may	not	really	be	a	view	at	all.	After	all,	how	can	you	have	a	view	from	
nowhere?	But	ultimately	he	can’t	rid	himself	fully	of	the	illusion	that	the	cosmic	
perspective	on	a	meaningful	life	is	a	coherent	one	–	and	like	Wittgenstein’s	fly	he	
remains	trapped	in	a	fly-bottle.38		
	
Consider,	for	example,	Nagel’s	contention	that	one	thing	that	“emerges	from	an	
objective	view	of	my	birth	is	its	unimportance.”39	What	does	it	mean	to	say	
something	is	important?	As	argued	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	concepts	of	
importance	and	caring	are	intimately	linked:	things	can	only	be	important	in	the	
																																																						
33	Camus	p46.	
34	Nagel,	1979,	p	15.	
35	Nagel	,1979,	p21.	
36	Camus,	pp97-98.	
37	Nagel,	1986,	p221.	
38	Wittgenstein,	Section	309,	p110.	
39	Nagel,	1986,	p213.	
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context	of	beings	that	care	about	something.	My	birth	can	be	important	to	me.	It	can	
also	be	important	from	the	point	of	view	of	other	beings	that	care:	say	my	parents,	
children	or	colleagues.	If	I	have	a	really	meaningful	life,	like	Socrates	or	Gandhi,	my	
birth	can	be	important	even	if	we	take	a	very	distant	vantage	point	–	say	the	
perspective	of	all	of	21st	Century	humanity.	But	from	the	cosmic	perspective,	the	
view	from	nowhere	–	or	perhaps	we	should	say	“the	view	from	nobody”,	where	
there’s	nobody	to	care	about	anything	-	the	term	“important”	doesn’t	have	any	use.	
My	birth	isn’t	important	from	that	perspective,	but	it’s	not	unimportant	either.	
	
To	dramatise	his	view	from	nowhere,	Nagel	introduces	a	“visitor	from	outer	space”,	
for	whom	our	lives	are	assumed	to	be	unimportant.40	This	device	betrays	the	
incoherence	of	his	account.	As	soon	as	we	have	a	visitor	from	outer	space,	we	do	
indeed	have	a	point	of	view.	But	we	can	no	longer	conclude	that	our	lives	have	no	
importance	for	her.	Why	shouldn’t	they,	especially	if	she	can	find	a	way	of	reaching	
out	to	us?	Science	fiction	is	full	of	stories	of	creatures	from	other	galaxies	mattering	
to	one	another	–	in	either	good	or	bad	ways.	Meanwhile,	if	we	posit	a	God,	who	can	
be	seen	as	a	sort	of	supernatural	visitor	from	outer	space,	there	is	no	problem	at	all	
thinking	our	lives	could	matter	to	her.	Indeed,	she	could	be	holding	us	in	her	mind	
the	whole	time.	Nagel’s	idea	that	our	lives	don’t	matter	from	the	cosmic	perspective	
only	has	plausibility	if	there’s	no	being	at	all	considering	us	from	that	point	of	view.	
But,	if	that	is	so,	there	is	no	view	either.	The	concepts	of	importance,	caring	and	
meaning	are	then	out	of	place.	While	it’s	true	that	from	the	cosmic	point	of	view	life	
isn’t	meaningful,	it	isn’t	meaningless	either.		
	
Nagel	gives	short	shrift	to	this	sort	of	critique.	He	says	the	history	of	philosophy	is	
the	“continual	discovery	of	problems	that	baffle	existing	concepts”	and	that	to	the	
extent	that	“no-nonsense	theories	have	an	effect,	they	merely	threaten	to	
impoverish	the	intellectual	landscape	for	a	while	by	inhibiting	the	serious	expression	
of	certain	questions.”41	But	Nagel	protests	too	much.	Pointing	out	the	incoherence	
of	the	cosmic	perspective	on	meaningful	lives	doesn’t	mean	we	have	to	abandon	the	
																																																						
40	Nagel,	1986,	p216.	
41	Nagel,	1986,	p11.	
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pursuit	of	meaning	in	our	lives.	Nor	does	it	mean	we	have	to	go	to	the	other	extreme	
and	look	at	our	lives	only	from	the	perspective	of	“me”	and	“now”.	Indeed,	Nagel	
himself	makes	clear	that	there	aren’t	just	two	perspectives:	“The	distinction	
between	more	subjective	and	more	objective	views	is	really	a	matter	of	degree,	and	
it	covers	a	wide	spectrum.”42	So	in	grappling	with	the	issue	of	how	to	lead	
meaningful	lives,	we	can	fruitfully	look	at	our	lives	from	the	outside	-	from	
perspectives	where	words	like	“meaning”	and	“importance”	have	semantic	meaning	
–	without	zooming	off,	like	Buzz	Lightyear	in	Disney’s	Toy	Story,	to	Infinity	and	
Beyond.	
	
Egoism	of	the	moment	is	incoherent	as	a	perspective	on	meaning	
	
If	it	is	incoherent	to	look	for	meaning	in	our	lives	from	a	cosmic	perspective,	what	
about	the	opposite	extreme:	looking	for	meaning	in	the	here	and	now	without	any	
consideration	of	the	spatial-temporal	context?	I	will	call	this	perspective	the	egoism	
of	the	moment.	The	only	thing	an	egoist	cares	for	is	herself.	She	doesn’t	care	for	
other	people,	other	beings	or	the	world	around	her.	If	we	add	that	she	only	cares	for	
what	happens	now	–	and	doesn’t	care	for	either	the	past	or	the	future	–	we	have	the	
egoism	of	the	moment.	At	the	level	of	what	matters,	this	can	be	seen	as	parallel	to	
what	could	be	called	the	solipsism	of	the	moment:	the	theory	that	the	only	thing	
that	exists	is	me	in	the	here	and	now.	
	
I	am	not	going	to	explore	whether	solipsism	is	a	coherent	point	of	view,	although	I	
doubt	it	is.	What	I	am	going	to	argue	is	that	a	person	cannot	have	a	meaningful	life	if	
she	is	radically	wedded	to	the	egoism	of	the	moment.	This	is	because	she	will	not	be	
able	to	care	for	anything.	She	will	be	unable	to	have	rich	emotions,	understand	why	
things	matter	or	be	effectively	engaged	with	anything,	even	herself.		
	
But	first	I	wish	to	distinguish	two	types	of	egoist	of	the	moment.	The	most	radical	
really	doesn’t	care	for	anything	beyond	herself	in	the	here	and	now,	either	because	
																																																						
42	Nagel,	1986,	p5.		
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she	doesn’t	want	to	or	because	she	lacks	the	capacity	to.	The	less	radical	does	care	
for	other	things	but	not	in	themselves.	She	only	cares	for	other	things	
instrumentally,	insofar	as	they	advance	her	wellbeing	in	the	here	and	now.	I	am	not	
seeking	to	prove	here	that	this	less	radical	type	of	egoist	cannot	have	a	meaningful	
life,	although	in	future	chapters	I	will	aim	to	show	that	being	deeply	connected	to	
oneself,	other	people	and	one’s	world	typically	leads	to	a	more	meaningful	life.	My	
target	in	this	chapter	is	the	polar	opposite	of	the	cosmic	perspective,	the	person	who	
is	so	totally	concerned	with	herself	in	the	here	and	now	that	she	is	radically	
disconnected	from	her	past,	her	future	and	her	world.	My	aim	is	to	show	that,	to	
have	a	meaningful	life,	she	has	to	be	at	least	to	some	extent	connected	in	space	and	
time.	
	
Our	radical	egoist,	by	definition,	does	not	care	for	anything	beyond	herself.	She	
doesn’t	care	for	her	family,	friends,	material	possessions	and	environment	–	not	
even	instrumentally	as	a	means	to	her	own	wellbeing.	But	now	imagine	that	her	
children	and	husband	are	killed,	her	friends	are	put	into	prison,	she	loses	all	her	
property	and	her	neighbourhood	is	destroyed	in	a	Biblical	flood.	Since	these	things	
are	beyond	the	bounds	of	her	self,	she	doesn’t	care.	By	definition,	our	radical	egoist	
of	the	moment	also	only	cares	for	the	present.	Because	she	doesn’t	care	for	the	
future,	she	doesn’t	have	any	purposes,	projects	or	plans	–	either	for	herself	or	for	
anyone	else.	Nor	does	she	have	any	emotions	that	relate	to	the	future,	such	as	fear	
or	hope.	She	doesn’t	worry,	for	example,	that	she	might	die	or	suffer	pain.	If	she	did,	
she	would	then	be	caring	about	the	future.	Meanwhile,	because	she	is	indifferent	to	
the	past,	history	doesn’t	matter	either.	She	doesn’t	feel	emotions	that	relate	to	the	
past	such	as	pride	and	shame.	She	doesn’t	care	for	either	her	own	history	or	
anybody	else’s.	A	girl	comes	to	her	in	agony;	it’s	her	daughter;	but	the	fact	that	she	
gave	birth	to	her,	suckled	her	and	brought	her	up	is	irrelevant.	If	she	allowed	these	
factors	to	matter,	she	would	be	caring	about	another	person’s	past	and	so	no	longer	
a	radical	egoist	of	the	moment.	
	
Now	consider	whether	this	person	can	lead	a	meaningful	life.	It	seems	that	her	
ability	to	care	falls	short	on	all	three	levels	that	I	argued	for	in	the	last	chapter:	
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emotion,	reflection	and	action.	It’s	doubtful	whether	she	really	cares	for	anything,	
even	herself	in	the	present.	She	can	still,	presumably,	feel	pain	and	pleasure.	But	
because	she	lacks	any	connection	with	the	past	or	the	future,	she	has	no	rich	
emotions.	It’s	even	harder	for	her	to	make	intelligible	to	herself	why	she	matters.	
She	has	no	story	she	tells	herself	about	who	she	is,	where	she	came	from	or	where	
she	might	be	going	that	would	help	her	explain	why	she	supposedly	cares	for	herself.	
Finally,	she	is	not	effectively	engaged	in	life.	She	isn’t	engaged	in	anything	because	
she	is	not	connected	to	anything.	She	i	she	lacks	the	capacity	to	or	because	s	also	not	
doing	anything	with	any	purpose	in	mind	because	she	is	radically	disconnected	from	
her	future	and	that	prevents	her	doing	anything	effectively.	
	
I	have	argued	that	two	extreme	perspectives	on	a	meaningful	life	–	the	cosmic	and	
the	egoism	of	the	moment	–	are	incoherent.	But	I	have	not	argued	against	more	
moderate	positions.	Indeed,	my	aim	has	been	to	show	that,	in	order	to	have	
meaning	in	our	lives,	we	have	to	see	ourselves	as	beings	situated	in	space	and	time.	
The	answer	to	both	the	cosmic	and	egoism-of-the-moment	perspectives	is,	at	one	
level,	the	same:	if	we	are	mere	blips,	there	is	no	meaning;	for	life	to	add	up,	it	cannot	
exist	in	spatial	and	temporal	isolation.	
	
Reflective	humans,	faced	with	the	apparent	absurdity	of	life,	seek	meaning	by	
transcending	the	egoism	of	the	moment	and	so	connecting	over	time	and	space.	In	
practice,	given	our	creative	and	social	natures,	this	mainly	involves	engaging	in	
meaningful	projects	and	meaningful	relationships.43	We	reach	across	time	mainly	by	
connecting	to	ourselves,	a	topic	I	explore	in	Chapters	5	and	6.	We	reach	across	space	
by	connecting	to	other	people	and	other	aspects	of	our	world,	something	I	discuss	in	
Chapter	7.	
	
	 	
																																																						
43	I	borrow	from	Kauppinen	the	idea	meaningful	lives	are,	in	practice,	mainly	about	
meaningful	projects	and	meaningful	relationships.	See	Kauppinen,	p360.	
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Why	reflect?	
	
But	why	should	we	go	through	the	effort,	and	sometimes	even	the	mental	agony,	of	
reflecting	deeply	on	our	lives?	Why	shouldn’t	we	just	live	for	the	moment,	or	
slavishly	follow	tradition,	or	go	along	with	the	herd	wherever	it	is	charging?	
Wouldn’t	that	lead	to	an	easier	life?	
	
These	questions	are	partly	based	on	empirical	assumptions	–	for	example,	that	going	
along	with	the	herd	will	actually	lead	to	an	easier	life.	The	veracity	of	these	
assumptions	could	be	examined,	and	it	seems	that	the	evidence	won’t	all	point	in	
one	direction.	Remember	that	we	are	talking	about	beings	that	have	the	capacity	to	
reflect	–	not	animals,	or	babies	that	are	yet	to	reflect,	or	old	people	with	dementia	
that	have	lost	the	capacity	to.	Insofar	as	reflective	beings	deliberately	run	away	from	
examining	their	lives,	mental	agony	may	crop	up	elsewhere.	What	Freudians	call	
“denial”	and	what	existentialists	call	“bad	faith”	rarely	leads	to	mental	health.	Those	
who	sweep	things	under	the	carpet	in	these	ways	can	suffer	from	anxiety,	bouts	of	
anger,	insomnia	and	depression.	They	can	behave	in	ways	that	are	destructive,	both	
to	others	and	to	themselves,	for	example	by	resorting	to	alcohol	or	drugs.	These	
costs	of	not	reflecting	need	to	be	set	against	the	benefits	of	sticking	one’s	head	in	
the	sand.	
	
The	question	of	whether	to	reflect	and,	if	so,	how	deeply	is	also	a	utilitarian	one.	If	
you	know	what	you	like,	what	you	value,	what	your	skills	are	and	what	your	
character	is,	you	will	make	better	choices	about	how	to	live	–	just	as	somebody	who	
knows	about	aerospace	will	make	better	choices	about	how	to	build	an	aircraft.	Only	
some	people	need	to	build	aircraft.	But	everybody	needs	to	live.	Hence,	we	should	
all	know	ourselves.	Hence,	too,	the	validity	of	the	motto	from	the	Delphic	oracle	-	
γνῶθι	σεαυτόν	–	know	yourself!	
	
This	argument,	of	course,	doesn’t	show	we	should	spend	all	day	reflecting	deeply,	
any	more	than	the	argument	that	we	sometimes	need	to	run	to	catch	a	bus	means	
we	should	spend	all	day	running.	Quite	apart	from	the	mental	agony	it	may	provoke,	
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deep	reflection	consumes	energy	that	can	be	devoted	to	other	activities.	There	is	an	
opportunity	cost	to	reflection.	Deep	thinking	can	suffer	from	diminishing	returns.	As	
Hallvard	Lillehammer	argues,	apathy	can	be	a	virtue	when	people	are	faced	with	so	
many	potential	things	to	care	about	that	a	proper	survey	of	them	would	be	
“impossible,	counterproductive,	or	downright	silly.”44	It	is	also	necessary	to	take	
breaks	from	reflection	in	order	to	refresh	one’s	thinking	–	just	as	a	farmer	won’t	try	
to	grow	the	same	crops	continuously	on	a	plot	of	land	but	will	allow	for	fallow	
periods	or	crop	rotation	in	order	to	increase	productivity	in	the	long	run.	
			
These	empirical	and	utilitarian	arguments,	though,	aim	off	from	the	main	point.	
When	people	wonder	whether	they	should	examine	their	lives	deeply,	they	are	
asking	whether	in	failing	to	do	so	they	will	be	missing	out	on	some	important	aspect	
of	what	it	is	to	be	a	human.	Socrates	thought	so.	That	was	the	point	of	his	dictum,	
“the	unexamined	life	isn’t	worth	living”.45	So	did	John	Stuart	Mill.	He	wrote:	“It	is	
better	to	be	a	human	being	dissatisfied	than	a	pig	satisfied;	better	to	be	Socrates	
dissatisfied	than	a	fool	satisfied.	And	if	the	fool,	or	the	pig,	is	of	a	different	opinion,	it	
is	only	because	they	only	know	their	own	side	of	the	question.”46		
	
But	were	Socrates	and	Mill	right?	There	are	two	main	objections.	First,	that	it’s	not	
necessary	to	reflect	on	the	meaning	of	life	in	order	to	lead	a	meaningful	life.	Second,	
even	insofar	as	a	meaningful	life	depends	on	existential	examination,	that	doesn’t	
mean	we	should	engage	in	it.	I	deal	with	these	in	turn.	
	
Bernard	Williams	makes	the	first	objection	as	follows:	“One	good	testimony	to	one’s	
existence	having	a	point	is	that	the	question	of	its	point	does	not	arise.”47	Wolf	
makes	a	similar	point,	less	categorically,	when	she	writes:	“If	we	want	to	live	
meaningful	lives,	we	cannot	try	too	hard	or	focus	too	much	on	doing	so.”48	
	
																																																						
44	Lillehammer	p113.	
45	Plato's	Apology	(38a5-6),	p33.	
46	Mill	p10.	
47	Williams,	1981a,	p12.	
48	Wolf,	2010,	p52.	My	italics.	
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There	is	much	wisdom	in	the	idea	that	it	can	be	pathological	to	fetishize	reflection	
and	meaningfulness.	We	can	be	so	concerned	agonising	over	the	meaning	of	life	that	
we	will	not	be	in	a	fit	state	to	lead	such	a	life.	However,	I	am	not	advocating	a	life	of	
perpetual	navel-gazing.	My	definition	of	meaningfulness	has	three	main	pillars:	
caring,	effective	engagement	and	intelligibility.	People	are	different,	and	they	won’t	
all	emphasise	each	pillar	equally.	It	is	also	quite	possible,	as	argued	in	the	previous	
chapter,	that	excessive	focus	on	one	aspect	of	meaningfulness	will	militate	against	
the	other	components.	For	example,	endless	reflection	may	get	in	the	way	of	
effective	action	and	even	balanced	emotions.	On	the	other	hand,	often	the	pillars	
reinforce	one	another.	Reflection	can	help	sort	out	one’s	feelings	and	clarify	the	best	
way	of	acting.	
	
Nor	am	I	saying	that	a	person	can	only	have	a	meaningful	life	if	she	has	first	walked	
through	the	valley	of	the	shadow	of	meaninglessness.	While	I	think	existential	doubt	
is	often	a	spur	to	finding	meaning	in	life,	some	people	may	be	so	blessed	that	their	
lives	are	naturally	fulfilled	and	they	see	no	need	to	question	the	meaning	of	them.	
Imagine	a	doctor	who	is	saving	lives	and	who	has	great	colleagues,	a	loving	husband,	
wonderful	kids	and	lots	of	friends.	Imagine,	too,	she	has	all	this	without	having	gone	
through	a	period	of	existential	doubt.	Her	life	will	be	a	meaningful	one.	
	
However,	reflection	will	still	play	a	role	in	her	life.	Even	if	she	isn’t	plagued	with	
existential	questions,	she	will	still	normally	be	able	to	think	about	her	job,	family	and	
friends,	and	why	she	cares	for	them.	She	will	also	be	able	to	reflect	when	something	
happens	that	challenges	her	way	of	life	or	the	things	she	cares	for.	Imagine	she	now	
comes	across	a	patient	who	has	suffered	female	genital	mutilation.	Or	perhaps	her	
husband	is	going	through	a	mid-life	crisis,	or	one	of	her	kids	suffers	from	depression	
or	a	friend	is	bereaved.	To	have	a	meaningful	life,	she	will	need	to	engage	effectively	
with	her	patient,	family	and	friends.	To	help	them,	she	will	need	to	relate	to	them	
deeply.	And	to	do	that,	she	will	now	need	to	reflect	on	things	that	perhaps	she	
hadn’t	thought	about	before,	including	life’s	meaning.	She	will	be	like	the	Buddha	
who	thinks	more	deeply	about	life	when	he	comes	across	sickness,	old	age	and	
death	after	a	childhood	shielded	from	such	things.	
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Now	look	at	the	second	objection	to	the	Socratic	view	that	the	unexamined	life	is	
not	worth	living:	that,	even	if	reflection	is	to	some	extent	needed	to	live	a	
meaningful	life,	we	could	still	be	better	off	as	a	happy	fool	or	a	happy	pig.			
	
We	can	approach	the	question	from	Socrates’	point	of	view.	We	can	imagine	some	
exceptional	situations	where	he	might,	indeed,	be	willing	to	trade	his	life	for	that	of	
the	fool	or	the	pig.	Say	the	Athenian	court	had	not	required	him	to	drink	hemlock	
but,	instead,	condemned	him	to	perpetual	torture	without	any	ability	to	
communicate	with	the	outside	world.	Given	that	he	was	going	to	live	in	agony	for	
the	rest	of	his	life	without	the	ability	ever	again	to	do	anything	meaningful,	he	might	
choose	to	become	a	happy	fool.	Or	imagine	some	evil	demon	gave	him	the	choice	
between	becoming	a	happy	pig	or	witnessing	the	destruction	of	the	planet.	
Sacrificing	his	ability	to	lead	a	meaningful	life	could	thereby	be	a	final	meaningful	
act.	
	
But	unless	there	is	some	such	exceptional	reason,	no	Socrates	would	exchange	his	
life	for	that	of	either	a	fool	or	a	pig.	Doing	so	would	mean	abandoning	forever	the	
world	of	meaning.	He	would	lose	the	ability	to	lead	a	life	that	was	engaged	in	things	
he	had	reasons	to	care	for.		
	
Somebody	might	still	ask:	“But	why	shouldn’t	I	give	up	a	life	of	reflection?	I	know	
that	I	will	be	sacrificing	depth,	autonomy	and	meaning	–	and	settling	for	a	life	that	is	
shallow,	slavish	and	meaningless.	But	so	what?	It	might	be	more	pleasurable	than	
your	meaningful	life.”	To	answer	this	question,	we	have	to	examine	the	sources	of	
normativity.	That	will	be	my	task	in	Chapter	4.	But,	to	anticipate	my	argument,	a	key	
conclusion	is	that,	if	we	abandon	the	world	of	meaning,	we	no	longer	have	any	
ability	to	say	we	should	or	shouldn’t	do	anything.		
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3	
Meaningful	lives	add	up	subjectively	and	objectively	
	
In	Chapter	1,	I	outlined	my	conception	of	a	meaningful	life	as	one	that	is	effectively	
engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	It	has	
both	a	subjective	aspect	in	that	what	we	care	for	must	make	sense	to	us;	and	an	
objective	aspect	in	that	there	must	be	reasons	for	what	we	care	for.	As	such,	my	
approach	can	be	seen	as	being	an	example	of	what	Kauppinen	calls	the	“new	
standard	view”49,	which	combines	subjective	and	objective	elements.	As	already	
explained,	Wolf	takes	a	similar	approach,	although	reflection	takes	a	more	central	
role	in	my	account	than	in	hers.	
	
However,	combining	the	subjective	and	objective	is	not	the	only	way	of	looking	at	
what	a	meaningful	life	is.	At	this	high	level	of	abstraction,	there	are	three	other	
positions	one	could	take.	One	could	say	that	a	meaningful	life	is	entirely	objective	–	
so	it	is	totally	irrelevant	what	the	subject	thinks.	This	is	closely	related	to	what	
Kauppinen	terms	a	“higher	purpose”	view,	under	which	meaning	is	given	by	some	
supernatural	purpose.	Alternatively,	one	could	say	that	a	meaningful	life	is	entirely	
subjective	–	so	it	only	matters	what	the	subject	thinks.	This	is	what	Kauppinen	calls	a	
“voluntaristic”	view	–	under	which	“our	lives	are	meaningful	when	our	heart	is	in	
what	we	do,	for	whatever	reason”.	Finally,	one	could	say	that	it	is	impossible	to	find	
meaning	on	either	a	subjective	or	objective	level.	This	is	nihilism.	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	I	discussed	and	dismissed	one	nihilistic	argument	to	the	effect	
that	life	is	meaningless.	I	don’t	claim	to	have	addressed	every	type	of	nihilism	–	only	
the	version	based	on	taking	a	cosmic	perspective	on	a	meaningful	life.	In	this	
chapter,	I	first	question	whether	the	existence	of	God	could	make	our	lives	
meaningful	for	us	irrespective	of	what	we	think	about	them.	I	then	argue	against	the	
idea	that	our	lives	could	be	meaningful	merely	on	the	basis	of	us	feeling	passionate	
about	what	we	do,	without	there	being	any	reason	to	do	so.	I	end	by	arguing	that	
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this	doesn’t	mean	that	choice	and	creativity	have	no	role	in	a	meaningful	life.	To	the	
contrary,	I	suggest	that	leading	a	meaningful	life	is	typically	a	creative	endeavour	and	
that,	even	if	it	involves	endless	routine,	it	is	supported	by	the	autonomous	decision	
to	buy	into	that	routine.	
	
What	if	God	exists?	
	
It	is	conceivable	that	there	could	be	a	higher	purpose	for	the	universe,	most	
obviously	if	God	exists.	In	such	a	situation,	she	might	have	a	plan	for	us.	And	our	lives	
could	have	meaning	for	her.	The	situation	is	somewhat	similar	to	a	human	who	has	a	
plan	to	build	a	house	with	a	garden.	The	stones	in	the	walls,	the	wood	beams,	the	
glass	in	the	windows,	the	brass	fittings	and	so	forth	all	have	roles	in	the	plan.	So	do	
the	fruit	trees,	flowers	and	watering	system.	For	the	person	designing	the	house,	all	
these	elements	could	have	meaning	in	her	life.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	that	the	
stones,	glass	and	flowers	have	meaningful	lives	in	themselves.	
	
Nagel	makes	this	point	eloquently:	“If	we	learned	that	we	were	being	raised	to	
provide	food	for	other	creatures	fond	of	human	flesh…	that	would…	not	give	our	
lives	meaning…	Although	we	might	acknowledge	that	this	culinary	role	would	make	
our	lives	meaningful	to	them,	it	is	not	clear	how	it	would	make	them	meaningful	to	
us.	Admittedly,	the	usual	form	of	service	to	a	higher	being	is	different	from	this.	One	
is	supposed	to	behold	and	partake	of	the	glory	of	God,	for	example,	in	a	way	in	
which	chickens	do	not	share	in	the	glory	of	coq	au	vin.”50	
	
There	is,	of	course,	an	important	difference	between	watering	systems	and	human	
beings.	Watering	systems	can’t	have	meaningful	lives	–	or	for	that	matter	
meaningless	lives.	But	humans	can.	It	is,	therefore,	possible	that	we	could	find	some	
meaning	for	ourselves	from	buying	into	God’s	plan	for	the	universe	in	a	way	that	a	
watering	system	couldn’t	find	meaning	from	buying	into	a	human’s	plan	for	her	
garden.	But	it’s	not	clear	that	there	is	any	automaticity	here.	Perhaps	there	is	a	
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satisfactory	theological	explanation	about	how	our	lives	can	be	meaningful	to	us	
without	us	thinking	God’s	plan	for	the	universe	matters.	But,	if	not,	for	her	purpose	
to	have	meaning	for	us,	it	would	seem	that	we	ourselves	would	need	to	buy	into	it.	
In	other	words,	even	if	God	exists	and	has	a	plan	for	us,	it	would	appear	that	
following	it	would	only	make	our	lives	meaningful	insofar	as	the	plan	made	sense	to	
us	subjectively.		
	
What’s	wrong	with	subjectivism?	
	
Why	not	go	to	the	other	extreme	and	say	that	the	only	thing	that	determines	
whether	a	life	is	meaningful	is	whether	the	person	living	it	finds	it	meaningful?	On	
this	view	there	are	no	reasons	for	choosing	any	particular	course	of	action	to	give	
one’s	life	meaning.	There	is	no	external	anchor	or	objectivity.	Such	a	subjectivist	
approach	comes	in	two	main	varieties.	Under	one,	the	person	has	a	meaningful	life	if	
she	feels	passionate	about	what	she	is	doing.	Under	the	other,	she	has	a	meaningful	
life	if	she	has	chosen	what	she	is	doing.	The	two	can	go	together.	David	Wiggins	uses	
the	term	“non-cognitivism”	to	encompass	both	of	these	views.51	I	consider	these	in	
turn.		
	
Following	Wiggins,	I	take	Richard	Taylor’s	retelling	of	the	Ancient	Greek	myth	of	
Sisyphus	as	an	example	of	the	first	type	of	subjectivism.	Sisyphus	was	condemned	by	
the	gods	to	roll	a	rock	to	the	top	of	a	hill,	only	for	it	to	come	tumbling	all	the	way	
down	and	for	him	to	have	to	roll	it	back	up	again	–	and	to	go	through	this	
unchanging	cycle	of	activity	forever.52	Taylor	uses	Sisyphus	with	his	“repetitious,	
cyclic	activity	that	never	comes	to	anything”	as	the	paradigm	of	a	meaningless	life.53	
	
Taylor’s	argument	has	two	parts.	The	first	is	to	say	that	there	is	no	objective	meaning	
to	life.	We	are	deluded	in	thinking	that	we	are	any	different	from	Sisyphus.	We	are	
also	deluded	if	we	think	we	are	different	from	any	creature	that	is	trapped	in	an	
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endless	cycle	of	activity,	such	as	glow-worms	that	devour	each	other	and	migratory	
birds	that	circle	the	globe.54	He	argues	that	most	of	our	achievements	are	bubbles	
and	any	“that	do	last,	like	the	sand-swept	pyramids,	soon	become	mere	curiosities,	
while	around	them	the	rest	of	mankind	continues	its	perpetual	toting	of	rocks,	only	
to	see	them	roll	down.”55	
	
This	part	of	Taylor’s	argument	suffers	from	the	same	weaknesses	as	the	attempt	to	
show	life	is	meaningless	by	taking	a	cosmic	perspective,	which	I	considered	in	the	
last	chapter.	Insofar	as	he	looks	at	human	achievement	from	a	human	perspective,	
what	he	is	saying	is	false.	After	all,	the	pyramids	are	not	“mere	curiosities”.	They	
provoke	awe.	They	inspire	us	to	think	about	a	sophisticated	civilisation	four	and	a	
half	thousand	years	old,	its	extraordinary	architectural	triumphs,	the	socio-political	
system	that	enabled	them	and	its	attitudes	to	life	and	death.	Such	reflection	can	
enrich	our	lives	today.	Taylor’s	attempt	to	say	the	pyramids	are	valueless	would	only	
have	plausibility	if	he	tried	to	look	at	them	from	some	point	in	the	infinite	future	
when	the	universe	and	everything	in	it,	including	the	pyramids,	had	been	destroyed.	
Bu,	as	I	argued	in	the	last	chapter,	meaningfulness,	importance	and	caring	have	no	
semantic	sense	if	we	take	such	a	view	from	nowhere.	Our	achievements	aren’t	
meaningful	from	that	perspective,	but	they	aren’t	meaningless	either.	
	
The	second	part	of	Taylor’s	argument,	which	distinguishes	him	from	the	nihilist,	is	to	
assert	that	meaning	is	entirely	down	to	how	we	feel.		He	ask	us	to	consider	this	idea	
by	imagining	that	the	gods	implant	some	stuff	in	Sisyphus’	veins	that	gives	him	a	
“strange	and	irrational	impulse”	to	roll	stones.	He	now	has	“but	one	obsession,	
which	is	to	roll	stones”	and,	as	a	result,	“his	life	is	now	filled	with	mission	and	
meaning”.56	
	
The	problem	with	this	part	of	Taylor’s	argument	is	it	isn’t	clear	how	our	newly	
drugged	Sisyphus	could	think	that	his	life	is	filled	with	meaning,	unless	he	reflects	on	
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what	he	is	doing	and	buys	into	it.	We	can	certainly	imagine	that	his	life	is	
pleasurable.	He	may,	in	some	happy-go-lucky	way,	feel	that	everything	is	going	fine.	
But	that’s	not	the	same	as	thinking	it	is	meaningful.	To	think	that,	even	on	a	purely	
subjective	level,	Sisyphus	must	reflect.	But	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	any	reflection	at	
all	going	on	in	Taylor’s	story.	It’s	not	just	that	Sisyphus	doesn’t	reflect.	Taylor	states	
that	a	human	“no	more	asks	whether	[his	life]	will	be	worthwhile,	or	whether	
anything	of	significance	will	come	of	it,	than	the	worms	and	the	birds.”57	This	
statement	is	false.	Quite	a	lot	of	humans	do	precisely	this.	
	
As	Wiggins	rightly	argues:	“Where	the	non-cognitive	account	essentially	depends	on	
the	existence	and	availability	of	the	inner	view,	it	is	a	question	of	capital	importance	
whether	the	non-cognitivist’s	account	of	the	inner	view	makes	such	sense	of	our	
condition	as	it	actually	has	for	us	from	the	inside.”58	Taylor	purports	to	give	us	an	
account	of	meaningfulness	that	is	purely	subjective.	But	when	we	look	at	it,	the	life	
doesn’t	add	up	from	even	an	internal	perspective.	
	
Let’s	now	look	at	an	alternative	variety	of	radical	subjectivism	–	the	existentialist	
view	that	we	give	meaning	to	our	lives	purely	by	choosing	what	to	do,	unconstrained	
by	any	objective	factors.		Sartre	summarises	this	view	with	the	phrase	that,	for	
human	beings,	“existence	comes	before	essence.”59	He	contrasts	humans	with	
objects	such	as	paper-knives,	whose	essence	or	conception	in	the	mind	of	the	artisan	
comes	before	their	existence.	He	rightly	argues	that	man	is	“a	project	which	
possesses	a	subjective	life,	instead	of	being	a	kind	of	moss,	or	a	fungus	or	a	
cauliflower.”60	But	he	then	goes	on	to	make	the	more	extreme	point	that	whatever	
we	choose	is	right:	“To	choose	between	this	or	that	is	at	the	same	time	to	affirm	the	
value	of	that	which	is	chosen;	for	we	are	unable	ever	to	choose	the	worse.	What	we	
choose	is	always	the	better.”61	Describing	a	student	who	comes	to	him	during	World	
War	Two	for	advice	on	whether	to	join	the	Free	French	forces	or	stay	at	home	with	
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his	mother,	for	whom	he	is	the	only	comfort,	Sartre	says	his	reply	was:	“You	are	free,	
therefore	choose	-	that	is	to	say,	invent.”62		And	yet	he	also	insists	that	a	man	has	a	
great	responsibility	in	how	he	chooses	because	“in	choosing	for	himself,	he	chooses	
for	all	men”63	and	that	anybody	who	pretends	he	doesn’t	have	this	responsibility	is	
engaged	in	“a	kind	of	self-deception”64.	
	
How	can	Sartre	square	this	circle,	asserting	at	the	same	time	that	nothing	
determines	what	is	a	good	choice	and	that	what	we	choose	really	matters?	Charles	
Taylor	attacks	this	notion	of	radical	choice,	unconstrained	by	any	reasons,	as	deeply	
incoherent.	He	argues	that	the	supposed	terrible	dilemma	faced	by	Sartre’s	student	
is	a	dilemma	“only	because	the	claims	themselves	are	not	created	by	radical	choice.	
If	they	were,	the	grievous	nature	of	the	predicament	would	dissolve,	for	that	would	
mean	that	the	young	man	could	do	away	with	the	dilemma	at	any	moment	by	simply	
declaring	one	of	the	rival	claims	as	dead	and	inoperative.	Indeed,	if	serious	claims	
were	created	by	radical	choice,	the	young	man	would	have	a	grievous	dilemma	
about	whether	to	go	and	get	an	ice	cream	cone,	and	then	again	he	could	decide	not	
to.”65	
	
The	existentialist	approach	to	meaningfulness	is	an	Indian	rope	trick.	It	wants	to	
construct	a	theory	that	we	can	invent	what	is	important	by	the	mere	exercise	of	the	
will,	unconstrained	by	any	reason	to	choose	anything	at	all.	Charles	Taylor	rightly	
points	out	that	Sartre	“maintains	a	semblance	of	plausibility	by	surreptitiously	
assuming”	that	things	really	do	matter66.	Not	only	does	Sartre	assume	that	we	have	
to	decide	between	issues	that	are	somehow	important;	he	also	argues	that	if	we	fail	
to	take	responsibility	for	our	choices,	we	are	guilty	of	self-deception.	But	if	radical	
choice	is	really	the	only	thing	that	determines	what	matters,	why	does	it	matter	if	
we	deceive	ourselves?	
	
																																																						
62	Sartre	p38.	
63	Sartre	p29.	
64	Sartre	p31.	
65	Charles	Taylor,	1982,	p119.	
66	Charles	Taylor,	1982,	p121.	
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Pursuing	a	meaningful	life	is	a	creative	endeavour	
	
I	have	argued	that	objective	meaning,	even	if	it	existed	say	in	the	form	of	God	having	
a	purpose	for	us,	seems	not	to	be	sufficient	to	make	life	meaningful	for	us	unless	we	
also	buy	into	that	meaning.	I	have	also	argued	that	the	idea	of	purely	subjective	
meaning,	without	any	anchor	outside	ourselves,	seems	incoherent	because	if	
anything	goes	we	could	not	make	sense	to	ourselves	that	anything	matters.	
	
But	just	because	I	concur	with	Wiggins	and	Charles	Taylor	in	rejecting	the	Indian	
rope	trick	of	hyper-subjectivism	doesn’t	mean	that	I	am	arguing	that	choice	plays	no	
part	in	giving	meaning	to	our	lives.	We,	at	the	bare	minimum,	need	to	buy	into	a	life	
that	has	been	given	to	us	by	others.	Normally,	too,	we	will	create	elements	of	our	
own	life.	As	such,	leading	a	meaningful	life	is	partly	a	creative	endeavour.	Humans	
are	creative	beings,	as	much	as	we	are	reflective	ones.	Indeed,	creativity	and	
reflection	stem	from	the	same	source:	nature	only	partly	determines	how	we	behave	
and	our	large	brains	help	fill	in	the	gaps.	Creativity	is	the	ability	to	do	things	
differently,	rather	than	just	going	round	and	round	in	the	same	circular	routine	–	like	
Sisyphus	pushing	his	rock	up	the	hill	–	or	drifting	aimlessly.		
	
We	don’t	just	find	meaning	in	our	lives.	Most	of	us	create	meaning.	Creativity	helps	
lives	be	meaningful	from	a	subjective	perspective.	If	things	never	change,	life	will	
usually	be	dull.	Relationships	that	never	develop	normally	become	stale.	People	
typically	become	alienated	from	jobs	that	are	endlessly	repetitive.	Equally,	if	
somebody	is	totally	bereft	of	creativity,	she	will	not	find	it	easy	to	engage	effectively	
with	things	that	she	cares	for.	When	circumstances	change	in	some	project	she	is	
engaged	in,	she	will	not	be	able	to	change	her	behaviour	and	take	advantage	of	the	
new	situation.	If	her	husband	suffers	some	setback	in	his	life,	she	will	not	be	able	to	
think	outside	the	box	–	and	that	will	militate	against	her	ability	to	help	him.	
Somebody	totally	lacking	in	creativity	will	be	hard-pressed	to	have	meaningful	
projects	and	meaningful	relationships.	
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To	be	clear,	when	I	talk	about	creativity,	I’m	not	saying	everybody	needs	to	be	a	
Picasso	or	Mozart	to	have	a	meaningful	life.	Life	is	full	of	endless	possibilities	to	be	
creative	in	small	ways	as	well	as	big	ones.	Brushing	one’s	daughter’s	hair	in	a	new	
way	so	she	doesn’t	scream	when	the	tangles	are	removed;	taking	a	new	route	to	
work	so	one	sees	a	different	part	of	one’s	neighbourhood;	subtly	changing	the	recipe	
of	a	dish	one	cooks	to	improve	the	taste	or	one’s	diet.	These	are	all	creative	activities	
that	help	make	life	meaningful.	We	can	see	reasons	to	do	these	things.		
	
Nor	am	I	saying	that	everybody	needs	to	be	involved	in	an	endless	whirl	of	creative	
activity.	Quite	apart	from	the	fact	that	some	people	are	naturally	more	creative	than	
others,	we	also	need	stability	in	our	lives.	Though	there	are	advantages	in	varying	
our	routines,	there	are	benefits	in	having	routines	in	the	first	place.	If	everything	was	
in	perpetual	flux,	nothing	solid	would	get	done.	Before	people	had	learnt	how	to	
exploit	a	new	innovation,	it	would	be	jettisoned	and	replaced	by	an	even	newer	one.	
In	the	last	chapter,	I	argued	that	there	were	diminishing	returns	and	opportunity	
costs	to	reflection.	The	same	goes	for	being	creative.		
	
Although	creativity	can	contribute	to	a	meaningful	life	–	and	meaning	can	be	created	
as	well	as	found	–	creativity	is	not	necessary	to	having	a	life	that	adds	up	both	
subjectively	and	objectively.	The	essential	element	rather	is	buying	into	what	one	is	
doing	because	one	can	see	a	reason	for	doing	it.	This	seems	to	be	what	Wiggins	
means	when	he	writes	that	our	lives	cannot	add	up	“unless	each	of	us	supplies	
something	extra,	some	conception	of	his	own,	to	make	sense	of	things	for	himself.”67	
If	one	takes	ownership	of	one’s	life	in	this	way,	even	what	might	superficially	seem	
like	mindless	activities	can	have	meaning.	Consider	somebody	whose	job	is	to	count	
the	number	of	people	passing	a	particular	crossroads	day	in	day	out,	week	in	week	
out.	This	may	seem	like	a	Sisyphean	activity.	But	if	she	can	see	a	reason	for	doing	this	
–	say	that	she	is	actually	counting	undercover	enemy	troops	and	accurate	
information	on	their	numbers	is	vital	to	foil	an	invasion	of	her	homeland	–	what	
might	otherwise	seem	like	a	boring	activity	could	be	deeply	meaningful.	We	are	back	
																																																						
67	Wiggins	p564.	
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with	Wolf’s	slogan:	“Meaning	arises	when	subjective	attraction	meets	objective	
attractiveness.”68	
	 	
																																																						
68	Wolf,	2010,	p9.	
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4	
Why	reflective	beings	should	pursue	meaningful	lives	
	
In	previous	chapters,	I’ve	set	out	my	conception	of	a	meaningful	life.	In	Chapter	1,	I	
argued	that	a	meaningful	life	is	one	effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	which	
we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	In	Chapter	2,	I	explained	why	reflectiveness	
was	an	important	aspect	of	human	nature	that	can	lead	us	to	pursue	meaning.	In	
Chapter	3,	I	showed	why	meaningful	lives	have	both	subjective	and	objective	
aspects.	What	I	haven’t	done	yet	is	show	why	reflective	beings	should	pursue	
meaningful	lives	rather	than	be	Mill’s	happy	fool.	Without	this,	my	thesis	consists	of	
an	analysis	of	a	meaningful	life	rather	than	a	recommendation	to	lead	such	a	life.	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	supply	such	an	argument.	
	
I	start	off	by	discussing	the	source	of	normativity.	I	argue	that	this	is	our	ability	to	
choose	and	to	seek	reasons	for	selecting	one	option	over	the	alternatives.	When	
considering	what	to	do,	we	can	ask	the	question	“why?”	we	should	do	one	thing	
rather	than	another.	The	“why?”	question	can	be	paraphrased	in	three	main	ways:	
“for	the	sake	of	what?”,	“for	what	reason?”,	and	“what’s	the	point?”	These	three	
formulations	are	associated	with	three	high-level	answers	about	what	to	do:	lead	the	
best	life;	do	what	is	right;	and	live	a	meaningful	life.	At	this	high-level	of	abstraction,	
we	have	theories	that	are	virtually	tautologous.	So	it	is	incumbent	on	those	
advocating	each	approach	to	spell	out	their	respective	conceptions.		
	
I	first	consider	the	best	life	a	reflective	being	could	live,	distinguishing	between	two	
types	of	happiness:	what	I	call	buffet-happiness	and	track-happiness.	I	argue	that	a	
life	that	is	merely	buffet-happy	will	not	be	meaningful,	whereas	a	track-happy	life	
can	be.	I	further	argue	that	somebody	who	is	dedicated	to	mere	buffet-happiness	
cannot	give	a	reason	why	she	should	lead	such	a	life	without	accepting	the	relevance	
of	being	on	the	right	track	–	and	therefore	that	the	only	type	of	good	life	we	could	
have	reason	to	follow	is	one	that	includes	track-happiness.	
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Next	I	turn	to	the	moralist,	who	argues	that	we	should	do	what	is	right.	I	distinguish	
between	two	types	of	morality:	those	which	people	can	buy	into;	and	those	which	
alienate	them	from	their	raison	d’etre.	I	argue	that	an	advocate	of	alienating	
moralities	cannot	give	us	reasons	why	we	should	follow	her	advice	–	and	therefore	
that	the	only	morality	we	have	reason	to	follow	is	one	that	doesn’t	alienate	us	from	
what	is	meaningful.	
	
Then	I	look	at	the	meaning	theorist.	I	have	already	spelt	out	my	conception	of	
meaningfulness.	I	now	clarify	that,	in	pursuing	a	meaningful	life,	we	have	reason	to	
care	for	ourselves	not	just	other	people	and	other	things.	I	then	argue	that	we	can	
give	reasons	for	following	my	conception	of	meaningfulness.	
	
Finally,	I	consider	whether	a	good	life	that	includes	track-happiness,	a	moral	life	that	
doesn’t	alienate	us	from	what	is	meaningful	and	a	meaningful	life	that	includes	
caring	for	ourselves	offer	radically	different	ways	of	living.	I	accept	that	looking	at	a	
good	life,	an	ethical	one	and	a	meaningful	one	in	these	ways	won’t	put	an	end	to	
tragic	conflicts.	But	I	argue	that	doing	so	will	lead	to	a	life	that	is	less	fragmented	
than	that	of	somebody	who	seeks	to	follow	conceptions	of	happiness	and	morality	
that	do	not	give	an	important	place	to	meaningfulness.	This	is	my	first	answer	to	my	
thesis	question:	to	what	extent	is	a	meaningful	life	an	integrated	one?	
	
Source	of	normativity	
	
Normativity	stems	from	our	ability	to	choose	and,	in	doing	so,	to	seek	reasons	for	
selecting	one	option	over	the	alternatives.	Unlike	other	creatures,	we	don’t	just	do	
things.	We	choose.	It	is	in	looking	for	reasons	for	action	that	the	world	of	“should”	is	
born.	
	
Anybody	who	has	spent	time	with	children	–	or	who	remembers	being	a	child	–	
knows	that	an	answer	to	a	“why	should	I	do	this?”	can	be	followed	with	“and	why	
should	I	do	that?”	and	so	on,	leading	to	a	seemingly	infinite	regress.	This	sort	of	
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chain	of	questioning	can	easily	end	up	with	the	existential	questions	I	explored	in	
Chapter	2	such	as	“why	should	I	do	anything	at	all?”	
	
Aristotle	offers	one	approach	to	stopping	the	infinite	regress.	For	him,	“why?”	could	
be	rephrased	as	“for	the	sake	of	what?”	He	argued	that	we	do	things	“for	the	sake	
of”	other	things	–	or	with	other	“ends”	in	mind.	So	we	need	medicine	for	the	sake	of	
health,	generalship	for	the	sake	of	victory	and	building	for	sake	of	having	houses.	He	
then	considers	whether	there	is	anything	for	the	sake	of	which	we	do	everything	we	
do.	He	asks	whether	there	is	a	final	end	we	aim	at.	He	concludes	that	εὐδαιμονία	–	
sometimes	translated	as	happiness	but	perhaps	best	translated	as	a	good	life	–	is	
that	thing,	“for	this	we	choose	always	for	itself	and	never	for	the	sake	of	something	
else.”69	
	
Having	reached	this	point,	Aristotle	remarks:	“Perhaps,	however,	to	say	that	
εὐδαιμονία	is	the	chief	good	seems	a	platitude.”	What	he	has	said	isn’t	quite	a	
tautology.	After	all,	he	doesn’t	consider	what	Camus	says	is	the	“one	truly	serious	
philosophical	problem”,	namely	suicide.70	Some	people	choose	suicide	–	and	maybe	
some	of	them	are	right	to	do	so	-	and	it	would	sound	strange	to	say	we	choose	
suicide	for	the	sake	of	a	good	life.	But	if	we	allow	for	εὐδαιμονία	to	include	death	in	
those	cases	where	death	is	better	than	the	best	life	possible,	it	does	seem	we	have	a	
tautology.	It	wouldn’t	make	sense	to	ask:	“For	the	sake	of	what	should	I	lead	the	
best	life	possible?”	
	
There	are	at	least	two	alternative	ways	of	bringing	the	potentially	infinite	regress	of	
questioning	to	an	end.	One,	what	I	will	call	the	moralist	approach,	starts	by	
rephrasing	“why?”	as	“for	what	reason?”	This	is	the	route	taken	by	Korsgaard.	She	
argues	that	our	capacity	to	think	about	our	desires	“sets	us	a	problem	no	other	
animal	has.	It	is	the	problem	of	the	normative.”	A	reflective	mind	can	question	
																																																						
69	Aristotle	pp223-224.	I	depart	from	the	Barnes/Kenny	translation	in	using	the	term	
εὐδαίμων/εὐδαιμονία	instead	of	happy/happiness.	
70	Camus	p11.	
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whether	a	desire	is	a	reason	to	act.	Without	a	reason	“it	cannot	commit	itself	or	go	
forward.”71		
	
One	answer	that	could	bring	this	particular	line	of	questioning	to	a	halt,	albeit	not	an	
approach	explicitly	taken	by	Korsgaard,	is:	“Because	there’s	most	reason	to	do	this.”	
It	doesn’t	make	sense	to	ask:	“For	what	reason	should	I	do	what	there’s	most	reason	
to	do?”	Do	what	there	is	most	reason	to	do	is	a	platitude,	just	as	lead	the	best	life	
possible	is.	It	is,	though,	possible	to	open	a	new	line	of	questioning	about	whether	
there	is,	indeed,	most	reason	to	do	any	specific	course	of	action	recommended	–	just	
as	one	can	open	a	new	line	of	questioning	over	whether	there	is	reason	to	follow	any	
particular	conception	of	εὐδαιμονία.	
	
A	third	option,	favoured	by	the	meaning	theorist,	rephrases	“why?”	as	“what’s	the	
point?”	The	answer	that	can	bring	this	particular	line	of	questioning	to	an	end	is:	
“Because	doing	this	is	the	most	meaningful	thing	you	can	do.”	Again,	it	doesn’t	make	
sense	to	ask:	“What	is	the	point	of	doing	what’s	most	meaningful?”	But	that’s	only	
because	it	is	a	platitude	to	say	it	makes	sense	to	do	what’s	meaningful.	Yet	again	it	is	
possible	to	open	a	new	line	of	inquiry	into	whether	there	is	reason	to	follow	any	
particular	conception	of	what	is	meaningful.	
	
At	this	very	high	level,	the	three	answers	to	the	“why?”	question	are	three	
tautologies.	The	prescriptions	they	offer	–	live	the	best	life	possible,	do	what	there’s	
most	reason	to	do	and	lead	the	most	meaningful	life	possible	–	may	seem	similar	or	
possibly	even	the	same.	However,	when	the	conceptions	are	spelt	out	in	detail,	it	
may	be	that	they	will	lead	to	different	conclusions	about	what	to	do.	For	example,	
the	advocate	of	the	good	life	may	recommend	the	pursuit	of	happiness	or	self-
interest;	the	advocate	of	doing	what	there’s	most	reason	to	do	may	suggest	leading	
a	moral	one;	and	the	meaning	theorist	may	say	we	should	do	what	we	care	for.	
	
																																																						
71	Korsgaard,	1996,	p93.	
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Wolf	suggests	precisely	such	a	trichotomy.	She	says	that	to	the	two	main	
philosophical	models	of	practical	reason	–	self-interest	and	morality	–	we	should	add	
meaningfulness.	She	argues	that	the	things	we	care	about	“give	meaning	to	our	
lives.”	This	sort	of	reason	“is	not	reducible	to	or	subsumable	under	either	happiness,	
as	it	is	ordinarily	understood,	or	morality.”72	However,	until	we	have	examined	
different	conceptions	of	happiness,	morality	and	meaning	–	and	seen	whether	
reflective	beings	have	reason	to	pursue	some	ordinarily	understood	ideas	of	
happiness	and	morality	-	we	shouldn’t	assume	that	there	will	be	a	radical	conflict	
between	the	courses	of	action	they	propose.	
	
A	good	life	is,	at	least	in	part,	meaningful	
	
Immediately	after	acknowledging	that	it	seems	a	platitude	to	say	the	good	life	is	the	
chief	good,	Aristotle	spells	out	his	conception	of	the	good	life	in	his	famous	ἔργον	
argument73.	ἔργον	is	typically	translated	as	task	or	function	and,	viewed	in	this	way,	
the	argument	has	lots	of	problems.	Aristotle	argues	that	the	human	ἔργον	is	“activity	
of	soul	in	accordance	with	reason,	or	not	without	reason”	and	the	good	life	is	
“activity	of	soul	in	conformity	with	virtue”.	But	why,	we	may	ask,	do	humans	have	
any	task	or	function	in	the	first	place?		
	
I	will	return	to	Aristotle’s	ἔργον	argument	shortly	and	seek	to	repair	it.	But	I	first	
wish	to	consider	two	rival	conceptions	of	the	good	life:	what	I	call	buffet-happiness	
and	track-happiness.	Imagine	you	are	in	the	first-class	carriage	of	a	train	eating	a	
delicious	meal	with	delightful	companions.	You	are	“buffet-happy”.	But	the	train	is	
going	in	the	wrong	direction.	So	you	are	not	“track-happy”.	Now	imagine	you	are	
sitting	on	the	floor	in	a	crowded	second-class	carriage,	but	you	are	going	where	you	
want	to.	You	are	not	buffet-happy,	but	you	are	certainly	track-happy.		
	
A	life	that	is	only	buffet-happy	is	one	filled	with	pleasure	and	with	little	or	no	pain.	A	
person	leading	it	eats,	drinks,	has	sex	and	lounges	around	in	the	sun	–	on	an	endless	
																																																						
72	Wolf,	2010,	pp2-3.	My	italics.	
73	Aristotle,	pp223-224.	
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holiday,	as	it	were.	Such	a	life	is	perhaps	not	so	different	from	the	one	a	non-
reflective	animal	such	as	a	cat	can	enjoy.	By	contrast,	lives	that	are	track-happy	are	
meaningful.	It	seems	that	Aristotle	might	advocate	such	a	life.	After	all,	he	concludes	
his	ἔργον	argument	by	saying:	“We	must	add	‘in	a	complete	life’.	For	one	swallow	
does	not	make	a	summer,	nor	does	one	day;	and	so	too	one	day,	or	a	short	time,	
does	not	make	a	man	blessed	and	εὐδαίμων.”	A	good	life	is,	therefore,	in	my	
terminology	one	that	involves	track-happiness	and	so	meaningfulness.	
	
Somebody	who	is	only	concerned	with	buffet-happiness	seeks	to	satisfy	her	desires	
rather	than	evaluates	whether	her	desires	are	any	good.	She	is	what	Charles	Taylor	
calls	a	simple	“weigher”	of	alternatives	for	satisfying	her	desires	rather	than	a	
“strong	evaluator”	of	them.74	She	cannot	be	track-happy	because	she	doesn’t	reflect	
deeply	about	whether	she	is	on	the	right	track.	As	such,	she	is	not	just	failing	to	
exercise	a	distinctive	part	of	herself;	she	is	also	missing	out	on	the	special	pleasures	
that	come	from	leading	a	meaningful	life.	If	our	simple	weigher	of	alternatives	sees	
that	strong	evaluators	are	enjoying	life	in	potentially	richer	ways	than	she	is,	she	
can’t	say	“Oh,	I’d	like	a	bit	of	that	track-happiness	to	mix	with	my	buffet-happiness”	
while	remaining	a	simple	weigher.	This	is	because	the	only	way	to	be	track-happy	is	
to	evaluate	her	desires	and,	in	doing	that,	she	ceases	to	be	a	simple	weigher.	
	
The	simple	weigher	may	then	respond:	“I	don’t	want	your	track-happiness.	I’m	not	
interested	in	strong	evaluation.	I’m	fine	as	I	am	in	the	buffet.”	It’s	at	this	point	that	
we	could	roll	out	a	modified	version	of	Aristotle’s	ἔργον	argument.	We	first	need	to	
follow	David	Bostock	in	interpreting	the	ἔργον	of	a	living	creature	not	as	its	task	or	
function	but	as	its	nature-determined	capacity	to	live	“a	certain	kind	of	life”75.	The	
argument	then	becomes	that,	for	humans,	a	key	part	of	our	nature-determined	way	
of	life	is	to	reflect	on	and	choose	our	way	of	life.76	By	refusing	to	evaluate	her	
desires,	the	simple	weigher	is	therefore	denying	an	important	part	of	her	humanity	–	
namely,	her	ability	to	reflect	on	how	to	live.	She	then	has	two	options.	She	can	start	
																																																						
74	Charles	Taylor,	1982,	p112.	
75	Bostock	p16.		
76	I	elaborate	on	this	in	one	of	my	MPhil	Stud	essays,	2016a.	
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reasoning	and	providing	an	argument	for	why	it	is	good	to	follow	the	desires	she	has	
–	in	which	case,	she’s	no	longer	a	simple	weigher.	Alternatively,	she	can	just	fall	
silent.	
	
In	other	words,	a	simple	weigher	cannot	give	us	any	reason	to	focus	just	on	buffet-
happiness.	This	means	that	the	only	type	of	good	life	that	we	could	have	reason	to	
pursue	is	one	that	includes	track-happiness	–	or	meaning.	
	
We	can’t	be	morally	required	to	give	up	our	raison	d’etre	
	
A	second	way	of	looking	at	the	source	of	normativity	is	to	express	“why?”	as	“for	
what	reason?”	This	naturally	fits	in	with	the	moralist’s	way	of	looking	at	things	–	
although	it	is,	of	course,	possible	to	give	reasons	without	being	a	moralist.	Just	as	we	
can	identify	two	types	of	happiness,	we	can	distinguish	two	kinds	of	morality:	
heteronomous	and	autonomous.	In	the	former,	moral	demands	are	imposed	on	us	
from	the	outside.	In	the	latter,	we	make	demands	on	ourselves;	even	when	these	are	
suggested	to	us	by	our	culture,	we	buy	into	them.	
	
Most	conventional	morality	is	of	the	former	kind.	A	set	of	rules	is	imposed	in	order	
to	make	society	run	smoothly.	The	Ten	Commandments	in	the	Bible	are	a	typical	
example.	If	we	exclude	the	four	commandments	which	relate	to	how	we	should	
behave	towards	God,	the	remaining	ones	all	concern	how	we	should	behave	to	other	
people:	honour	your	parents	and	don’t	steal,	commit	adultery,	murder,	covet	your	
neighbour’s	possessions	or	bear	false	witness.	
	
Such	heteronomous	morality	is	imposed	on	us	via	incentives.	Society	puts	huge	
effort	into	socialising	the	young	through	a	system	of	carrots	and	stick:	gold	stars	or	
treats	if	you	are	good,	black	marks	or	detention	if	you	are	bad.	The	system	continues	
in	adult	life:	praise	and	honour	for	those	who	behave	well;	criticism	and	punishment	
(even	up	to	death)	for	those	who	behave	badly.	
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Subtler	forms	of	pressure	reinforce	the	crude	form	of	carrots	and	sticks.	Religious	
myths	promise	heaven	in	the	after-life	for	those	who	follow	the	rules	and	threaten	
hell	for	those	who	break	them.	There	are	also	various	types	of	pressure	that	play	on	
our	emotions,	especially	guilt	and	pride.	If	we	behave	badly,	as	defined	by	our	
society,	we	often	feel	guilty	as	well;	and	if	we	behave	well,	we	may	feel	proud.	The	
dictates	of	our	culture	can	in	this	way	become	embodied	in	what	Sigmund	Freud	
called	the	superego,	internalising	a	system	of	carrots	and	sticks.	
	
All	these	forms	of	socialisation	are	heteronomous.	They	train	us	to	behave	
“morally”,	in	the	same	way	that	somebody	might	train	her	horse	to	jump	fences	by	
whipping	it	or	giving	it	sugar	lumps.	They	give	us	incentives	not	fully-fledged	reasons	
that	persuade	us	to	act	in	the	right	way	because	we	perceive	the	inherent	value	of	
doing	so.	
	
But	insofar	as	we	are	reflective	beings,	such	heteronomous	morality	can	never	be	
satisfactory.	We	can	ask	why	we	should	go	along	with	these	commands.	We	can	
question	whether	we	are	being	told	the	truth	and	whether	we	are	being	
manipulated.	Even	if	we	have	already	internalised	the	demands	of	our	culture	via	
our	emotions,	we	can	question	those	emotions.	Sometimes,	of	course,	we	will	find	
reasons	to	do	what	we’ve	been	conditioned	to	do.	Family,	friends,	teachers	and	
society	at	large	may	give	us	good	explanations.	But	if	reasons	are	not	forthcoming,	
we	will	feel	rules	are	being	imposed	upon	us	–	unless,	that	is,	we	break	them.	
	
It	was	part	of	Immanuel	Kant’s	genius	to	highlight	the	fact	that	any	type	of	morality	
that	we	don’t	buy	into	isn’t	truly	morality.	We	are	not	morally	required	to	do	
something	that	is	imposed	upon	us	without	any	reason	for	doing	so.	He	wrote:	“We	
cannot	possibly	conceive	of	a	reason	as	being	consciously	directed	from	outside	in	
regard	to	its	judgments;	for	in	that	case	the	subject	would	attribute	the	
determination	of	his	power	of	judgment,	not	to	his	reason,	but	to	an	impulsion.	
Reason	must	look	upon	itself	as	the	author	of	its	own	principles	independently	of	
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alien	influences.”77	This	led	him	to	the	conclusion	that	morality	had	to	be	
autonomous.	It	is	important	to	stress	that	this	insight	is	separate	from	his	further	
contentions	that	morality	means	living	by	principles	that	one	can	will	as	universal	
laws	and	that	such	laws,	in	turn,	have	to	range	impartially	over	all	rational	beings.	It	
may	be	possible	to	have	autonomous	morality	without	universal	principles	let	alone	
such	principles	being	applied	impartially.	
	
A	reflective	being	doesn’t	just	demand	reasons	to	act.	She	also	will	not	accept	as	a	
reason	any	argument	that	would	alienate	her	from	what	gives	her	life	meaning	–	
which,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	1,	involves	being	an	autonomous	agent.	Korsgaard	says	
that	to	violate	your	conception	of	yourself	“is	no	longer	to	be	able	to	think	of	
yourself	under	the	description	under	which	you	value	yourself	and	find	your	life	
worth	living	and	your	actions	worth	undertaking.	That	is	to	be	for	all	practical	
purposes	dead	or	worse	than	dead.”78		
	
Williams	makes	a	similar	point.	In	attacking	utilitarianism,	he	argues	that	it	is	
“absurd”	to	demand	that	somebody	sacrifices	what	he	cares	about	at	the	deepest	
level	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	increase	overall	happiness.	“It	is	to	alienate	him	in	
a	real	sense	from	his	actions	and	the	source	of	his	action	in	his	own	convictions.”79	In	
a	separate	paper,	Williams	attacks	impartial	morality,	which	he	takes	to	include	
Kantian	morality,	saying:	“There	can	come	a	point	at	which	it	is	quite	unreasonable	
for	a	man	to	give	up,	in	the	name	of	the	impartial	good	ordering	of	the	world	of	
moral	agents,	something	which	is	a	condition	of	his	having	any	interest	in	being	
around	in	that	world	at	all.”80	
	
Whether	Williams’	attacks	on	impartial	morality	are	valid	depends	on	what	one	
means	by	Kantian	morality.	The	requirement	that	morality	cannot	alienate	
somebody	from	what	gives	her	life	meaning	is	not,	in	itself,	inconsistent	with	the	
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78	Korsgaard,	1996,	p102.	
79	Williams,	1988,	p49.	
80	Williams,	1981a,	p14.	
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categorical	imperative.	It	would,	after	all,	be	possible	to	will	as	a	universal	law	that	
“nobody	should	be	required	to	sacrifice	what	gives	her	life	meaning.”		
	
Nevertheless,	both	Williams	and	Korsgaard	are	right	in	saying	that	we	cannot	be	
morally	required	to	alienate	ourselves	from	what	gives	our	lives	meaning.	To	
understand	why,	consider	how	a	moralist	could	give	us	a	reason	to	do	so.	Imagine	
she	was	a	utilitarian.	She	might,	for	example,	persuade	us	that	we	should	sacrifice	
our	own	happiness	in	the	interest	of	the	greater	good	by	pointing	out	that	the	
increase	in	other	people’s	wellbeing	would	outweigh	the	loss	of	our	wellbeing	many	
times	over.	But,	insofar	as	we	accept	this	as	a	genuine	reason	-	rather	than	going	
along	with	it	because	we	have	been	manipulated,	bullied	or	incentivised	by	
extraneous	factors	-	we	are	buying	into	it.	We	will	therefore	be	changing	what	we	
care	about.	As	such,	acting	as	the	moralist	proposes	will	not	ride	roughshod	over	
what	gives	meaning	to	our	lives.	Any	reason	the	moralist	can	give	us	which	we	
accept	as	autonomous	beings	cannot	therefore	alienate	us	from	our	raison	d’etre.	
	
A	meaningful	life	can	properly	include	caring	for	oneself	
	
The	third	source	of	normativity	is	the	“why?”	question	phrased	as	“what’s	the	
point?”	In	previous	chapters,	I	have	set	out	and	defended	my	conception	of	a	
meaningful	life.	I	wish,	though,	to	make	one	further	clarification:	caring	for	oneself	is	
normally,	and	appropriately,	part	of	a	meaningful	life.	It	might	seem	unnecessary	to	
stress	this,	in	that	my	definition	of	meaningfulness	doesn’t	put	any	restriction	on	
what	we	can	care	for	so	long	as	we	can	see	a	reason	to	care	for	it.	However,	Wolf	
takes	the	opposite	view.	She	argues	that	a	meaningful	life	has	to	be	involved	with	
“something	other	than	oneself	–	that	is,	with	something	the	value	of	which	is	
independent	of	and	has	its	source	outside	of	oneself”.81	
	
There	are	actually	two	different	ideas	here,	vying	for	attention.	To	give	meaning	to	
our	lives,	does	one	need	to	be	concerned	with	something	other	than	oneself	-	or	
																																																						
81	Wolf,	2010,	p19.	
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with	something	that	has	value	independent	of	oneself?	The	arguments	I	deployed	in	
the	last	chapter	pointed	to	the	conclusion	that	we	can’t	just	invent	what	we	have	
reason	to	care	for,	but	that	doesn’t	exclude	caring	for	ourselves.		
	
Caring	for	ourselves	–	including	the	basics	such	as	physical	and	mental	health	but	
also	looking	after	our	skills,	reputation,	financial	wellbeing	and	so	forth	-	is	normally	
an	essential	element	of	leading	a	meaningful	life.	If	we	are	mentally	or	physically	ill,	
have	low	skills,	have	a	bad	reputation	and	little	money,	we	will	rarely	be	able	to	
achieve	much.	We,	therefore,	have	every	reason	to	care	for	ourselves	–	and	that,	
under	my	conception	of	meaningfulness,	means	caring	for	ourselves	contributes	to	a	
meaningful	life.	
	
Wolf	accepts	that	a	meaningful	life	doesn’t	have	to	be	focussed	on	other	people.	We	
can	derive	meaning	from	caring	for	things	like	playing	the	cello,	doing	philosophy	or	
keeping	our	garden	free	of	weeds.	However,	because	she	wrongly	thinks	that	only	
things	independent	of	ourselves	can	have	value	independent	of	ourselves,	she	thinks	
we	can’t	derive	meaning	from	caring	for	ourselves.	She	states	that	“a	life	lacks	
meaning	if	it	is	totally	egocentric,	devoted	solely	toward	the	subject’s	own	survival	
and	welfare”.82	This	leads	her	to	a	paradox:	“If	finding	food	and	shelter	for	one’s	
child,	nursing	one’s	partner	back	to	health,	rescuing	one’s	wounded	comrade	from	
the	hands	of	death,	are	worthwhile	activities,	why	shouldn’t	feeding,	sheltering,	
healing,	and	rescuing	oneself	be	worthwhile	as	well?”83	She	aims	to	resolve	her	
paradox	by	saying	that	looking	after	oneself	can	have	value	but	that	doesn’t	make	a	
life	meaningful.	
	
Wolf	has	created	an	unnecessary	paradox	and	there	is	therefore	no	need	to	engage	
in	such	verbal	somersaults	to	escape	it.	Given	her	worldview,	Robinson	Crusoe’s	
efforts	to	survive	and	take	care	of	his	mental	and	physical	health	would	not	
contribute	to	a	meaningful	life.	Nor	do	our	own,	whereas	in	fact	they	are	normally	a	
necessary	component	of	a	meaningful	life.		
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	 54	
	
If	we	accept	that	caring	for	oneself	is	an	important	and	legitimate	part	of	leading	a	
meaningful	life,	we	will	also	see	that	such	a	life	may	well	be	a	happy	one.	Not	only	is	
there	the	special	track-happiness	that	comes	from	living	meaningfully.	If	somebody	
succeeds	in	taking	care	of	herself,	she	will	probably	have	lots	of	other	pleasures	too.	
She	will,	for	a	start,	be	physically	and	mentally	healthy,	have	a	good	reputation	and	
sufficient	financial	resources.	These	are	typically	the	basis	for	much	buffet-
happiness.	What’s	more,	enjoying	life	is	not	an	irrelevant	extra	for	somebody	
pursuing	a	meaningful	life.	After	all,	it	is	often	a	sign	that	she	is	functioning	well,	
which	in	turn	enhances	her	ability	to	engage	effectively	in	things	she	cares	for	–	
which	is	part	of	my	conception	of	meaningfulness.	By	contrast,	if	she	is	stressed,	in	
pain	and	grouchy,	she	will	normally	not	be	as	effective	as	an	agent.	
	
Having	clarified	that	the	pursuit	of	a	meaningful	life	can	properly	involve	caring	for	
oneself,	I	am	now	finally	ready	to	explain	why	reflective	beings	have	reason	to	
pursue	a	meaningful	life.	Remember	that	I	have	defined	a	meaningful	life	as	one	
effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	
for.	Imagine	somebody	disputes	this.	Which	element	is	she	going	to	dispute:	that	we	
should	care	for	things:	that	we	should	do	so	effectively;	or	that	we	should	be	able	to	
see	why	we	should	do	so?		
	
My	answer	to	these	potential	objections	is	as	follows:	first,	we	have	reasons	to	care	
for	things	because	doing	so	gives	us,	as	Wolf	rightly	says,	reasons	to	live;	second,	we	
have	reasons	to	do	this	effectively	because	we	will	then	live	better;	third,	we	have	
reasons	to	be	able	to	see	why	we	care	for	what	we	do	to	make	sure	that	we	are	not	
wasting	our	lives	on	worthless	endeavours.	
	
Accepting	role	of	meaning	leads	to	less	fragmented	lives	
	
I	have	argued	in	this	chapter	that	we	don’t	have	reason	to	pursue	a	good	life	unless	
our	conception	of	a	good	life	includes	leading	a	meaningful	one;	that	we	don’t	have	
reason	to	lead	an	ethical	life	if	this	involves	alienating	us	from	our	raison	d’etre;	and	
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that	a	meaningful	life	properly	includes	caring	for	ourselves.	I	now	wish	to	consider	
whether	these	three	types	of	life,	suitably	defined,	are	in	radical	conflict	in	the	way	
that	Wolf	suggested.	Each	purports	to	give	recommendations	about	what	we	should	
do.	Could	they	end	up	giving	conflicting	recommendations?		
	
These	definitions	of	happiness,	morality	and	meaningfulness	would	seem	to	reduce	
the	extent	of	conflict,	but	not	to	eliminate	it.	What’s	more,	it	would	seem	that	
people	pursuing	these	types	of	life	would	still	be	susceptible	to	tragic	conflicts.		
	
For	example,	while	I	have	argued	that	pursuing	a	meaningful	life	has	its	pleasures,	it	
is	not	guaranteed	to	make	us	buffet-happy.	It	will	sometimes	involve	hard	work,	pain	
and	suffering.	Fate	may	deal	us	an	unlucky	hand,	requiring	us	to	suffer	great	
hardship	if	we	want	to	keep	acting	meaningfully.	We	may	face	a	choice	between	
being	track-happy	or	buffet-happy	–	say,	if	we	need	to	sell	out	on	what	we	deeply	
care	for	in	return	for	an	easy	life.	This	was	the	choice	the	Chinese	authorities	gave	
the	Liu	Xiaobo,	the	pro-democracy	Nobel	Laureate,	according	to	his	lawyer:	freedom	
in	return	for	a	confession	of	guilt.	He	turned	it	down	and	died	in	jail.84	So	somebody	
seeking	a	meaningful	life	won’t	necessarily	be	fully	happy.	But	she	will	have	the	
happiest	life	a	reflective	creature	can	live	in	the	circumstances	that	she	finds	herself	
in	–	even	if	she	goes	the	whole	way	and	dies	for	something	she	rightly	cares	for,	as	
Socrates,	Gandhi	and	Liu	Xiaobo	did.		
	
Or	consider	a	young	man	on	the	24th	floor	of	a	burning	tower	block.	He	knows	that	if	
he	runs	down	the	stairs,	he	can	save	himself.	But	his	elderly	parents,	whom	he	
adores,	are	also	on	the	24th	floor	and	not	in	a	position	to	save	themselves.	He	thinks	
he	has	time	to	carry	one	of	them	slung	over	his	shoulder	to	safety.	But	he’s	not	sure	
–	and,	in	any	case,	he	certainly	can’t	carry	them	both	or	do	the	round	trip,	taking	one	
down	before	climbing	the	stairs	to	rescue	the	second.	There’s	a	further	
complication.	On	the	same	floor	there	are	two	young	children	he	barely	knows	who	
moved	in	the	previous	week.	He	thinks	he	could	probably	carry	both	of	them	to	
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safety	–	one	under	each	arm.	What	should	he	do?	This	is	not	such	a	fanciful	example.	
The	UK	press	carried	stories	in	June	2017	of	a	young	man	who	carried	his	disabled	
mother	to	safety	from	the	Grenfell	Tower	fire.85	His	father	died.	
	
This	man	may	suffer	a	conflict	of	values.	If	he	is	concerned	with	his	narrow	self-
interest,	he	will	run	down	the	stairs	and	save	himself.	If	he	is	a	utilitarian,	he	will	put	
himself	at	some	risk	and	try	to	save	the	two	young	children.	If	he	is	concerned	with	
what	he	cares	about,	he	will	again	put	himself	at	some	risk	but	in	this	case	try	to	save	
one	of	his	parents.	But	even	if	he	chooses	to	fight	for	what	he	cares	for,	he	will	still	
face	a	dilemma.	Which	parent	should	he	save?	In	other	words,	he	will	face	a	conflict	
not	just	between	three	perspectives	over	what	to	do	–	but,	even	within	the	
perspective	of	what	is	meaningful,	there	will	be	a	terrible	dilemma.	
	
Williams	thinks	that	in	such	a	kind	of	tragic	conflict	of	values,	“an	agent	can	
justifiably	think	that	whatever	he	does	will	be	wrong”.86	Whether	that’s	the	case	
isn’t	clear.	After	all,	Williams	acknowledges	that	“it	can	actually	emerge	from	
deliberation	that	one	of	the	courses	of	action	is	the	one	that,	all	things	considered,	
one	had	better	take.”	87	So	it’s	possible	that	the	young	man	will	decide	that	the	
course	of	action	he	actually	takes	is	the	least	bad	option	available	–	and,	as	such,	
that	he	hasn’t	done	anything	wrong.	Perhaps	he	decides	to	rescue	his	mother,	
reflecting	that	he	couldn’t	live	with	himself	if	he	saved	his	skin	but	left	her	to	die.	
Perhaps	he	chooses	to	save	his	mother	rather	than	his	father,	in	part	because	he	
knows	that	this	is	what	his	father	would	expect	him	to	do.	Perhaps	he	thinks	that	he	
can’t	be	morally	required	to	sacrifice	his	mother	for	two	children	he	barely	knows.	
He	will	probably	be	haunted	by	the	trauma	for	a	long	time.	But	maybe	eventually,	
through	deep	reflection	and	love,	he	will	also	conclude	that	he	hasn’t	after	all	done	
anything	wrong.	
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I’m	not	arguing	that	it	will	necessarily	be	possible	to	resolve	such	conflicts.	I	leave	
this	as	an	open	question.	What	I	am,	though,	suggesting	is	that	the	clash	of	values	
will	be	less	sharp	if	we	accept	that	for	reflective	creatures	a	good	life	has	to	include	
meaning,	that	an	ethical	life	can’t	ride	roughshod	over	meaning	and	that	a	
meaningful	life	can	legitimately	include	caring	for	oneself.	By	giving	a	place	for	
meaningfulness	in	our	conceptions	of	happiness	and	morality,	we	will	therefore	be	
less	fragmented	than	if	we	don’t.	This	is	the	first	part	of	the	answer	to	my	thesis	
question:	to	what	extent	is	a	meaningful	life	an	integrated	one?	
	 58	
5	
Integrating	one’s	agency	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	I	argued	that	giving	a	place	for	meaningfulness	in	our	conception	
of	happiness	and	morality	will	lead	to	a	less	fragmented	life.	In	the	next	three	
chapters	I	look	at	the	connections	between	integration	and	meaningfulness	from	the	
other	direction.	Rather	than	exploring	how	pursuing	a	meaningful	life	contributes	to	
living	an	integrated	one,	I	examine	how	an	integrated	life	contributes	to	a	
meaningful	one.	In	this	chapter,	I	consider	integrating	one’s	agency.	In	Chapter	6,	I	
look	at	integrating	oneself.	In	Chapter	7,	I	examine	integrating	with	one’s	world.	
There	are	links	between	three	types	of	integration,	which	I	explore	in	the	concluding	
chapter.	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	first	explain	that	I	mean	by	the	integration	of	agency	the	alignment	
of	what	we	care	about	with	our	judgments,	values,	principles	and	actions.	Then	I	
argue	that	principles	provide	the	intellectual	architecture	of	agency,	before	looking	
at	how	wide	and	deep	reflection	is	a	central	way	of	integrating	one’s	agency.	I	argue	
that	such	integrated	agency	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	by	enabling	us	both	to	
understand	more	deeply	the	things	we	care	about	and	engage	more	effectively	with	
them.	Finally,	I	consider	a	challenge	to	the	effect	that	fragmented	agency	might	be	
more	meaningful	than	integrated	agency.	
	
What	is	integration	of	agency?	
	
An	agent	is	a	being	that	acts.	By	acting,	I	don’t	mean	just	moving	her	limbs	but	doing	
things	for	a	purpose.		
	
People’s	actions	are	influenced	by	what	they	care	about.	Typically,	they	care	about	
lots	of	specific	things.	They	also	make	specific	judgments	about	what	is	the	right	
thing	to	do	in	a	particular	situation.	What’s	more,	people	have	values,	which	express	
what	they	care	about	at	a	more	general	level.	Such	values,	in	turn,	can	be	expressed	
in	principles.	Principles	are	rules	about	how	to	act	in	particular	types	of	situation.	
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They	generalise,	in	the	sense	that	the	same	sort	of	action	is	supposed	to	follow	if	the	
same	sort	of	situation	arises.	Principles	usually	express	in	more	detail	the	essence	of	
what	is	contained	in	values.	People	also	typically	care	deeply	about	their	values	and	
their	principles.	
	
The	integration	of	agency	is	the	alignment	of	what	we	care	about	with	our	
judgments,	values,	principles	and	actions.	What	we	think	should	be	done	in	general	
dovetails	with	what	we	think	should	be	done	in	specific	cases.	What’s	more,	insofar	
as	we	are	the	ones	who	are	supposed	to	be	acting,	we	are	then	able	to	do	what	we	
should	do	and	then	actually	do	it.	This	requires	willpower.	Integration	of	agency	is	
partly	what	is	meant	by	integrity.	
	
Such	integration	is	an	ideal.	Few,	if	any	people,	meet	it.	Integration	comes	in	
degrees.	It	is	possible	for	our	agency	to	be	fragmented	in	many	ways.	Broadly	
speaking,	we	can	distinguish	between	conflicts	within	a	class	of	things	relevant	for	
our	agency	(for	example	between	specific	things	we	care	about);	and	conflicts	
between	classes	of	things	relevant	for	our	agency	(for	example	between	our	actions	
and	our	principles).		
	
Principles	provide	the	intellectual	architecture	of	our	agency	
	
Korsgaard	states	that	“the	reflective	structure	of	human	consciousness	requires	that	
you	identify	yourself	with	some	law	or	principle	that	will	govern	your	choices.”88	G.	
A.	Cohen,	in	his	commentary	on	Korsgaard’s	Tanner	lectures,	flatly	disputes	this,	
saying:	“It	is	not	true,	that	the	structure	of	my	consciousness	requires	that	I	identify	
myself	with	some	law	or	principle....	sometimes	the	commands	that	I	issue	will	be	
singular,	not	universal.”89	
	
Cohen	is	right.	The	things	I	care	for	–	which,	in	turn,	gives	me	reasons	for	action	-	can	
be	very	particular.	I	love	my	daughter.	I	care	for	my	garden.	I	think	Britain’s	
																																																						
88	Korsgaard,	1996,	pp103-104.	
89	Cohen	p176.	
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membership	of	the	European	Union	is	valuable.	These,	in	turn,	give	me	reasons	to	
help	my	daughter,	water	my	plants	and	fight	Brexit.	Principles,	on	the	other	hand,	
generalise	what	should	be	done	beyond	the	specific	situation.	We	don’t	strictly	
speaking	need	them	to	act.	Korsgaard	has	overstated	her	case.	
	
However,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	principles	don’t	matter.	To	the	contrary,	they	
provide	the	intellectual	architecture	for	our	agency.	This	is	because	principles	are	
both	general	and	articulated.	If	all	we	had	were	specific	things	we	cared	about,	
specific	judgments	and	specific	actions,	our	agency	could	only	be	partly	integrated.	
Our	actions,	judgments	and	what	we	care	about	could	be	aligned	in	particular	cases;	
but	there	wouldn’t	be	any	thread	linking	our	agency	in	one	case	with	other	
situations.	
	
Values	are	also	general.	But	they	are	normally	not	as	articulated	as	principles.	
Imagine	you	value	honesty.	That	could	mean	a	lot	of	different	things.	Principles	tend	
to	spell	out	more	precisely	what	is	meant.	For	example,	the	value	of	honesty	could	
be	articulated	as	“I	should	tell	the	truth”,	“politicians	should	tell	the	truth”,	“people	
should	tell	the	truth”	or	all	three.	It	is	also	possible	to	elaborate	principles	in	more	
detail.	For	example,	I	could	modify	“I	should	tell	the	truth”	to	read	“I	should	tell	the	
truth	to	people	who	care	for	me	but	not	to	those	who	don’t”.	
	
Principles	don’t	just	group	specific	cases	of	agency	under	a	common	rubric;	lower-
level	principles	can	in	turn	be	grouped	under	higher-level	ones.	Consider	three	fairly	
low-level	principles:	“take	regular	breaks	when	using	the	computer”,	“always	pay	for	
a	bus	ticket”	or	“make	sure	there’s	always	enough	food	in	the	fridge”.		The	first	could	
be	included	with	other	maxims	such	as	“brush	your	teeth	before	going	to	bed”	under	
the	slightly	higher-level	principle,	“take	care	of	your	physical	health”.	This,	in	turn,	
could	be	grouped	with	other	maxims	such	as	“take	care	of	your	reputation”	and	
“look	after	your	finances”	in	a	still	higher-level	principle,	“lead	a	good	life”.	
	
Meanwhile,	“always	pay	for	a	bus	ticket”	could	be	included	with	other	maxims	such	
as	“don’t	cheat	when	playing	games”	under	a	higher-level	principle,	“act	honestly”.	
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This,	in	turn,	could	be	grouped	with	other	maxims	such	as	“stand	up	to	bullies”	or	
“treat	people	fairly”	under	the	still	higher-level	principle,	“act	morally”.	Finally,	
“make	sure	there’s	always	enough	food	in	the	fridge”	could	be	included	with	maxims	
such	as	“feed	the	cat	twice	a	day”	under	the	higher-level	principle,	“care	for	the	
physical	needs	of	your	nearest	and	dearest”.	This,	in	turn,	could	be	included	with	
maxims	such	as	“don’t	waste	energy	on	futile	pursuits”	in	the	still	higher-level	
principle,	“engage	effectively	with	what	you	care	for”.	
	
Integrating	agency	through	reflection	
	
By	saying	that	principles	provide	the	intellectual	architecture	of	agency,	I	don’t	mean	
to	suggest	that	our	principles	should	trump	our	specific	judgments,	what	we	care	
about	or	our	values	in	deciding	what	to	do.	When	there’s	a	clash	we	need	to	reflect.	
And	this	could	mean	adjusting	our	principles,	values,	intuitive	judgments	or	what	we	
care	about	–	or	more	than	one	of	these.		
	
Consider	the	following	example.	I	have	agreed	to	go	to	a	friend’s	birthday.	I	care	for	
him.	I	want	to	go	and	he	wants	me	there.	I	also	think	it’s	important	to	keep	my	
promises.	So	I	have	reasons	to	go,	some	of	which	stem	from	the	fact	that	I	care	for	
him	and	one	of	which	is	a	general	principle	about	keeping	promises.	But	since	I	
agreed	to	attend,	there	has	been	a	fire	in	a	tower	block	in	my	neighbourhood	killing	
100	people.	There’s	a	church	ceremony	to	commemorate	the	dead	at	the	same	time	
as	my	friend’s	birthday.	I	didn’t	know	anybody	who	died	but	I	do	know	somebody	
who	survived.	I	think	it’s	important	to	show	solidarity	with	my	community.	So	I	have	
good	reasons	to	go	to	the	church.	But	I	can’t	be	in	two	places	at	the	same	time.	
What	should	I	do?		
	
Well,	I	can	reflect	on	how	strong	each	of	the	reasons	is.	How	much	would	I	be	
missed	in	each	case	if	I	didn’t	attend?	Is	there	any	way	of	making	amends	to	my	
friend,	say	by	inviting	him	to	dinner	at	a	separate	time?	If	I	explain	why	I	might	not	
attend	and	apologise,	will	he	release	me	from	my	promise?	Equally,	is	there	an	
alternative	ceremony	to	honour	the	dead?	I	can	reflect	on	how	important	the	
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principle	of	keeping	my	promises	is	–	and	whether	honouring	the	dead	matters	
more.	
	
In	finally	deciding	what	to	do,	I	clarify	what	I	really	care	for	and	what	my	principles	
are	–	and	therefore	I	make	clear	to	myself	what	is	meaningful	in	my	life.	I	may,	for	
example,	modify	my	principle	about	keeping	promises	to	something	like	“keep	
promises	except	when	there	is	a	good	reason	to	break	them	–	in	which	case,	
apologise	and	make	amends”.	This	may	be	a	useful	elaboration	of	my	initial	
principle.	But,	even	then,	the	new	principle	won’t	cover	all	possible	situations.	It	
may,	for	example,	be	impossible	to	apologise	or	make	amends	if,	say,	the	person	one	
should	be	apologising	to	dies	before	I’m	able	to	–	and	it	leaves	open	the	question	of	
what	would	be	a	good	reason	to	break	a	promise.	
	
This	process	of	integrating	our	agency	through	reflection	is	akin	to	what	Norman	
Daniels,	following	Rawls,	has	termed	seeking	“wide	reflective	equilibrium”90.	
However,	there	are	several	differences	between	the	system	Daniels	sets	out	and	the	
approach	I	am	advocating.	For	a	start,	Daniels	views	the	process	as	achieving	
coherence	between	one’s	moral	principles,	specific	judgments	and	background	
theories,	such	as	one’s	theory	of	a	person.	I	think	these	are	all	relevant,	but	I	have	
included	actions	and	what	one	cares	in	the	mix.	In	fully	integrating	our	agency,	we	
need	to	align	all	of	these.	I	also	view	principles	as	any	rule	of	thumb	over	how	to	act,	
such	as	brushing	one’s	teeth	regularly,	not	merely	those	that	are	viewed	as	narrowly	
moral.91		
	
Such	reflection	is	not	a	one-off	process	that	achieves	stability	once	and	for	all.	It	
leads,	at	most,	to	a	temporary	harmony.	The	work	needed	to	integrate	a	reflective	
being’s	agency	never	ends,	except	in	death	or	dementia.	What’s	more,	the	process	
of	seeking	reflective	equilibrium	is	not	confined	to	integrating	one’s	agency.	It	can	
also	be	used	to	integrate	oneself	and	integrate	with	one’s	world	–	processes	to	be	
																																																						
90	Daniels,	pp256-282.	See	also	Rawls,	especially	p	11,	pp39-44	and	pp506-509.	
91	I	explore	the	process	of	seeking	reflective	equilibrium	in	one	of	my	MPhil	Stud	
essays,	Dixon,	2016b.	
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explored	in	future	chapters.	In	such	endeavours,	it	is	important	to	reflect	on	many	
others	things	too	–	including	one’s	emotions,	plans	and	desires	and	how	one	came	to	
be	who	one	is,	as	well	as	the	feelings,	projects	and	histories	of	those	we	care	for.		
	
In	other	words,	the	reflection	we	engage	in	to	integrate	ourselves	may	need	to	be	
very	wide	indeed.	It	may	also,	as	argued	by	Charles	Taylor,	be	very	deep,	going	to	the	
core	of	our	being.	He	notes	this	is	challenging:	“It	is	those	[evaluations]	which	are	
closest	to	what	I	am	as	a	subject,	in	the	sense	that	shorn	of	them	I	would	break	
down	as	a	person,	which	are	among	the	hardest	for	me	to	be	clear	about.”	92	That	
said,	we	should	be	clear	that	such	deep	reflection	–	and	the	consequent	deep	
integration	of	our	agency	–	is	an	ideal,	rather	than	something	that	is	essential.	In	
this,	I	part	company	with	Taylor	who	says	this	radical	evaluation	“engages	my	whole	
self”	and	is	“essential	to	our	notion	of	a	person.”	Similarly,	I	take	issue	with	
Korsgaard	who	writes	that	it	is	“essential”	to	the	concept	of	agency	that	an	agent	
sees	her	actions	as	the	expression	of	her	“self	as	a	whole.”93	How	many	of	us,	if	
indeed	any	of	us,	are	really	able	to	engage	our	whole	selves	in	action?	
	
Integration	of	agency	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	
	
Such	integration	of	agency	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	in	two	ways.	First,	we	will	
be	better	able	to	interpret	who	we	are	and	the	purpose	of	our	lives.	On	a	subjective	
level,	our	lives	will	add	up	more	because	our	principles,	values,	specific	judgments,	
actions	and	what	we	care	about	will	be	aligned.	By	contrast,	if	our	agency	is	highly	
fragmented	and	we	are	pulled	in	different	directions,	it	will	be	nigh	impossible	to	tell	
a	story	to	ourselves	about	what	we	stand	for	and	why	the	things	we	care	for	matter.	
	
Second,	if	our	agency	is	integrated,	we	will	normally	be	able	to	engage	more	
effectively	with	the	things	we	care	for.	We	will	have	clear	aims.	We	will	have	
harnessed	our	energy	and	talents,	and	directed	them	towards	hitting	those	goals.	
																																																						
92	Charles	Taylor,	1982,	p124.	
93	Korsgaard,	2009,	p18.	
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And	we	won’t	be	so	beset	by	internal	conflict,	which	hamstrings	us	from	acting	
decisively	and	with	vigour.	
	
What’s	more,	given	our	intensely	social	nature,	influencing	others	is	an	especially	
important	element	of	our	ability	to	engage	effectively	with	what	we	care	for.	Mostly	
this	relies	on	persuading	rather	than	telling	them	what	to	do.	Hypocrites	find	it	hard	
to	get	people	to	do	what	they	want	because	what	they	do	doesn’t	match	up	with	
what	they	say.	By	contrast,	somebody	who	has	integrated	her	agency	will	be	in	a	
particularly	good	position	to	influence	others	because	she	will	be	living	according	to	
principles	and	her	actions	will	be	in	accord	with	those	principles.	She	will	be	
practising	what	she	preaches.	Gandhi	and	Socrates	both	exemplified	this	type	of	
integrated	agency	to	a	great	degree	and	both	had	a	huge	impact	on	humanity	with	
the	result	that	their	lives	were	especially	meaningful.	
	
To	be	clear,	I	am	not	arguing	that	agents	should	be	insensitive	to	the	circumstances	
in	which	they	operate	–	that	they	should,	as	it	were,	adopt	a	cookie	cutter	approach	
to	life.	Far	from	it.	Effective	action	needs	to	be	deeply	sensitive	to	the	circumstances.	
As	such,	I	have	no	issue	with	the	idea	that,	given	our	complex	societies	and	the	
multiple	roles	we	inhabit	within	them,	that	a	particularly	useful	skill	is	to	practise	
what	Lillehammer	calls	the	art	of	separation,	“whereby	people	who	occupy	different	
social	roles	may	cultivate	the	ability	to	distinguish	between	different	‘spheres	of	life’	
and	the	proper	place	of	different	ethically	relevant	considerations	in	some	spheres	
of	life	as	opposed	to	others.”94	However,	tailoring	one’s	actions	appropriately	to	the	
circumstances	is	different	from	being	fragmented.	Indeed,	reflecting	on	the	nuances	
of	different	circumstances	can	enhance	the	art	of	separation.	It	can	also	help	
integrate	rather	than	divide	one’s	agency	by	articulating	more	sophisticated	views	
about	how	to	act.	
	
It	could	be	objected	that	saying	people	will	normally	engage	more	effectively	with	
what	they	care	for	if	their	agency	is	integrated	is	an	empirical	generalisation.	
																																																						
94	Lillehammer	p119.	
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However,	as	I	already	argued	briefly	in	Chapter	1,	integration	of	agency	is	a	
defeasible	criterion	for	effective	engagement	–	by	which	I	mean	that	there	is	a	
conceptual	connection	between	integration	of	agency	and	effective	engagement,	
albeit	one	that	can	be	defeated	by	circumstances.	Similarly,	somebody	whose	
agency	is	fragmented	may	still	have	an	impact	in	the	world	but	it	won’t	be	the	
purposeful	directed	action	that	is	necessary	to	give	our	lives	meaning.	
	
Imagine	a	politician	who	is	radically	fragmented,	so	much	so	that	she	has	two	rival	
value	systems	and	doesn’t	reflect	on	why	it	might	be	appropriate	sometimes	to	
follow	one	set	of	values	and	sometimes	the	other.	Let’s	say	her	two	value	systems	
are	self-interest	and	morality.	When	she’s	in	the	realm	of	self-interest,	she	believes	
the	ends	justify	the	means.	Because	she	believes	it’s	in	her	interest	to	become	prime	
minister,	she	thinks	she	is	therefore	justified	to	lie,	bribe	and	make	false	promises	to	
the	electorate	in	order	to	win	an	election.	But	when	she	puts	her	ethical	hat	on,	she	
thinks	lying,	bribing	and	making	false	promises	are	wrong.	By	definition,	because	
she’s	deeply	fragmented,	she	cannot	even	attempt	resolve	this	conflict.	
	
So	what	happens?	Well,	perhaps	she’s	paralysed	by	indecision	–	in	which	case	she	
certainly	won’t	engage	effectively	with	anything.	Or	perhaps	she	flips	in	a	Jekyll-and-
Hyde-like	fashion	between	acting	ethically	and	acting	ruthlessly.	In	each	case,	we	can	
say	she	has	agency	because	she	is	acting	with	a	purpose.	But	won’t	her	two	types	of	
action,	in	the	normal	case,	undermine	one	another?	When	she	has	qualms	about	
lying,	she	won’t	be	as	brazen	in	pushing	out	alternative	facts	as	some	other	
politicians	and	so	may	lose	out	in	her	attempt	to	become	prime	minister.	Equally,	
when	she	lies	and	cheats,	she	will	undermine	her	ability	to	pursue	the	things	she	
cares	about	when	she’s	wearing	her	ethical	hat.	
	
But	isn’t	it	also	possible	that,	by	accident,	her	actions	will	support	rather	than	
undermine	one	another?	Imagine	that	she	sacks	a	colleague	found	guilty	of	bribery	
and	does	this	for	ethical	reasons	with	her	Jekyll	hat	on,	but	that	it	wins	plaudits	with	
the	public	and	helps	her	advance	her	Hyde-like	agenda	of	becoming	prime	minister.	
Or	imagine,	in	the	contrary	case,	that	she	sacks	the	colleague	in	order	to	win	plaudits	
	 66	
with	the	public	with	her	Hyde	hat	on,	but	that	this	has	the	by-product	of	advancing	
her	Jekyll-like	ethical	agenda.	In	both	of	these	cases,	she	accidentally	achieves	a	goal	
that	her	alter	ego	happens	to	hold.	But	when	she’s	acting	like	Jekyll,	she	doesn’t	
achieve	his	goals;	and	when	she’s	acting	like	Hyde	she	doesn’t	achieve	his	goals	
either.		
	
I,	therefore,	conclude	that	integrated	agency	does,	in	the	normal	case,	contribute	to	
more	effective	engagement	in	what	one	cares	for.	
	 	
	 67	
	
6	
Integrating	oneself	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	I	argued	that	integrating	our	agency	–	the	alignment	of	what	we	
care	about	with	our	values,	judgments,	principles	and	action	–	contributes	to	a	
meaningful	life.	In	this	chapter,	I	consider	the	integration	of	emotions,	memories,	
purposes,	projects	and	plans	–	and	how	this	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	But,	as	
already	mentioned,	there	isn’t	a	sharp	divide	between	these	two	types	of	
integration.	I	highlight	some	conceptions	between	them	in	the	final	chapter.		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	first	argue	that	human	beings	have	complex	psychologies.	The	self	is	
not	a	simple	thing	that	exists	fully	formed	at	birth	and	continues	unchanged	until	
death.	A	person,	rather,	is	constructed	throughout	a	life.	
		
I	then	argue	that	psychological	integration	typically	leads	to	mental	health	and,	with	
it,	an	ability	to	harness	one’s	talents	and	energies	and	therefore	to	engage	
effectively	with	what	one	cares	deeply	about.	It	also	normally	gives	one	a	deeper	
understanding	of	oneself	and	what	one	cares	for.		
	
I	next	look	at	a	closely	linked	phenomenon,	temporal	integration.	This	has	two	
aspects,	making	sense	of	one’s	past	and	connecting	with	one’s	future	selves.	I	argue	
that	understanding	one’s	past	is	an	important	part	of	making	sense	of	the	things	one	
cares	about	–	and	that	the	knowledge	that	comes	from	being	integrated	with	one’s	
past	contributes	to	one’s	ability	to	engage	effectively	with	those	things.		
	
I	finally	turn	to	integration	with	one’s	future.	A	big	part	of	such	integration	is	having	
purposes,	projects	and	plans.	These	help	somebody	engage	effectively	with	what	she	
cares	about	and	clarify	what	caring	about	specific	things	actually	amounts	to.	
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Self	is	constructed	
	
For	people	who	believe	in	an	immortal	soul,	the	self	is	a	simple	concept.	The	self	or	
the	person	is	merely	the	soul,	which	exists	eternally	and	is	the	subject	of	experience	
and	action.	Pretty	much	the	same	goes	for	those	who	believe	in	a	mortal	soul,	the	
only	difference	being	that	the	self	comes	into	existence	fully	formed	at	birth	(or	
perhaps	conception)	and	then	vanishes	at	death.	But,	for	those	who	rely	on	their	
observations,	the	self	is	more	complex.	It	doesn’t	emerge	at	birth	like	Athena	
springing	in	her	shining	armour	from	the	head	of	Zeus.	It	develops	as	the	foetus	
becomes	first	a	baby,	then	a	child,	then	an	adolescent	and	then	an	adult.	It	often	
decays	in	old	age	with	dementia.	The	person	changes	through	life.	It’s	not	just	her	
body	that	changes.	So	does	her	mind.	As	Heraclitus	wrote,	πάντα	ῥεῖ	“everything	
flows”	–	and	that	goes	for	the	self	too.	
	
What’s	more,	it’s	not	just	that	the	self	develops	over	time.	At	any	point	in	time,	
there	is	a	complex	mass	of	reflections,	emotions,	desires,	beliefs,	memories,	
purposes,	projects,	plans	and	other	things	we	are	conscious	of.	There’s	also	a	special	
part	of	our	consciousness	–	our	ability	to	reflect	on	the	contents	of	our	mind	and,	
indeed,	on	whom	we	are.	As	already	argued	in	Chapter	2,	it	is	this	reflective	capacity	
that	can	set	us	off	on	the	journey	of	seeking	meaning	in	the	first	place.	
	
Freud	added	further	depth	to	our	understanding	of	the	self	by	revealing	the	
powerful	role	the	unconscious	mind	plays	in	our	lives.95	Our	selves	don’t	just	evolve	
over	time;	there	are	huge	chunks	of	our	selves	that	we	are	unaware	of.	This	is	partly	
because	they	just	don’t	come	to	mind;	but	Freud’s	key	insight	was	that	feelings,	
memories	and	perceptions	may	be	repressed	because	being	aware	of	them	is	
painful.	These	repressed	parts	of	the	self	don’t	go	away;	they	often	erupt	in	
unexpected	ways.	
	
																																																						
95	See	Freud,	The	Interpretation	of	Dreams.	
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The	self	is,	therefore,	not	a	simple	thing	that	continues	unchanging	through	life.	
Rather	it	is	something	that	is	constructed	over	time.	What’s	more,	the	job	of	
integration	is	not	a	one-off	effort.	It	continues	through	life.		
	
Psychological	integration	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	
	
A	person	who	is	psychologically	integrated	is	able	to	access	and	bring	into	harmony	
the	different	parts	of	her	personality.	In	this	section,	I	will	focus	mainly	on	being	in	
touch	with	one’s	emotions	and	aligning	them	with	our	intellect.	In	the	following	
sections,	I	will	look	at	being	in	touch	with	one’s	past,	via	one’s	memories,	and	with	
one’s	future,	via	one’s	purposes,	projects	and	plans.	I	accept,	though,	that	there	is	
no	sharp	division	between	these	aspects	of	integrating	oneself.	
	
Psychological	integration	leads	to	mental	health.	This	is	why	the	psychoanalyst	
Margot	Waddell	writes	that:	“The	aim	of	psychoanalysis	could	be	described	as	
seeking	to	make	available	to	the	patient	more	aspects	of	the	self.”96	Meanwhile,	
psychological	disintegration	is	equated	with	madness.	As	Søren	Kierkegaard	put	it:	
“Can	you	think	of	anything	more	frightful	than	that	it	might	end	with	your	nature	
being	resolved	into	a	multiplicity,	that	you	really	might	become	many,	become,	like	
those	unhappy	demoniacs,	a	legion,	and	you	thus	would	have	lost	the	inmost	and	
holiest	thing	of	all	in	a	man,	the	unifying	power	of	personality?”97	
	
There	are	many	forms	of	fragmentation	that	fall	short	of	madness	but	are	still	
unhealthy.	Psychoanalytical	literature,	starting	with	Freud,	is	full	of	examples	of	how	
personalities	can	be	splintered.	The	general	idea	is	that	suppressing	feelings,	
memories	and	the	like	are	defence	mechanisms	that	help	us	deal	with	mental	pain.	
These	may	be	reasonably	healthy	short-term	options,	but	they	are	sub-optimal	if	
they	become	chronic.		
	
																																																						
96	Waddell	p61.	
97	Kierkegaard	p164.	
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I	will	briefly	describe	some	examples	of	defence	mechanisms	by	way	of	illustration.	
One	identified	by	Freud	is	“denial”.	Although	this	succeeds	in	pushing	an	unpleasant	
feeling	underground,	the	individual	typically	suffers	from	psychosomatic	symptoms,	
destructive	behaviour	or	various	types	of	mental	illness,	such	as	depression,	anxiety	
and	rage.	Somebody	who	has	repressed	parts	of	her	personality	will	not	be	able	to	
tap	into	her	emotions	properly	and	reflect	upon	the	messages	they	are	sending	her.	
Another	common	defence	mechanism	is	to	expel	our	pain	and	anxiety	by	
“projecting”	it	onto	others,	often	in	the	form	of	anger.	This	is	most	clearly	seen	in	
babies,	who	howl	when	they	are	anxious	or	in	pain.	Meanwhile,	a	typical	defence	
mechanism	for	somebody	who	lacks	self-confidence	is	to	retreat	into	a	shell.	But,	as	
Waddell,	notes:	“The	brittle,	protective	façade	may	suddenly	crack,	exposing	an	
absence	of	inner	resources	and	a	panic	about	being	torn	away	from	protective	
structures.”98	
	
Making	sense	of	our	feelings	is	not	just	a	matter	of	getting	in	touch	with	what	is	in	
our	gut.	Emotions	also	have	a	large	cognitive	component.	We	begin	to	understand	
how	our	feelings	connect	with	what	is	happening	around	us.	So,	for	example,	
somebody	hurts	you	and	you	are	angry	and	want	her	to	suffer	in	return.	Or	
somebody	does	something	good	to	you	and	you	feel	gratitude	or	love	and	want	her	
to	feel	good	too.	Making	sense	of	our	feelings	goes	hand	in	hand	with	making	sense	
of	how	we	interact	with	the	world.	Feelings	make	sense	when	they	are	lined	up	with	
the	context	in	which	they	occur.	What’s	more,	as	we	reflect,	our	emotions	change	
and	deepen.	They	become	more	articulated.	For	example,	when	you	love	somebody,	
you	don’t	just	feel	a	flutter	in	your	heart.	You	have	a	heightened	awareness	of	her	
existence.	You	imagine	how	she	is	and	what	she’s	feeling.	You	imagine	being	
together	and	weave	plans	to	make	that	happen.	Given	our	psychological	complexity,	
being	in	touch	with	our	emotions	involves	the	integration	of	what	we	feel	with	what	
we	think.	
	
																																																						
98	Waddell	p54.	
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Being	psychologically	integrated	contributes	to	living	a	meaningful	life	in	two	ways.	
First,	it	enhances	a	person’s	ability	to	make	sense	of	her	life.	Somebody	who	is	
psychologically	integrated	will	be	a	deep	interlocutor	with	herself.	What’s	more,	
because	her	emotions	and	her	intellect	will	be	connected,	she	will	have	a	better	
understanding	of	what	she	cares	about	and	why.		
	
Second,	psychological	integration	enhances	a	person’s	ability	to	engage	effectively	in	
what	she	cares	for.	Rather	than	being	riven	with	conflict,	she	will	be	able	to	harness	
her	energies	and	talents,	and	focus	them	on	what	she	considers	important.	By	
contrast,	a	person	who	is	crimped,	psychologically	impoverished	and	hamstrung	–	let	
alone	somebody	whose	personality	has	splintered	into	a	legion	of	conflicting	shards	-	
will	find	it	hard	to	live	a	meaningful	life.		
	
Making	sense	of	our	past	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	
	
Any	life,	whether	meaningful	or	not,	is	lived	in	the	present.	The	present	is	suspended	
between	past	and	future.	A	meaningful	life	is	one	that	integrates	both	the	past	and	
the	future	in	the	present.	In	this	section,	I	look	at	integration	with	one’s	past;	in	the	
next,	at	integration	with	one’s	future.	
	
We	are	not	just	here	today,	without	any	history.	We	have	a	back-story,	which	
influences	who	we	are.	It	influences	our	values	–	and	what	we	care	about.	As	argued	
in	Chapter	2,	a	radical	egoist	of	the	moment,	who	is	totally	disconnected	from	
history,	will	be	unable	to	make	sense	of	what	she	cares	for.	Think	of	love	for	a	
daughter.	How	can	we	love	her	unless,	on	some	level,	we	are	connected	to	our	past	
life	with	her	–	how	we	had	sex	with	her	mother,	helped	bring	her	up	and	so	forth?	Or	
think	of	patriotism.	How	can	we	make	sense	of	the	fact	that	we	care	for	our	country	
unless	we	are	somehow	connected	to	it	and	its	practices	in	the	past	–	how	we	were	
born	in	or	came	to	the	country,	took	pride	in	its	achievements,	got	angry	if	it	was	
attacked	and	so	forth?		
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Such	connections	do	not	have	to	be	fully	conscious.	We	might	have	suppressed	
various	memories	but	they	could	still	be	operating	at	an	unconscious	level.	However,	
often	the	connections	will	be	conscious	–	or,	at	least,	capable	of	becoming	so.	We	
will	be	able	to	tap	into	our	personal	history	and	find	what	links	us,	say	a	shared	life,	
to	what	we	care	about.	The	more	we	are	conscious	of	these	links,	the	more	we	will	
understand	who	we	are,	how	we	became	what	we	are	and	why	we	care	for	the	
things	we	do	care	about.	
	
Understanding	ourselves	means	telling	stories	about	ourselves.	We	connect	
ourselves	to	our	past	by	joining	the	dots.	In	this	sense,	narrative	is	an	important	part	
of	constructing	a	meaningful	life.	In	constructing	these	stories,	the	virtues	required	
for	achieving	dynamic	harmony	listed	in	the	introductory	chapter	are	important:	
honesty	and	openness.	We	need	to	reflect	truthfully	about	our	lives	and	we	need	to	
be	open	to	ourselves.	Just	telling	stories	that	make	us	feel	good	isn’t	good	enough.	If	
they	are	false,	we	will	be	like	a	mad	person	who	thinks	she	is	Napoleon.		
	
Sometimes	the	third	person	sees	us	more	accurately	than	we	see	ourselves.	Often	
the	interplay	between	the	first	person	and	the	third	person	perspectives	can	help	
the	subject	tell	a	better	story	that	helps	her	integrate	herself	better.	That’s	one	
reason	why	people	find	it	useful	to	talk	about	their	problems	to	their	friends	and	
partners.	That’s	why	they	see	shrinks.	That’s	also	why	they	write	diaries:	by	putting	
something	down	on	paper,	they	get	a	distance	from	it	and	may	be	able	to	look	at	
what	they’ve	written	more	objectively.	
	
Just	because	there	are	false	stories,	which	underpin	people’s	delusions,	doesn’t	
mean	there’s	only	one	way	of	telling	the	story	of	our	lives.	We	can	thread	the	events	
of	our	life	as	we	look	backwards	in	many	ways.	Often	it	makes	sense	to	go	over	the	
past	again	and	again,	telling	and	retelling	the	story	from	different	perspectives	-	or	
going	deeper,	as	we	try	to	make	sense	of	it.	This	is	especially	so	when	we	are	
troubled	or	traumatised.	That’s	why	psychoanalysis	often	involves	the	patient	going	
over	the	same	events	again	and	again	from	different	angles	until	they	no	longer	
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trouble	her.	When	a	past	event	is	no	longer	so	frightening,	she	can	look	at	it	rather	
than	sweeping	it	under	the	carpet	and	then	integrate	it	with	the	rest	of	herself.		
	
This	account	of	how	people	tell	and	retell	stories	to	make	sense	of	their	lives	–	and,	
in	the	process,	integrate	themselves	–	is	not	uncontroversial.	Alasdair	MacIntyre	
makes	the	much	stronger	claim	that	“stories	are	lived	before	they	are	told”99.	He	
says:	“We	all	live	out	narratives	in	our	lives	and…	we	understand	our	own	lives	in	
terms	of	the	narratives	that	we	live	out”.	100	MacIntyre	partly	bases	this	claim	on	the	
assertion	that	personal	identity	and	narrative,	as	well	as	intelligibility	and	
accountability,	are	interdependent	concepts101.	If	this	is	true,	you	can’t	understand	
what	a	person	is	without	understanding	what	a	narrative	is	–	and	vice	versa.		
	
But	this	seems	muddled[.	People	don’t	live	stories;	they	live	lives	and	tell	stories.	It	is	
the	concepts	of	person	and	life,	which	are	interdependent	-	not	those	of	person	and	
narrative,	as	Williams	points	out.	He	argues	that	we	couldn’t	identify	stories	about	a	
person’s	life	unless	we	first	had	a	conception	of	a	person’s	life	“any	more	than	we	
could	recognize	a	story	about	a	penny	unless	we	knew,	more	or	less,	what	a	penny	
was.”102	He	continues:	“We	could	not	use	the	idea	of	narrative	to	model	a	person’s	
life	unless	we	could	independently	pick	out	a	person;	and	since	what	is	in	question	is	
a	person’s	life…	we	need	to	have	that	notion	as	well.”		
	
But	Williams	goes	too	far	in	dismissing	the	importance	of	narrative.	He	quotes	
approvingly	a	remark	from	Kierkegaard’s	journal	for	1843:	“It	is	perfectly	true,	as	
philosophers	say,	that	life	must	be	understood	backwards.	But	they	forget	the	other	
proposition,	that	it	must	be	lived	forwards.	And	if	one	thinks	over	that	proposition,	it	
becomes	more	and	more	evident	that	life	can	never	really	be	understood	in	time	
																																																						
99	MacIntyre	p246.	
100	MacIntyre	p246.	
101	MacIntyre	p	
102	Williams,	2007,	pp306-7.	
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simply	because	at	no	particular	moment	can	I	find	the	necessary	resting	point	from	
which	to	understand	it	–	backwards.”103	
	
True,	there	is	no	final	resting	point	except	death,	at	which	point	I	am	no	longer	in	a	
position	to	understand	my	life.	And	Williams	is	right	to	say	that	“the	idea	of	a	
completed,	unified,	or	coherent	narration	is	of	no	help	in	leading	a	life”104	–	unless	
perhaps	we	believe	there	is	a	God	who	has	already	planned	out	our	lives	for	us	and	
we	buy	into	her	project.	But	there	are	plenty	of	temporary	resting	points	when	we	
are	still	alive,	from	which	we	can	view	our	lives	up	to	that	point	and	interpret	them.	
If	we	are	looking	for	multiple,	partial	interpretations	which	help	make	our	lives	
intelligible	at	different	points	of	time	–	rather	than	searching	for	a	single,	complete,	
true	story	–	telling	such	stories	can	be	very	useful	in	helping	us	lead	our	lives.		
	
So	we	should	concur	with	Williams	in	his	criticism	of	MacIntyre’s	claim	that	
“narratives	are	lived	before	they	are	told”	but	not	throw	the	baby	out	with	the	
bathwater	and	assume	that,	as	we	seek	to	lead	meaningful	lives,	there’s	no	value	in	
telling	stories	about	the	past.	
	
Integrating	with	our	past	doesn’t	just	help	us	make	sense	of	who	we	are,	it	also	helps	
us	engage	effectively	in	what	we	care	for.	Without	knowledge	of	the	past,	we	are	
condemned	to	repeat	the	same	mistakes	again	and	again.	Being	radically	
disconnected	with	our	history	undermines	our	agency.	Imagine	I	love	my	daughter.	
Couldn’t	it	be	enough	that	I	rush	in	and	help	her	if	she	is	in	need?	Well,	in	some	
cases,	that	could	be	sufficient.	Say	she	is	about	to	be	run	over	by	a	bus	and	I	yank	her	
away.	But,	normally,	given	the	complexity	of	our	lives,	having	knowledge	about	her	
will	be	vital	to	caring	for	her.	If	I	rush	in	–	like	the	Americans	invading	Iraq	with	little	
knowledge	of	its	history	–	I	may	thrash	around	like	a	bull	in	a	china	shop,	having	
impact	but	not	in	line	with	my	goals.	Practical	knowledge	is	a	defeasible	criterion	for	
effective	action,	not	just	contingently	connected	to	it.	After	all,	it	wouldn’t	be	
knowledge	if	it	wasn’t	conceptually	linked	to	doing	things	successfully.	 	
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Integrating	our	future	selves	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	
	
We	don’t	just	tell	stories	about	the	past.	We	have	hopes	and	dreams	for	the	future.	
We	also	have	purposes,	projects	and	plans.	All	these	integrate	our	future	selves	with	
our	present	self	and	play	an	important	role	in	giving	our	lives	meaning.		
	
For	a	start,	without	such	projection	of	ourselves	into	the	future,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	
we	could	make	sense	of	our	lives.	If	we	had	no	purposes	at	all,	it’s	not	clear	we	could	
see	any	point	in	living.	We	would,	surely,	think	our	lives	were	meaningless.	
Meanwhile,	our	projects	spell	out	in	more	detail	what	we	care	about.	They	make	our	
purposes	more	concrete.	Finally,	our	plans	set	out	how	we	intend	to	execute	our	
projects	and	achieve	our	purposes.	They	can	be	seen	as	stories	about	how	we	intend	
the	future	to	be.	They	enhance	our	understanding	of	what	we	care	about.	
	
Plans	also	increase	our	ability	to	engage	effectively	with	what	we	care	about.	Of	
course,	our	plans	may	be	thwarted.	But	this	doesn’t	mean	that	the	link	between	
having	a	plan	and	effective	engagement	is	merely	an	empirical	generalisation.	
Rather,	plans	are	a	defeasible	criterion	for	effective	engagement.	After	all,	what	
would	the	word	“plan”	mean	if	it	wasn’t	linked	to	achieving	purposes?	
		
The	importance	of	plans	in	a	meaningful	life	doesn’t,	though,	mean	we	need	a	life-
plan	to	lead	such	lives.	Kauppinen	makes	a	useful	distinction	between	chapters	of	
lives	and	whole	lives.	In	particular	chapters,	we	pursue	projects	–	and,	I	would	add,	
need	plans.	The	question,	then,	is	how	the	various	chapters	can	come	together	to	
form	a	meaningful	life.	He	distinguishes	four	options:	a)	disconnection	b)	repetition	
c)	single	purpose	and	d)	coherence.105		
	
The	first,	“disconnection”,	isn’t	really	a	connection	at	all	–	and	is	relatively	easily	
dismissed.	If	there’s	no	connection	between	the	different	parts	of	one’s	life,	it	
wouldn’t	add	up	and	so	couldn’t	be	meaningful.	The	repetition	option	involves	each	
																																																						
105	Kauppinen	pp365-369.	
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chapter	repeating	the	previous	one.	Kauppinen	rejects	this	on	the	basis	that	such	
Sisyphean	circularity	won’t	be	meaningful	although,	as	I	mention	in	Chapter	3,	there	
could	be	unusual	situations	where	endless	repetition	could	make	sense	to	
somebody.	Kauppinen	dismisses	a	single	purpose	life	on	the	grounds	that,	unless	the	
single	purpose	was	something	really	overarching	like	justice,	it	would	lead	to	the	
atrophying	of	important	aspects	of	oneself	because	one	would	not	develop	one’s	
talents	to	the	full	–	and	doing	so	is	an	essential	part	of	leading	a	meaningful	life.	That	
leaves	Kauppinen	with	a	coherent	life	as	a	model	for	how	a	meaningful	one	is	
integrated,	namely	one	“whose	chapters	build	on	one	another	without	being	
subsumed	under	a	single	goal”	–	and	this	is	the	option	he	plumps	for.	
	
Although	Kauppinen	makes	useful	distinctions	between	ways	of	integrating	the	
chapters	of	one’s	life,	it’s	not	clear	that	he	is	right	to	choose	his	conception	of	a	
coherent	life	as	the	only	way	of	leading	a	meaningful	one.	A	coherent	life,	as	he	
describes	it,	would	be	a	meaningful	one.	But	why	wouldn’t	a	single	purpose	life	be	
meaningful	too?	While	Kauppinen	may	be	right	that	developing	one’s	talents	to	the	
full	would	contribute	to	the	most	meaningful	life,	we	will	never	in	practice	achieve	
such	an	idealistic	goal.	What’s	more,	there	is	a	trade-off	between	putting	lots	of	
energy	into	developing	a	few	of	our	talents	and	spreading	it	thinly	over	all	aspects	of	
ourselves.	Mightn’t	somebody	lead	a	more	meaningful	life	by	devoting	herself	
obsessively	to	a	single	purpose,	such	as	becoming	a	brilliant	tennis	player	or	fighting	
for	democracy	in	China,	rather	than	by	trying	to	be	a	Renaissance	person?	Even	if	
she	may	need	to	develop	some	other	talents	to	achieve	her	main	goal,	she	is	unlikely	
to	become	an	all-rounder.	
	
Kauppinen	also	dismisses	too	quickly	the	idea	that	the	separate	meaningful	projects	
in	each	chapter	of	his	ideal	coherent	life	can	be	subsumed	under	a	single	goal.	What	
about	Gandhi’s	life?	Couldn’t	it	be	seen	as	devoted	to	a	single	extremely	meaningful	
goal	–	securing	Indian	independence	through	nonviolent	means?	Even	if	it	couldn’t,	
mightn’t	there	be	some	higher,	overarching	goal	that	incorporates	both	the	struggle	
for	Indian	independence	and	his	other	purposes?	Why	should	we	dismiss	a	priori	the	
possibility	that	Gandhi	sought	to	give	unity	to	his	life	by	thinking	of	his	various	
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projects	as	aspects	of	a	bigger	struggle	for	justice	through	love	and	truth	–	as,	
indeed,	he	seems	to	have	done?	Or	look	at	Socrates:	the	courageous	soldier,	waspish	
interrogator	of	people	who	thought	they	knew	more	than	they	really	did,	moral	
philosophy	pioneer,	educationalist,	and	role	model	in	death.	We	could	view	these	as	
separate	chapters	of	a	life	that	built	on	one	another.	But	Socrates	himself	seems	to	
have	seen	them	as	more	integrated	than	that.	They	were	all	part	of	an	attempt	to	
seek	wisdom	by	examining	life	and,	hence,	live	a	virtuous	one.	Didn’t	that	give	even	
unity,	and	meaning,	to	his	life?		
	
Kauppinen	also	doesn’t	seem	to	consider	the	possibility	that	one	project	gives	birth	
to	new	ones,	but	not	by	intention	or	purpose	–	although	perhaps	this	is	implicit	in	his	
conception	of	a	coherent	life.	Ex	post,	we	might	well	be	able	to	see	the	threads	that	
linked	our	different	projects	but	we	wouldn’t	plan	all	the	connections	ex	ante.	
Indeed,	it	is	quite	possible	that	many	lives	without	such	life-plans	are	more	
meaningful	than	those	that	have	them.	After	all,	it	is	only	as	we	journey	through	life	
that	we	clarify	to	ourselves	what	we	care	for.	If	we	tried	to	fix	everything	at	the	start,	
we	might	end	up	being	too	rigid	to	see	what	really	mattered.	As	C.P.	Cavafy	wrote:	
“As	you	set	out	for	Ithaka	hope	the	voyage	is	a	long	one,	full	of	adventure,	full	of	
discovery.”106	
	
There	are,	therefore,	several	ways	in	which	the	different	chapters	of	our	lives	can	be	
integrated.	However,	Kauppinen’s	focus	on	chapters	of	lives	building	on	one	another	
contains	an	important	insight,	which	applies	not	just	to	the	way	he	defines	a	
coherent	life.	Our	future	lives	build	on	the	past	in	two	ways	that	are	relevant	for	my	
argument.	First,	through	reflection	about	how	the	chapters	of	our	lives	connect,	we	
deepen	our	understanding	of	the	things	we	care	about	and	why	we	care	about	them.	
Second,	in	our	voyage	of	discovery,	we	can	develop	a	vast	array	of	skills	and	
knowledge	that	can	be	deployed	in	the	future	and	which	then	enhances	our	ability	
to	engage	effectively	with	what	we	care	about.	In	this	way,	integrating	our	lives’	
chapters	contributes	to	their	meaningfulness.	
																																																						
106	Cavafy,	introduction	to	Ithaka.	
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7	
Integrating	with	one’s	world	
	
Leading	a	meaningful	life	involves	transcending	the	egoism	of	the	moment.	We	
reach	out	across	time	and	connect	our	past	and	future	selves,	as	argued	in	the	last	
chapter.	We	also	reach	out	across	space	and	connect	to	our	world.	That’s	the	topic	
of	this	chapter.	
	
I	start	by	explaining	what	I	mean	by	integrating	with	one’s	world.	Humans,	like	other	
creatures,	have	habitats.	Our	world	is	particularly	complex	–	made	up	of	other	
humans,	physical	things	we	have	created,	non-physical	things	we’ve	created	such	as	
culture	and	institutions,	and	our	natural	environment.	I	argue	that	integrating	with	
this	world	involves	caring	for	it	and	being	supported	by	it.	Because	we	don’t	always	
feel	at	home	in	our	world	find,	we	often	need	to	adapt	it	to	our	needs.		
	
I	then	look	specifically	at	how	we	integrate	with	other	individuals.	Given	our	
intensely	social	nature,	relationships	play	a	vital	role	in	our	lives.	Since	this	is	a	vast	
topic,	I	focus	just	on	friendship	and	love,	which	are	hardly	small	subjects.	I	argue	that	
caring	is	a	central	feature	of	friendship	and	love.	I	further	argue	that	loving	another	
means	treating	her	as	an	autonomous	source	of	creativity	and	trying	to	understand	
her.	Friendship	and	love	enable	us	both	to	care	and	to	be	cared	for.	
	
Next	I	look	at	integration	with	our	wider	world.	I	focus	on	two	aspects	of	this	equally	
vast	topic:	work	and	politics.	I	discuss	how	work	can	both	be	supportive	of	an	
individual	and	give	her	things	to	care	for,	but	also	how	it	can	be	alienating.	I	also	
consider	how	the	political	environment	can	support	individuals	but	also	persecute	
them.		
		
Finally,	I	explain	how	integration	with	our	world	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	
There	is	a	direct	link	via	caring,	which	is	central	to	both	integration	with	our	world	
and	leading	a	meaningful	life.	Meanwhile,	feeling	supported	and	at	home	with	our	
world	gives	us	the	resources	to	engage	effectively	with	what	we	care	for,	while	the	
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process	of	understanding	our	world	also	enables	us	to	engage	effectively	with	it.	I	
argue	that	it’s	hard	to	lead	a	meaningful	life	if	we	are	alienated	from	our	world	and	
that	there	are	conceptual	links	between	integration	with	our	world	and	
meaningfulness.	
	
What	does	integrating	with	our	world	mean?	
	
Humans,	like	other	creatures,	have	habitats.	Our	world	is	particularly	complex.	It’s	
not	just	the	natural	environment.	Relations	with	other	humans	are	especially	
important.	Our	families,	friends,	neighbours,	colleagues	and	other	people	are	a	
central	element	of	our	world.	But	given	human	inventiveness,	our	world	consists	of	
much	more	than	nature	and	other	people.	For	a	start,	there	are	the	physical	things	
humans	have	created:	most	obviously	homes,	infrastructure,	artefacts	and	
technology.	And	then	there	are	the	non-physical	things	we’ve	created:	stories,	
music,	bodies	of	knowledge,	laws,	institutions	and	so	forth.	When	I	talk	about	our	
world,	I	mean	all	of	these	things.	However,	because	the	subject	is	so	vast,	I	will	focus	
in	this	chapter	on	three	aspects	of	our	world:	friends	and	people	we	love;	work;	and	
politics.	
	
By	integrating	with	our	world,	I	mostly	mean	two	things:	caring	for	it	and	being	
supported	by	it.	Most	obviously,	we	care	for	other	people.	But	we	also	care	for	
causes	such	as	justice,	activities	such	as	doing	philosophy,	other	animals,	things	of	
beauty,	the	physical	environment	and	so	forth.	Indeed,	we	can	care	for	pretty	much	
anything	in	our	world.	And,	as	argued	in	Chapter	1,	caring	has	three	elements:	
intellectual,	emotional	and	practical.	When	we	care	for	something,	we	think	it	is	
important,	we	have	positive	feelings	towards	it	and	we	are	ready	to	act	to	advance	
its	interests.	Given	the	complexity	of	our	world,	effective	engagement	with	what	we	
care	for	typically	involves	understanding	it,	often	deeply.	
	
Being	supported	by	the	world	means	being	at	home	with	it.	We	can	be	supported	by	
virtually	any	aspect	of	our	world,	most	obviously	by	other	individuals.	But	we	can	
also	feel	at	home	with	physical	nature,	our	built	environment,	our	work,	our	culture,	
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our	political	system	and	so	forth.	When	other	individuals	support	us,	they	typically	
care	for	us	or	even	love	us.	Given	the	complexity	of	our	natures,	a	vital	component	
of	caring	for	us	is	understanding	us.	
	
We	don’t,	though,	always	find	the	world	supportive	and	caring.	Instead	of	being	at	
home	in	it,	we	can	be	alienated	by	it.	Other	people	can	be	abusive,	bullying	and	
manipulative.	Work	can	be	mind-numbing.	Our	political	system	can	be	unjust	or	just	
plain	incompetent.	Like	any	life	form,	we	are	most	effectively	integrated	with	our	
world	when	we	are	well	adapted	to	it.	But	unlike	other	animals,	we	have	a	special	
ability	to	adapt	our	environments	to	our	needs.	We	do	this	in	so	many	ways.	For	
example,	we	typically	put	a	huge	amount	of	effort	into	our	homes	–	not	just	building	
them	so	we	can	withstand	the	ravages	of	the	weather,	but	also	fitting	them	out	so	
that	they	satisfy	a	host	of	refined	needs	and	desires.	When	other	people	–	or	
institutions	created	by	other	people	-	are	not	supportive,	we	may	also	be	able	to	
change	them	to	meet	our	needs.	Sometimes	this	can	be	done	through	persuasion	
but,	at	other	times,	it	may	be	necessary	to	fight.	Integrating	with	one’s	world	is	not	
always	a	conflict-free	process.		
	
Integration	with	other	individuals	
	
Given	our	intensely	social	nature,	relationships	play	a	vital	role	in	our	lives.	A	central	
feature	of	such	relationships	is	caring	for	the	other.	This	is	a	vast	topic	and	here	I	will	
focus	on	friendship	and	love.	
	
This	is	not	to	say	that	all	friendships	are	caring	or	that	all	love	affairs	are	loving.	
Relationships	can	be	abusive	and	manipulative	–	among	supposed	friends	and	lovers	
as	well	as	among	strangers	and	enemies.	However,	when	I	talk	about	integration	
with	other	individuals	as	a	positive	thing,	I	am	focussing	on	healthy	friendships	that	
involve	caring	genuinely	for	the	other.	When	we	care	for	or	love	another,	we	have	
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reasons	to	act	to	advance	her	wellbeing.	We	also	have	what	Wolf	calls	“reasons	to	
live”107.	Meanwhile,	when	another	cares	for	us,	we	are	supported	and	feel	at	home.	
	
It	is	possible	to	distinguish	friendship	from	love,	and	to	distinguish	different	types	of	
love:	for	example,	love	for	children,	parents,	friends	and	partners.	There	are	
differences	in	the	depth	of	various	types	of	friendship;	and	romantic	love	can	be	
especially	intense.	What’s	more,	genuine	romantic	love,	unlike	say	love	for	a	young	
child,	is	a	two-way	street:	you	care	for	the	loved	one	and	she	cares	for	you.	
However,	what	is	common	to	all	types	of	healthy	human	relationships	is	caring	for	
the	other.	It	is	such	caring	which	is	the	main	glue	that	integrates	us	with	society.	
	
Caring	for	others	doesn’t	just	mean	having	positive	feelings	towards	them.	When	we	
care,	the	full	range	of	our	emotions	can	potentially	be	triggered.	We	fear	for	their	
safety,	we	are	angry	when	they	don’t	look	after	themselves,	we	hate	and	feel	
vengeful	towards	those	who	oppress	them,	we	feel	guilty	when	we	haven’t	taken	
care	of	them	ourselves	and	so	forth.	As	argued	already,	caring	isn’t	just	a	feeling.	
There’s	also	a	cognitive	component,	which	articulates	and	enriches	the	emotion.	
What’s	more,	caring	involves	being	prepared	to	act	to	advance	the	wellbeing	of	the	
person	we	love.	
	
Many	philosophers	accept	the	idea	that	caring	is	a	central	feature	of	love	–	and	that	
caring	involves	both	an	emotion	and	a	willingness	to	act	on	the	loved	one’s	behalf.	
Nozick,	for	example,	writes:	“What	is	common	to	all	love	is	this:	Your	own	well-being	
is	tied	up	with	that	of	someone	(or	something)	you	love…	When	something	bad	
happens	to	one	you	love...	something	bad	also	happens	to	you.”108	Meanwhile,	Wolf	
says:	“Though	loving	someone	need	not	in	general	involve	a	desire	actively	to	
benefit	her,	the	disposition	to	benefit,	to	comfort,	to	help	the	loved	one	if	she	needs	
it	follows	directly	from	the	fact	that	you	care	about	her	good.”109	
	
																																																						
107	Wolf,	2015,	191.	
108	Nozick	p68.	
109	Wolf,	2015,	p190.	
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This	view	has	not	gone	unchallenged.	David	Velleman,	for	example,	attacks	the	idea	
that	caring	about	others	“necessarily	coincides	with	caring	for	them	or	taking	care	of	
them…	In	most	cases,	a	love	that	is	inseparable	from	the	urge	to	benefit	is	an	
unhealthy	love,	bristling	with	uncalled-for	impingements.”110	Instead,	he	thinks	love	
is	the	“arresting	awareness	of	[a	person’s]	value”111.	Love	can,	indeed,	involve	a	
heightened	sensitivity	to	a	person’s	value.	But	a	love	that	is	purely	passive	
admiration	or	worship	without	any	active	component	would	not	involve	any	
integration	with	the	other.	I	will	not	be	considering	this	type	of	love.	
	
If	one	cares	genuinely	for	another,	one	also	treats	her	as	an	autonomous	being.	She	
is	an	end	in	herself,	not	an	instrument	to	be	used	to	advance	one’s	own	ends.	Again	
this	is	something	that	many	philosophers	agree	on.	Wolf,	for	example,	says:	“When	
one	loves	someone,	one	values	the	beloved	as	an	end	in	herself.”	112	Treating	
somebody	as	an	autonomous	being	doesn’t	just	mean	you	don’t	dominate	or	
manipulate	her.	One	consequence	of	relating	to	others	this	way	is	that	you	can	learn	
from	her,	whereas	you	couldn’t	if	she	was	totally	under	your	thumb.	As	Nozick	puts	
it:	“Only	someone	who	continues	to	possess	a	nonsubservient	autonomy	can	be	an	
apt	partner	in	a	joint	identity	that	enlarges	and	enhances	your	individual	one.”113	
	
And	precisely	because	caring	for	another	involves	respecting	her	autonomy,	it	also	
means	one	should	not	fuse	with	her.	This	applies	even	to	romantic	love,	where	there	
can	be	a	tendency	to	lose	one’s	identity	in	the	other.	Because	humans	are	
autonomous	sources	of	creativity,	when	they	come	together	in	harmony,	they	need	
to	maintain	some	separateness.	They	need	their	private	zones,	where	they	can	
reflect	and	create	for	themselves,	before	they	share	their	creations	with	each	other	
and	the	wider	world.	Healthy	love	does	not	squish	this	source	of	initiative.	In	other	
words,	it	is	possible	to	integrate	with	another	without	obliterating	either	person’s	
																																																						
110	Velleman	p353.	
111	Velleman	p360.		
112	Wolf,	2015,	p191.	
113	Nozick	p74.	
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individuality.	This	is	in	keeping	with	my	definition	of	integration	in	Chapter	1	as	
creating	a	dynamic	harmony	of	diverse	elements.		
	
An	important	feature	of	all	friendship	and	love	is	wanting	to	understand	the	other.	
The	desire	to	know	is	mainly	an	end	in	itself.	But	there’s	also	an	instrumental	aspect:	
if	we	understand	the	other,	we	will	be	better	able	to	help	her.	In	order	to	know	
another,	we	need	to	be	sensitive	to	her,	but	she	needs	to	open	up	too.	Letting	
somebody	into	our	innermost	sanctum	can	be	risky.	But	relationships	can	be	deeper	
if	we	can	reveal	ourselves	honestly	to	the	other.	People	are	only	willing	to	do	this	if	
they	trust	the	other	–	and,	to	gain	such	trust,	we	typically	need	to	press	the	right	
buttons.	It’s	a	mixture	of	open	sesame	and	the	dance	of	the	seven	veils.	We	say	the	
right	words	and	do	the	right	things,	and	are	rewarded	by	a	gradual	revelation	of	who	
the	other	person	is.	
	
In	romantic	love,	the	desire	to	know	the	other	and	to	be	known	deeply	by	her	is	
especially	intense.	By	knowing	the	other	–	what	she	cares	for,	what	she	fears,	her	
hopes,	how	she	came	to	be	what	she	is	and	so	forth	-	lovers	integrate.	We	integrate	
spatially	with	the	other	by	also	integrating	with	her	temporal	dimension.	Sexual	
intimacy	is	a	special,	albeit	not	the	only	way,	of	achieving	this	deep	understanding.	
As	Nozick	writes:	“In	intimacy,	we	let	another	within	the	boundaries	we	normally	
maintain	around	ourselves...	Through	the	layers	of	public	defenses	and	faces,	
another	is	admitted	to	see	a	more	vulnerable	or	a	more	impassioned	you.”114		
	
Such	deep	love	can	transform	the	lovers.	By	integrating	with	the	other,	one	
integrates	oneself.	The	demons	that	lurk	within	almost	all	of	us	to	a	greater	or	lesser	
extent	can	be	exhumed,	shared	and	found	less	tormenting.	If	one	trusts	the	other	
enough	to	open	up	and	share	those	bits	of	oneself	that	cause	one	pain	–	and	if	she	
repays	that	trust	by	treating	one	sensitively	–	love	can	be	a	healing	experience.		
	
																																																						
114	Nozick	p64.	
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I	will	explore	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	how	such	integration	with	others,	
both	by	caring	for	them	and	being	cared	for	by	them,	contributes	to	a	meaningful	
life.	
	
Integrating	with	our	work	
	
Friendship	and	love	are	not	the	only	ways	we	connect	spatially.	Work	figures	
prominently	in	most	people’s	lives,	absorbing	much	of	our	energy.	How	we	engage	
with	our	work	therefore	normally	has	a	huge	influence	on	how	meaningful	our	lives	
are.	As	with	friendship,	there	are	two	main	aspects:	how	well	supported	are	we	by	
our	work;	and	how	much	do	we	care	about	what	we	are	doing?	These	two	aspects	
often	go	hand	in	hand:	if	we	are	well	supported	at	work,	we	are	more	likely	to	care	
about	what	we	are	doing	there.	
	
E.	F.	Schumacher	attributes	to	Camus	the	following	quote:	“Without	work,	all	life	
goes	rotten.	But	when	work	is	soulless,	life	stifles	and	dies.”115	This	brings	out	neatly	
how	we	need	to	deploy	our	energies	in	some	productive	way,	although	not	
necessarily	in	paid	work,	in	order	for	our	lives	to	be	meaningful;	but	that	there	are	
also	so	many	ways	in	which	work	can	be	meaningless.		
	
People	typically	work	in	order	to	make	money.	But	if	we	consider	work	to	be	only	
about	earning	money,	we	are	likely	to	be	alienated	from	it.	For	a	start,	the	workplace	
is	an	environment	that	can	be	supportive	or	abusive.	Bosses	can	motivate	their	staff,	
unleash	their	creativity	and	help	them	develop	their	talents;	alternatively,	they	can	
oppress	and	exploit	them.	Developing	somebody’s	talents	isn’t	simply,	or	even	
mainly,	a	matter	of	giving	her	formal	training,	although	that	is	normally	important.	It	
is	also	a	matter	of	stretching	her	mind	and	allowing	her	to	contribute	her	own	ideas	
to	how	to	do	her	work.	It	is	about	treating	an	employee	as	an	autonomous	source	of	
creativity,	rather	than	as	somebody	who	is	to	be	told	what	to	do.		
																																																						
115	Schumacher	p4.	
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Meanwhile,	colleagues	can	become	friends	and	care	for	us,	or	they	can	work	against	
our	interests.	Bosses	cannot	always	ensure	that	their	employees	get	on	with	one	
another,	but	they	can	have	an	impact	in	this	area	too.	In	particular,	they	can	
establish	systems	that	minimise	bullying	and	harassment.		
It’s	not	just	whether	work	supports	the	individual	that	matters;	it’s	also	whether	the	
individual	cares	for	her	work.	In	the	so-called	caring	professions,	the	connection	can	
seem	obvious.	Doctors,	nurses	and	carers	help	those	who	are	sick,	teachers	help	
people	learn,	and	so	forth.	On	the	other	hand,	the	mere	fact	that	one	works	in	a	
caring	profession	doesn’t	mean	one	has	a	meaningful	job.	There	are	many	people	
who	are	alienated	from	their	work	because	of	difficult	working	conditions,	bad	
management,	inadequate	resources	or	whatever.	
	
Equally,	many	people	who	work	in	jobs	that	aren’t	considered	caring	professions	can	
care	deeply	about	what	they	do.	They	can	take	pride	in	the	goods	or	services	they	
produce	if	these	are	genuinely	valuable.	Entrepreneurs	who	create	businesses,	
managers	who	run	efficient	organisations	and	get	the	best	out	of	their	people,	
inventors	who	develop	new	technologies	and	intellectuals	who	produce	new	ideas	
can	take	pride	in	their	work	too.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	easy	to	feel	alienated	from	one’s	work	if	one	cannot	see	how	
the	final	good	or	service	one	is	producing	–	or	the	specific	role	one	is	playing	in	the	
enterprise	-	is	useful.	One	can	feel	one	is	merely	a	wage	slave,	even	if	one	is	a	highly-
paid	worker.	For	example,	during	the	global	credit	crunch	of	2007	and	2008,	few	
traders	and	bankers	could	give	a	coherent	account	of	whether	what	they	were	doing	
contributed	to	the	human	good	and,	if	so,	how.	They	were	often	so	focussed	on	one	
small	part	of	the	giant	financial	machine	that	they	couldn’t	see	the	big	picture.	
Lacking	a	vision	of	how	their	work	was	socially	useful,	they	concentrated	on	what	
their	work	could	give	to	them	–	and	that	probably	enhanced	the	greed	endemic	the	
financial	system.	Indeed,	it	was	partly	because	hardly	anybody	could	see	the	big	
picture	that	the	machine	ran	amok.	As	Adair	Turner,	chair	of	the	UK’s	Financial	
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Services	Authority,	said,	the	financial	sector	had	“swollen	beyond	its	socially	useful	
size.”116	
	
Bosses,	again,	can	play	an	important	role	in	enabling	their	employees	to	see	the	big	
picture	–	provided,	of	course,	that	they	can	see	it	themselves.	They	can	explain	their	
strategy	and	invite	their	employees	to	contribute	their	thoughts	about	it.	Doing	so	
not	only	enables	the	employee	to	see	how	her	specific	activity	fits	into	some	larger	
valuable	activity;	it	can	also	inspire	the	employee	and	get	her	buy-in	to	what	she	is	
doing.	Such	an	employee	will	not	be	alienated	from	her	work.	
	
Integrating	with	our	political	environment	
	
The	other	aspect	of	our	wider	world	I	wish	to	consider	is	integrating	with	is	our	
political	environment.	This,	I	take	to	include:	the	system	of	government	we	live	
under;	the	laws	of	our	land	and	whether	they	are	obeyed;	and	the	people	in	power	
and	the	policies	they	pursue.	I	also	include	our	relations	with	other	countries,	for	
example	whether	we	are	at	peace	or	war	with	them.		
	
The	nature	of	our	political	environment	will	have	a	huge	influence	on	how	well	
supported	we	are	as	individuals.	Do	we	feel	at	home	in	our	country	or	are	we	
alienated?	Political	systems	vary	from	democracies	which	treat	their	citizens	as	
reasonably	autonomous	beings	to	tyrannies	which	treat	their	people	as	cannon	
fodder.	Politicians	vary	from	those	who	act	reasonably	honestly	to	those	who	lie,	
cheat	and	manipulate.	And,	of	course,	the	range	of	laws	and	policies	governments	
adopt	varies	considerably.	Laws,	taxes	and	the	provision	of	public	services	can	be	
reasonably	fair	or	discriminatory.	What’s	more,	government	can	be	more	or	less	
efficient	–	and	that	matters	too.	
	
This	is	not	the	place	to	consider,	in	any	detail,	what	sorts	of	political	environment	are	
likely	to	be	the	most	supportive.	However,	I	think	Martha	Nussbaum	is	largely	right	
																																																						
116	Interview	with	Prospect	Magazine.	
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to	say	that:	“Leaders	of	countries	often	focus	on	national	economic	growth	alone,	
but	their	people,	meanwhile,	are	striving	for	something	different:	meaningful	lives	
for	themselves.”117	If	so,	the	question	then	becomes	what	do	people	need	in	order	
to	live	meaningful	lives	and	what	sorts	of	political	systems	are	most	likely	to	support	
their	quest.		
	
Our	political	environment	doesn’t	just	determine	how	supported	we	are;	it	is	also	a	
field	which	many	individuals	feel	passionate	about.	They	devote	their	talents	and	
energy	to	causes,	great	and	small.	They	work	to	improve	their	communities,	they	get	
involved	in	politics	and	they	fight	against	injustices	of	numerous	types.	In	doing	this,	
they	are	seeking	to	adapt	their	political	environment	to	their	vision	of	a	better	world.	
	
Insofar	as	one	is	fighting	injustice,	one	can	rarely	avoid	conflict.	But	what	is	the	best	
way	of	conducting	a	struggle	in	order	to	achieve	a	just	society?	Do	the	ends	justify	
the	means,	as	Marxists	and	Machiavellians	argue?	Or	do	dishonest,	exploitative	and	
violent	means	ultimately	corrupt	the	end?	These	are	huge	questions	that	it	is	not	
possible	to	answer	in	this	thesis.	The	only	point	I	wish	to	make	here	is	that	there	are	
alternatives	to	the	Marxist/Machiavellian	approach	which	are	likely	to	lead	to	a	
person	being	more	integrated	with	her	world.		
	
In	representative	democracies,	the	alternative	is	for	activists	to	behave	with	integrity	
and	for	voters	to	elect	politicians	who	themselves	act	with	integrity.	In	this	context,	I	
consider	integrity	to	mean	broadly	speaking	sticking	to	one’s	core	principles,	
practising	what	one	preaches	and	keeping	one’s	promises.	Voters	should	care	that	
politicians	behave	with	integrity	because,	when	politicians	don’t,	it’s	normally	a	
warning	sign	that	they	are	acting	in	their	own	interests	rather	than	in	the	interests	of	
the	population	at	large.	Moreover,	a	lack	of	integrity	by	politicians	can	alienate	
voters	from	the	political	system.	This	corrupts	the	democratic	process	and	so	can	
open	the	way	for	demagogues	to	take	power.118	By	contrast,	if	politicians	are	honest	
with	voters	and	treat	them	as	autonomous	beings	rather	than	trying	to	manipulate	
																																																						
117	Nussbaum	p1.	
118	I	expand	on	these	ideas	in	one	of	my	MPhil	Stud	essays,	Dixon	2016c.	
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them,	the	electorate	is	more	likely	to	buy	into	the	political	system	and	feel	at	home	
with	it.	This	constitutes	being	well	integrated	with	their	political	environment	under	
my	definition	of	integration.	
	
In	more	dramatic	cases,	where	there	is	no	democracy	to	start	off	with,	an	alternative	
to	violent	revolution	is	Gandhian-style	nonviolent	struggle.	Gandhi’s	theory	of	
political	action,	Satyagraha,	emphasises	improving	our	world	while	inflicting	the	
minimum	amount	of	destruction	in	the	process.	Although	Satyagraha	is	usually	
translated	as	nonviolent	struggle,	its	etymological	meaning	is	“truth-force”.	My	
interpretation	of	his	philosophy	of	political	change	is	that	truth	figures	in	three	ways.	
First,	there	is	being	true	to	oneself,	or	integrity.	Second,	there	is	being	truthful	to	
others,	or	honesty.	Third,	there	is	being	truthful	to	the	situation,	or	realism.	It	is	the	
combination	of	these	three	types	of	truthfulness	that	has	sometimes	succeeded	in	
righting	injustices	without	causing	massive	collateral	damage.	
	
There	is	sometimes	an	assumption	that	India’s	independence	struggle	was	a	special	
case	and	that	resorting	to	violence	is	normally	the	most	effective	way	of	winning	
such	battles.	However,	this	doesn’t	seem	to	be	borne	out	by	research.	For	example,	
Maria	Stephan	and	Erica	Chenoweth	examined	323	violent	and	nonviolent	resistance	
campaigns	from	1900	to	2006	and	discovered	that	53	percent	of	the	nonviolent	
campaigns	succeeded,	roughly	double	the	26	percent	success	rate	for	violent	ones.	
They	said	the	relative	success	of	nonviolent	struggle	was	because	it	enhanced	a	
struggle’s	“domestic	and	international	legitimacy”	while	“regime	violence	against	
nonviolent	movements	is	more	likely	to	backfire	against	the	regime.”	119	
	
Nonviolent	struggle	will	not,	of	course,	always	win	the	day.	But	insofar	as	it	does	
succeed,	people	are	likely	to	feel	more	at	home	with	their	fellow	citizens	and	so	
integrated	with	their	world	than	if	their	country	is	smashed	up	in	a	violent	frenzy.		
	
	 	
																																																						
119	Stephan	and	Chenoweth	pp8-9.	
	
	 89	
How	integrating	with	one’s	world	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life	
	
I	have	considered	three	main	aspects	of	how	we	integrate	with	our	world:	friendship	
and	love;	work;	and	politics.	I	have,	in	each	case,	sought	to	show	how	integrating	
with	our	world	means	caring	for	it,	understanding	it	and	being	supported	by	it.	I	now	
wish	to	show	how	such	integration	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	Remember	how	
I	defined	a	meaningful	life	in	Chapter	1	as	one	effectively	engaged	in	things	we	care	
for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	
	
Caring	is	central	both	to	how	we	integrate	with	the	world	and	my	definition	of	
meaningfulness.	If	we	love	our	friends,	family	and	partners,	our	lives	will	have	
meaning.	If	we	care	deeply	about	the	work	we	do,	that	too	will	give	meaning	to	our	
lives.	So	will	our	engagement	in	political	causes.		
	
Understanding	our	world,	meanwhile,	helps	us	make	sense	of	ourselves	as	beings	in	
our	world.	What’s	more,	such	knowledge	is	often	practical.	As	such,	this	helps	us	
engage	effectively	with	what	we	care	for	–	and	that	too	enhances	the	
meaningfulness	of	our	lives.	We	are	better	able	to	help	our	friends,	family	and	
lovers;	better	able	to	be	effective	in	our	work;	and	better	able	to	advance	the	causes	
we	care	for.	As	argued	in	Chapter	6,	the	link	between	practical	knowledge	and	
effective	engagement	is	a	conceptual	one,	not	just	an	empirical	generalisation.	
		
Finally,	being	supported	by	our	world	gives	us	resources	to	lead	a	meaningful	life.	A	
good	family	life,	deep	romantic	love,	a	workplace	that	enhances	our	skills	and	
unleashes	our	creativity,	and	a	political	environment	that	supports	rather	than	
persecutes	us	will	all	normally	enhance	our	ability	to	engage	effectively	with	what	
we	care	for.	Again	this	is	not	an	empirical	generalisation.	There	is	a	conceptual	link	
between	being	supported	and	being	able	to	act.	Of	course,	there	are	abnormal	
cases,	when	somebody	who	is	thwarted	by	her	environment	triumphs	or	when	
somebody	supported	by	her	environment	gains	no	benefit	from	this.	But	it	would	be	
hard	to	understand	what	being	supported	meant	if	it	didn’t	normally	enhance	our	
ability	to	act.	Being	supported	is	a	defeasible	criterion	for	effective	action.	This	is	
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another	way	in	which	integration	with	one’s	world	contributes	to	a	meaningful	life.	
By	contrast,	if	we	care	for	nothing	in	our	world,	don’t	understand	it	and	are	
alienated	it,	we	will	not	be	connected	to	our	environment	and	it	will	then	be	hard	for	
us	to	lead	meaningful	lives.	
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8	
Conclusion	
	
Let	me	recap	my	argument.	I	have	defined	a	meaningful	life	as	one	that	is	effectively	
engaged	in	things	we	care	for,	which	we	can	see	we	have	reasons	to	care	for.	My	
definition	of	meaningfulness	has	subjective	aspects:	one	cares	for	things	and	one	can	
make	sense	of	what	one	cares	for.	It	also	has	objective	aspects:	there	are	reasons	for	
caring	for	these	things	and	one	is	effectively	engaged	with	them.	A	meaningful	life,	
therefore,	is	one	that	adds	up	both	subjectively	and	objectively.	
	
I	then	argued	that	we	have	no	reason	to	pursue	a	happy	life	unless	our	conception	of	
happiness	embraces	meaningfulness	and	that	we	have	no	reason	to	pursue	an	
ethical	life	if	that	alienates	us	from	our	raison	d’etre.	I	argued	that	if	meaningfulness	
takes	its	proper	place	in	our	conceptions	of	happiness	and	morality,	we	will	be	less	
likely	to	be	pulled	in	different	directions.	This	is	the	first	part	of	the	answer	to	my	
thesis	question:	to	what	extent	is	a	meaningful	life	an	integrated	one?	
	
I	then	looked	at	the	issue	from	the	other	direction:	to	what	extent	an	integrated	life	
contributes	to	a	meaningful	one.	I	argued	that	integration	enables	us	to	understand	
better	why	the	things	we	care	for	matter	and	to	engage	more	effectively	in	
promoting	their	wellbeing.	This	is	the	second	part	of	the	answer	to	my	thesis	
question.	
	
At	various	points,	I	mentioned	that	the	distinctions	between	integrating	agency,	
integrating	oneself	and	integrating	with	one’s	world	are	not	sharp.	I	now	wish	to	
point	out	a	few	of	the	connections.	For	a	start,	integrating	agency	and	integrating	
oneself	are	two	aspects	of	integrating	a	person.	Although	I	have	put	principles,	
values,	actions,	judgments	and	what	one	cares	about	in	the	integrating	agency	
bucket,	with	emotions,	desires,	memories,	plans	and	so	forth	in	the	integrating	
oneself	bucket,	this	is	for	ease	of	explanation.	There	is	clearly	a	lot	of	mixing	
between	the	buckets:	an	integrated	person	will	have	her	actions	aligned	with	her	
emotions,	her	plans	matched	up	with	her	principles	and	what	she	cares	about	in	
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harmony	with	her	memories.	The	deep	reflection	that	leads	to	integration	will	range	
across	all	these	areas.	What’s	more,	the	integration	of	a	person	and	integration	with	
her	world	are	intimately	linked.	A	person	who	is	psychologically	integrated	will	find	it	
easier	to	love.	A	person	who	lives	in	a	caring	family	and	a	fair	society	is	more	likely	to	
be	psychologically	balanced.	A	person	who	is	willing	to	change	in	response	to	honest	
and	fair	reflection	about	her	family	and	society	is	likely	to	become	more	integrated	
in	herself	and	with	those	around	her.		
	
I	have	argued	that	a	meaningful	life	involves	transcending	the	egoism	of	the	moment	
by	connecting	in	time	and	space:	reaching	out	to	one’s	past	and	future	selves	is	the	
temporal	dimension,	while	reaching	out	to	others	and	the	wider	world	is	the	spatial	
one.	But	the	two	dimensions	can’t	be	separated.	We	can	only	pursue	our	purposes	
via	projects,	supported	by	plans,	if	we	engage	with	the	world	around	us	and	typically	
with	other	people	too.	Meanwhile,	loving	somebody	or	something	doesn’t	just	mean	
connecting	to	them	now;	it	also	involves	appreciating	their	history	and	taking	care	of	
their	future.		
	
A	person’s	life	adds	up	subjectively	when	she	knows	who	she	is,	where	she	comes	
from,	what	she	cares	for,	what	she	stands	for	and	what	her	plans	are.	All	these	
things	reinforce	each	other.	Her	life	is	objectively	meaningful	when	she	can	harness	
her	talents	and	energies	and	make	things	happen	that	are	valuable.	Being	integrated	
as	an	agent,	integrated	with	herself	and	integrated	with	her	world	will	all	enable	this.	
Instead	of	being	a	fragmented	person	who	is	pulled	in	different	directions	by	
conflicting	forces,	she	will	be	a	unified	person	with	a	deep	understanding	of	the	
things	she	cares	for	and	better	able	to	advance	their	wellbeing.		
	
Meaningfulness	comes	in	degrees.	So	does	integration.	Somebody	can	have	a	more	
or	less	meaningful	life,	and	be	more	or	less	integrated.	However,	in	general,	
somebody	who	is	integrated	in	the	ways	I	have	described	will	have	a	meaningful	life.		
She	will	be	track-happy.	She	will	also	be	well	placed	to	achieve	good	things	in	her	life	
and	be	buffet-happy.	Of	course,	she	will	not	be	omnipotent	and	bad	luck	or	the	
actions	of	other	autonomous	agents	may	frustrate	her	plans.	So	neither	success	nor	
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buffet-happiness	is	guaranteed.	But	such	a	life	will	still	be	the	most	meaningful	one	
she	can	live.	
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